mjg59

74 ms·

901.
by mjg59 5y ago
> The CFAA covers use of a computer that extends beyond the authorized use. Right. I have valid credentials for a system which grant me read access to a bunch of binaries. Are you saying that I need explicit authorisation to copy those?
902.
by mjg59 5y ago
> So the person copying it to you can be targeted by Microsoft, and if you copied Windows without that user's permission, you are probably going to be charged with a violation of the CFAA. If I'm given permission to use a compu
903.
by mjg59 5y ago
Why would I have to accept the contract to obtain the software? I can just copy it off another machine where someone else accepted the contract.
904.
by mjg59 5y ago
What law would they use to stop you? Just modify the binary to skip the agreement. If they don't hold copyright over the code then you're not breaking the law in doing so.
905.
by mjg59 5y ago
If copyright didn't apply to software, why would you agree to the EULA?
906.
by mjg59 5y ago
I didn't say otherwise? The comment I replied to said: > there will not be derivative works of closed source at least from a copilot use case point of view. which is inaccurate, since many public repositories on Github aren't o
907.
by mjg59 5y ago
What existing law, precedent, and circumstances demonstrate that the output of an ML model is a derived work of the training data?
908.
by mjg59 5y ago
I'm not saying we should ignore GPL violations. I'm saying we should consider whether the greater benefit for free software would be in them not being violations in the first place.
909.
by mjg59 5y ago
The majority of public repositories on Github aren't "open source" - there's no associated license that grants you any right to use or modify the code. Copilot is trained on them regardless.
910.
by mjg59 5y ago
It can't be violating if it's not a derived work, and if courts conclude that the output of an ML model isn't derivative of its training material (which is, I understand, the current situation in the US) then it doesn't
911.
by mjg59 5y ago
What trade secret controls do you imagine could be used against users? Once you've lawfully obtained a piece of software, trade secret law doesn't protect against reverse engineering.
912.
by mjg59 5y ago
A 5x, which ended badly when they mostly died due to a hardware design issue.
913.
by mjg59 5y ago
Spain disputes that the land the airport is on was covered by the Treaty of Utrecht.
914.
by mjg59 5y ago
Unless your firmware vendor updates the microcode embedded in your firmware and you update to that newer firmware, the new microcode is loaded at runtime and won't persist over power cycles. The old microcode is still available, yes.
915.
by mjg59 5y ago
No. Every TPM has a factory-supplied unique key called the endorsement key, but every other key on the TPM is randomly generated on the TPM. The keys you actively use /can/ be tied back to the endorsement key, but there's no
916.
by mjg59 5y ago
Diverse double compilation should allow a demonstration that the toolchain is trustworthy.
917.
by mjg59 5y ago
An object in direct sunlight is going to get hotter than the ambient air temperature.
918.
by mjg59 5y ago
Not just that - if customers are already asking for an existing part, it's easier to sell them something that pretends to be that part than it is to convince them to change to something else. They'll notice if you suddenly start s
919.
by mjg59 5y ago
Yes, if you're using WDS, otherwise you only have three addresses used. Since you need the transmitting device to populate the DA, you can't just turn on bridging on a client and have everything work - you need both ends of the li
920.
by mjg59 5y ago
On wired ethernet, a packet contains the MAC address of the destination host. Switches across the network keep track of which port a given MAC address is associated with and forward it appropriately. Wifi doesn't have the same concept
921.
by mjg59 5y ago
The article describes the plan for this. For printers that don't implement IPP Anywhere natively, an app can present a local IPP Anywhere implementation and bridge that to the printer's native protocol. Abstracting the native prot
922.
by mjg59 5y ago
> But if you have a way to pop the machine into redstate you can exfiltrate the secret key and actually sign microcode changes that will be accepted as legit. No. The article mentions that the key required to decrypt microcode updates ca
923.
by mjg59 5y ago
There's a bunch of cases where you want these devices to be resilient against attackers who have physical access to the system. That means it has to be impossible to simply re-flash them given physical access, unless you can detect tha
924.
by mjg59 5y ago
Pretty much every x86 system with a TPM and UEFI Secure Boot can have the secure boot keys swapped out by the owner.
925.
by mjg59 5y ago
TPM-based remote attestation doesn't involve SGX at all. If Boot Guard is enabled then you're trusting the ACM to perform its measurements correctly, but that's a not overly large amount of code that can be disassembled and v
926.
by mjg59 5y ago
The UEFI variable store is typically just a region of the flash chip that stores the firmware. It's not impossible that some systems perform some sort of integrity validation, but I haven't seen that in the wild.
927.
by mjg59 5y ago
"Never" is a strong word, but given that they're already previous generation devices and haven't been properly compromised yet, it wouldn't surprise me.
928.
by mjg59 5y ago
Where are the hacks that let you run arbitrary code on an Xbox One running current firmware?
929.
by mjg59 5y ago
> Well, you're comparing hashes to ones online, can't you put the password hash online? (sorry, I am very ignorant of the situation here and am asking stupid simple questions) If the system is compromised then it can just repor
930.
by mjg59 5y ago
The short version is "It's complicated". Most ARM cores have a feature called TrustZone. Effectively, there's a set of system resources that are allocated to TrustZone and not accessible from the normal world. Various ev

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