mjg59

27 ms·

511.
by mjg59 3y ago
The problem with tying encryption to the serial number is that it becomes harder to distribute the material in the first place - either you need to know the serial number of the device you're going to put a drive into so you can pre-en
512.
by mjg59 3y ago
For context: this document describes the design goals for the successor chipset to the AGA chipset shipped in the Amiga 1200 and 4000. If you watch the Deathbed Vigil video of the last day at Commodore there's a brief shot of a prototy
513.
by mjg59 4y ago
This is largely solved with approaches such as Flatpak or Snap, but graphics drivers are still an issue - they're expected to be supplied by the distribution, and components of them end up in-process in the application even if the rest
514.
by mjg59 4y ago
If you can dump the contents of memory then you have the key (after all, the CPU has to be able to encrypt and decrypt the material, so it has to be available).
515.
by mjg59 4y ago
A stronger KDF would plausibly have protected him even if his password was embarrassingly deterministic.
516.
by mjg59 4y ago
argon2i is a strict improvement over PBKDF2, but sadly grub2 doesn't support any argon2 KDFs right now.
517.
by mjg59 4y ago
I don't want to overstate this - it's absolutely possible that the password was obtained through some other mechanism. But a weak password (even if it's 20 characters long!) as the input to PBKDF2 is something that can plausi
518.
by mjg59 4y ago
The presumption that 20 characters is any meaningful amount of entropy is based on the password actually being somewhat random, and there's no fundamental reason to believe that that's true. I tend towards brute forcing not being
519.
by mjg59 4y ago
Archive link for anyone who's stuck behind some sort of captcha (sorry, I don't make the CDN decisions here) https://archive.is/5hu2x
520.
by mjg59 4y ago
You usually can't take existing firmware and run it on a new CPU, because the new CPU requires different bringup code anyway. Take a look at https://github.com/coreboot/coreboot/tree/master/src/
521.
by mjg59 4y ago
That's fine for orderly transitions, but if you're worried that your private host keys have been compromised then (a) you can't trust any new transitions and (b) if the new private keys are already on the systems then have th
522.
by mjg59 4y ago
I'm talking about the firmware on the motherboard. Your BIOS is CPU-specific - if a future CPU changes the default CPU mode, you simply update your BIOS code to match while you're doing the rest of the work you need to do for that
523.
by mjg59 4y ago
Under this scenario you wouldn't need to do anything if the site rotates their key - the new key would be presented with a certificate signed with the same CA key. But no clients support doing this kind of semi-automated enrollment at
524.
by mjg59 4y ago
The format doesn't support intermediates.
525.
by mjg59 4y ago
No, I'd like sites to be able to present a CA to trust rather than a static key to trust and then be able to rotate their keys without triggering identity change notices.
526.
by mjg59 4y ago
Firmware needs to know CPU-specific details (it needs to be able to program the memory controller, for instance), so skipping (or inverting) the real mode to protected mode code in the firmware is just another step in porting to a new platf
527.
by mjg59 4y ago
The PSP sets up the memory controller before the x86 cores are started. It's not implausible that the PSP has some sort of cache as RAM stage, but that's before Coreboot starts.
528.
by mjg59 4y ago
> the Intel ME/AMD PSP can't be updated Yes they can, their firmware is in the same flash as the system firmware.
529.
by mjg59 4y ago
> I see mgj is still complaining about people being able to boot in modes other than UEFI I'm not sure how you get that impression, since I'm mostly talking about what happens before you get to that point. Having the CPU hand o
530.
by mjg59 4y ago
No, firmware needs to hand off in the state the software you're booting needs. That says nothing about the mode the CPU needs to be in when it starts running firmware.
531.
by mjg59 4y ago
> I take it that that OS is Minix? It's the Minix kernel, I don't think the userland contains much Minix. > Wait... How can an attacker replace the BIOS? If you have physical access you can just attach to the flash directly
532.
by mjg59 4y ago
Simultaneously lacking real mode and paging support did kind of restrict it to embedded use cases
533.
by mjg59 4y ago
That's an argument for including support for real mode, rather than for coming up in it. Modern systems booting legacy software are already transitioning into protected mode to run the UEFI stack, and then switching back to real mode b
534.
by mjg59 4y ago
GPU option ROMs no longer make assumptions about legacy setup - UEFI option ROMs are executed in either 32-bit or 64-bit mode, and there's no need to implement any of the legacy VGA compatibility. Same for PXE, which just hooks into th
535.
by mjg59 4y ago
It was initially ARC, but transitioned to x86 with version 11.
536.
by mjg59 4y ago
The majority of that comment is just, uh, wrong and bizarre and conspiracy theory laden and I can't figure out what it's actually trying to say about IEEE 1667 at all.
537.
by mjg59 4y ago
You're describing the equivalent of 802.1x. Nobody would assert that enabling 802.1x turns your office LAN into a zero-trust network.
538.
by mjg59 4y ago
And every definition of "zero trust networking" I can find still states that the point is that trust is something that's continually evaluated, which isn't the case if you're trusting someone simply because they&#x2
539.
by mjg59 4y ago
The point of zero-trust is that you don't implicitly trust something, but instead re-evaluate its trustworthiness every time you have to make an access control decision. Trusting a device simply because it's on your VPN is equival
540.
by mjg59 4y ago
> with TPM, you can put your own keys, and use the TPM to refuse payloads not signed with your keys (ex: a Windows install thumbdrive) No, that's UEFI Secure Boot, which doesn't use the TPM - it's entirely handled on-CPU.

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