mjg59

55 ms·

811.
by mjg59 5y ago
They're merged, and if you're running a current version of Thermal Daemon then things /should/ be better than they were. But most policies don't actually explicitly modify the throttling temperature MSR, and Windows
812.
by mjg59 5y ago
Trivial example: you want to avoid the exterior of the laptop getting hot enough to be uncomfortable for the user. If you support adaptive policies, you can read the skin temperature sensor and then only throttle the CPU if that's abov
813.
by mjg59 5y ago
The conflict between the market wanting systems that are (a) as small and light as possible and (b) as fast as possible means that modern systems are designed to have close integration between the platform and the OS to perform appropriate
814.
by mjg59 5y ago
MMS is a vehicle into your phone's media decoding stack, and there have definitely been vulnerabilities demonstrated using MMS as the delivery mechanism (eg, https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2020/07/mms-e
815.
by mjg59 5y ago
I suspect that the majority of people turning up at my front gate just want to drop off the package they're carrying as quickly as possible rather than waiting for me to put on a mask and walk down two flights of stairs for the sake of
816.
by mjg59 5y ago
One thing the article doesn't really cover is how Hayes solved the problem of it being extremely hard to avoid +++ appearing in th data stream - Hayes required that there be a pause where no data was sent both before after the +++ befo
817.
by mjg59 5y ago
Most SSO solutions don't verify device identity or state, so you're not ensuring that the connection is coming from a computer you trust running software you trust.
818.
by mjg59 5y ago
For the avoidance of doubt when anyone finds this at some random point in the future: sorry, this was me.
819.
by mjg59 5y ago
If you have the institutional buy-in to handle auth being done at the proxy level, that gets you away from having to implement SSO per service. I agree that doing this well isn't trivial, but in the long term there's a reasonably
820.
by mjg59 5y ago
It's not clear to me that a VPN endpoint is a meaningfully smaller attack surface than an authenticating proxy? The VPN approach has a couple of downsides: * You don't have a central location to perform more granular access contro
821.
by mjg59 5y ago
$ host buganizer.corp.google.com buganizer.corp.google.com is an alias for uberproxy.l.google.com. uberproxy.l.google.com has address 142.250.141.129 uberproxy.l.google.com has IPv6 address 2607:f8b0:4023:c0b::81 Google's corp services
822.
by mjg59 5y ago
Flash needs to be writable at runtime - things like ram training parameters are stored there.
823.
by mjg59 5y ago
Ah, so a signed firmware bootblock that runs something user signed? I wrote the original version of the boot Shim that Linux distros use for bridging from the Microsoft root of trust to the distro one, so let me know if there's any way
824.
by mjg59 5y ago
Are you planning to ship systems that don't have Boot Guard enforcement enabled? I've done a couple of Coreboot ports (I'm typing from a laptop that's running my build) and the Framework is an extremely interesting targe
825.
by mjg59 5y ago
It's not guaranteed, but it's going to last longer than the current free tier, so?
826.
by mjg59 5y ago
Google employees are entitled to a discounted tier ($0.75 per user per year, I think), and that will continue even if you leave the company.
827.
by mjg59 5y ago
> BIOS flashing from the OS has been a thing for a long, long time now. Heck my XPS 13 running Linux even gets BIOS updates from apt-get. UEFI capsule updates are triggered by the OS, but don't occur in the OS. The updates are copie
828.
by mjg59 5y ago
It's not the largest, but against advanced targets who have a chance of detecting other attack vectors, it's a realistic threat. "We don't need this kind of security" is probably true for specific (and even broad) d
829.
by mjg59 5y ago
Ok, as promised, I wrote up my thoughts at https://mjg59.dreamwidth.org/58424.html . I think with a few small tweaks Boot Guard could be turned into something that offered the same security benefits without being as user-ho
830.
by mjg59 5y ago
> it would not be permanent If it's not permanent then it doesn't work - any plausible mechanism for allowing it to be disabled can be triggered by whoever's replacing your firmware (which makes AMD's approach somewha
831.
by mjg59 5y ago
A computer that requires the firmware to be replaced to boot Linux is already at the point where 99% of users are just not going to install Linux (I've personally ported Coreboot to two of my laptops, and even I would never buy hardwar
832.
by mjg59 5y ago
Windows is signed with different keys to all other third party UEFI code, so in theory you could ship a system that trusted Windows but not anything else. "Anything else" would include the option ROMs on GPUs, so you'd never
833.
by mjg59 5y ago
You're conflating two different things - AMD's Platform Security Processor (PSP) and Platform Secure Boot (PSB). PSP is broadly equivalent to Intel's ME, but lives on the CPU package rather than in the chipset. PSB is equival
834.
by mjg59 5y ago
When you connect to a remote machine, you send traffic to a specific port on that remote machine but also from a specific port on your machine. The remote port would probably be well-known (eg, port 80 on TCP is the well known port for HT
835.
by mjg59 5y ago
The described functionality of Pluton doesn't allow it to prevent you from booting unsigned code. Your system firmware would need to ask Pluton for permission, and if it doesn't do so then no number of Pluton firmware updates is g
836.
by mjg59 5y ago
If you've got to the point where Google is specifically pushing you a modified app, Google could just push a backdoored keyboard update that exfiltrated all your keyboard inputs instead. Why bother targeting a single app when you can g
837.
by mjg59 5y ago
This is true even in a decentralised world - even if the protocol can be guaranteed to be secure, you could still push a modified binary to an individual.
838.
by mjg59 5y ago
Google is pushing towards that, but for apps that already exist you can absolutely still upload stuff signed with your own keys.
839.
by mjg59 5y ago
> But people get it from the official app stores It doesn't matter what "people" do - what matters is whether a third party can obtain the same package and verify it. And they can! > This claim isn't true - they ca
840.
by mjg59 5y ago
> Is there an easy way to get a direct HTTPS download link from the Play Store? Easy? No. But you can grab the apk from any number of third party download sites and verify the signature, and you can also just download it from https:&#x2

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