mjg59

22 ms·

361.
by mjg59 3y ago
I'm maybe missing something, but: the article states that Android previously provided an AV1 software decoder. New versions of Android ship a new software decoder called "libdav1d", which is currently opt-in - apps that don&#
362.
by mjg59 3y ago
US vs Elcom was based on 1201 violations?
363.
by mjg59 3y ago
People pointing out that this is some weird quirk of Japanese law: if there's an argument that reverse engineering the software to determine how this works is circumvention of a technical control, this would potentially be a violation
364.
by mjg59 3y ago
He was only discovered once the plane was taxiing, which doesn't sound like it pretty much worked - if the flight hadn't been full, he may well have got away with it.
365.
by mjg59 3y ago
The sd-notify protocol is literally "Read socket address from environment variable, write a value to that socket". There's no need to link in libsystemd to achieve this. It's unreasonable to blame systemd for projects th
366.
by mjg59 3y ago
It wouldn't matter in this case, since the exploit could simply rewrite the function that calls out to the unprivileged process. If you already have malicious code in your privileged parent process there's no way to recover from t
367.
by mjg59 3y ago
This is only true if Google never release old private keys for DKIM signatures, which various people have been campaigning for them to do in order to provide long-term deniability around DKIM-signed mails.
368.
by mjg59 3y ago
Thanks! The quality of the expert witness statements is astonishing, and the sheer scale of the work carried out in a relatively short period of time is something I just can't imagine. Do you know if there's any likelihood of the
369.
by mjg59 3y ago
It's not really permanent - you can change it as much as you want. Once someone has established a connection with you via your username once, that connection will still exist even if you change your username.
370.
by mjg59 3y ago
No, the kill switch is a literal electronic connection to the pin on the WiFi card that tells the firmware on that card to disable itself. ACPI may provide an alternative mechanism to trigger the same pin, but that doesn't mean ACPI ca
371.
by mjg59 3y ago
Everyone, as far as I know
372.
by mjg59 3y ago
This is going to be true for any VPN - even if it were purely IP in IP encapsulation, you'd need an additional IP header to get the packet to the VPN endpoint, so your payload is smaller. But fragmentation probably isn't the right
373.
by mjg59 3y ago
> ISA ran at 8Mhz (maybe 10Mhz or 16Mhz, memory is funny) The answer is "It depends", but it also depends on what you mean by ISA? The slots in the PC, XT, and AT (and clones of the appropriate vintage) tended to run synchronou
374.
by mjg59 3y ago
It exists in everything x86 made since around 2014. Whether it exists usefully is up to your firmware.
375.
by mjg59 3y ago
It's up to your firmware to enable any CPU or chipset provided TPM implementation. The CPU supporting it is unhelpful unless the firmware provides a mechanism to turn it on.
376.
by mjg59 3y ago
CPUs? AMDs support running a TPM implementation on the PSP which is on-die. Intel has a TPM implementation running on the PCH, and on low-power mobile parts that's on-package with the CPU. ARM SoCs frequently provide a TPM implementati
377.
by mjg59 3y ago
There is E2EE! The spec defines it! It works! But Bitlocker doesn't use it (systemd-cryptenroll does), and as a result is vulnerable to this attack.
378.
by mjg59 3y ago
It's a Bitlocker vulnerability to the extent that Bitlocker doesn't encrypt its communication with the TPM, which is a feature provided by the spec.
379.
by mjg59 3y ago
Yes, it does, as does using any other CPU or chipset based TPM (Intel PTT, the AMD PSP-based TPM, running in Trustzone on ARM). The non-Pluton approaches potentially have greater overall attack surface, so Pluton is probably the best choice
380.
by mjg59 3y ago
This is mitigated by a Trusted Computing Group feature - at boot, the OS sets a non-volatile flag, and clears it again on clean shutdown after wiping any sensitive material from RAM. If the system boots with the flag set then the firmware w
381.
by mjg59 3y ago
You don't need to store that key anywhere, just like you don't need to store any keys to validate TLS connections.
382.
by mjg59 3y ago
Not really? Encrypted sessions block the trivial attack of just watching the secret go across the bus. Pushing people to MITM attacks is already an improvement, and while generating initial trust in the TPM for that purpose isn't strai
383.
by mjg59 3y ago
Ok, yes, sounds like it is in that case. Which means figuring out how Linux is doing this differently to Windows, sigh. The easiest validation is to boot Windows under qemu with a debug-enabled EDK2 build to trace the calls.
384.
by mjg59 3y ago
Last I checked (which was about a decade ago) Windows doesn't call GetNextVariableName() - it just accesses variables on demand. We should probably handle that in a cleaner way.
385.
by mjg59 3y ago
For ARM laptops intended to run Windows? Yes. Vendors can abstract away portions of their hardware design behind a HAL module that Windows will use in a way that can't be done on x86, and if the vendor doesn't make an effort to ge
386.
by mjg59 3y ago
The dx didn't have an FPU either - the difference was the size of the data bus (sx had a 16 bit data bus, dx was 32). It was the 486 where the sx/dx notation indicated floating point support.
387.
by mjg59 3y ago
For those arguing that this is a privacy or security response: the first pypush commit was in April, with the first working demo commit at the beginning of May. If it's a security or privacy issue, that means it's been exploited f
388.
by mjg59 3y ago
Apple devices with a secure enclave have the ability to attest to their identity, and also attest that keys were generated on a secure enclave (this functionality is very locked down for privacy preservation purposes, but is certainly avail
389.
by mjg59 3y ago
How are the secrets kept secret? If the encryption key is stored on disk then giving me physical access lets me extract that and gain all the secrets. The TPM has no knowledge of the biometric state so doesn't help here.
390.
by mjg59 3y ago
SCDP describes a driver-level API, it doesn't tell you how to talk to the actual hardware. Vendors ship Windows drivers that implement that API but I'm not aware of any who've documented it. And while SCDP provides a secure c

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