mcpherrinm

7 ms·

61.
by mcpherrinm 11mo ago
Versity Gateway looks like a reasonable option here. I haven't personally used it, but I know some folks who say it performs pretty great as a "ZFS-backed S3" alternative. https://github.com/versity/versi
62.
by mcpherrinm 11mo ago
I don't expect we'll ever remove the other validation methods, and certainly have no plans to do so. There are pros and cons of various approaches.
63.
by mcpherrinm 11mo ago
Note that renewing certificates is generally exempt from rate limits: https://letsencrypt.org/docs/rate-limits/#limit-exemptions-f... We are working on further improvements to our rate limits, including adding mor
64.
by mcpherrinm 11mo ago
We had (optional) safety training when I worked at Square, which included CPR training, going over office evacuation procedures, etc. One of the most fun parts was they had a virtual fire extinguisher training, which involved basically a vi
65.
by mcpherrinm 11mo ago
The Register is adding very little on top of https://blog.cloudflare.com/detecting-cgn-to-reduce-collater... Previously discussed (a bit) at https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=45746509
66.
by mcpherrinm 11mo ago
I wonder if that's not very visible in Cloudflare's data because those mobile devices will likely use IPv6 to connect to Cloudflare-hosted sites.
67.
by mcpherrinm 1y ago
https://blog.nelhage.com/post/regex-crosswords-z3/ was posted a few days ago here and is an interesting way to solve these
68.
by mcpherrinm 1y ago
On some major OSes (like Windows and Mac), there’s a “platform verifier” which can handle some of this, including the fetching and sharing of out of band data. It doesn’t have to be tied to a browser. Linux should probably get one too, but
69.
by mcpherrinm 1y ago
I think most folks involved are assuming the landmarks will be distributed by the browser/OS vendor, at least for end-user devices where privacy matters the most - Similar to how CRLSets/CRLite/etc are pushed today. There&#x2
70.
by mcpherrinm 1y ago
Yeah. From the RFC draft: > If a new landmark is allocated every hour, signatureless certificate subtrees will span around 4,400,000 certificates, leading to 23 hashes in the inclusion proof, giving an inclusion proof size of 736 bytes,
71.
by mcpherrinm 1y ago
Capture-now Decrypt-later isn't really relevant to certificates, who mostly exist to defend against active MITM. The key exchange algorithms need to be PQ-secure for CN-DL, but that has already happened if you have an up-to-date client
72.
by mcpherrinm 1y ago
The migration here is going to be long. Chrome and Cloudflare are doing a MTC experiment this year. We'll work on standardizing over the next year. Let's Encrypt may start adding support the year after that. Downstream software mi
73.
by mcpherrinm 1y ago
Yes, the rest of the cryptography needs to be PQ-secure as well. But that's largely already true: The key exchange is now typically done with X25519MLKEM768, a hybrid of the traditional x25519 and ML-KEM-768, which is post-quantum secu
74.
by mcpherrinm 1y ago
Next week at IETF 124, there's a Birds-of-a-Feather session that will kick off the standardization process here. I think Merkle Tree Certificates a promising option. I'll be participating in the standardization efforts. Chrome has
75.
by mcpherrinm 1y ago
Is there a good documentation (or maybe code) reference to the protocols that get used here? Running readsb is fine enough by me, but I'm just interested in how these systems work. I see some mentions of a Beast format. And then there&
76.
by mcpherrinm 1y ago
It appears to be where "you" (website visitors) have loaded page tiles. I was able to draw a little picture on the map by zooming in and panning around! The PR introducing it is easier to read than the whole repo: https:/&#x
77.
by mcpherrinm 1y ago
I don't know specifically what skills you're interested in, but this is all pretty much networking fundamentals. I think I learned most of what I'd need to do this in 'TCP/IP Illustrated: Volume 1'. There'
78.
by mcpherrinm 1y ago
For Let’s Encrypt certificates which no longer contain an OCSP URL, I don’t think it’ll have any effect. Firefox also already has more effective revocation checking in CRLite: https://blog.mozilla.org/en/firefox/cr
79.
Addressing the unauthorized issuance of multiple TLS certificates for 1.1.1.1(blog.cloudflare.com)
37 points by mcpherrinm 1y ago|5 comments
80.
by mcpherrinm 1y ago
It does seem mostly possible to host a Docker registry with static files and a bit of config: https://github.com/jpetazzo/registrish I haven’t tried running this yet, but it seems worth keeping in mind. It’s relatively
81.
by mcpherrinm 1y ago
Do you have any references for doing similar system hardening under either of those?
82.
by mcpherrinm 1y ago
Everyone from the single-user homelab to the biggest companies should have SSO.
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by mcpherrinm 1y ago
I've reviewed the privacy policy and performance of various DoH servers, and determined in my opinion that Cloudflare and Google both provide privacy-respecting policies. I believe that they follow their published policies and have rea
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by mcpherrinm 1y ago
Yes, the static-ct api is designed to be highly cacheable by a CDN. That is one of the primary motivations of its design over the previous CT API, which had some relatively flexible requests that led to less good caching.
85.
by mcpherrinm 1y ago
If it was a blog post or announcement, we’d have surely included more context, and not a forum post really intended for limited distribution. You just used HN without expanding that acronym! :)
86.
by mcpherrinm 1y ago
It's the "for longer than a week" bit - Unless you have a paid developer account, you can only sign apps to sideload that last one week. There's some tools to automate "refreshing" the app, but that requires yo
87.
by mcpherrinm 1y ago
well, unless both client and server have sufficiently weak crypto enabled that an attacker can break it during the handshake. Then you can MITM, force both sides to use the weak crypto, which can be broken, and you're in the middle. Al
88.
by mcpherrinm 1y ago
No: while the handshake is unencrypted, it is authenticated. An attacker can’t modify it. What an attacker can do is block handshakes with parameters they don’t like. Some clients would retry a new handshake with an older TLS version, becau
89.
by mcpherrinm 1y ago
Well, my only real point is that it’s not the version negotiation in TLS that’s broken. It’s the workaround for intolerance of newer versions that had downgrade attacks. Fortunately that’s all behind us now, and transitioning from 1.2 to 1.
90.
by mcpherrinm 1y ago
The main difference is in the padding. When the POODLE attack was pre-announced as only affecting SSL3 and not TLS1.0, that was enough to predict it was going to be a padding oracle. I think it’s fair to say they’re very similar, with a few

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