maqp

17 ms·

91.
by maqp 10mo ago
>What do you use now? Signal mostly. >separate ids for every connection and group The thing is, there's Akamai and Runonflux, two companies hosting the entire public SimpleX infrastructure. If you're not using Tor and Simple
92.
by maqp 10mo ago
>but they suggest that you don't understand the landscape very well. Yeah, what could I possibly know about secure messaging. >Plus another half-minute every time you add a new contact. Can you point to some instant messaging app
93.
by maqp 10mo ago
>proof-of-work scheme using a memory-hard hash function like scrypt So who's doing the computation? The spammer can't afford to run 3 second key derivation time per spam device? Or how long do you think normal user will wait wh
94.
by maqp 10mo ago
Yeah if you buy a number with Durov's TON shitcoin. The original sales are over and number auctions start from opening bid of 37 dollars, and run all the way to 14,000 USD https://fragment.com/numbers , and they take ve
95.
by maqp 10mo ago
Yup. As the guy who put together the most secure FOSS messaging system*, it's not "impossible to hack". It's a caveat ridden, inconvenient to use, tedious to setup, hardware-isolated, multinode application, with long mus
96.
by maqp 10mo ago
Yup, it's almost like they're feelings/emotions over evidence/science. It's not that hard to understand considering how that weird lot consists of all sorts of cranks, pooled by the alt right radicalization pipeline
97.
by maqp 10mo ago
Short answer is no. Signal provides content-privacy by design with E2EE. Signal provide metadata-privacy by policy, i.e. they choose to not collect data or mine information from it. If you need metadata-privacy by design, you're better
98.
by maqp 10mo ago
SimpleX front page lied by omission about it having no identifiers. The fine print threat model did not mention the server has access to your IP addresses, and the mitigation to create "decentralized" system of users talking via s
99.
by maqp 10mo ago
No. https://delta.chat/en/help#pfs
100.
by maqp 10mo ago
The sad part is, that's what's keeping Signal safe from spam. Also, average Joe is not using proxy to hide the IP-address of their device so they leak their identity to the server anyway. Signal is not keeping those logs so that h
101.
by maqp 1y ago
That's up to the mixing. If it's a surround system, sure it's better the dialogue comes from the right place in the scene. But if you have stereo speakers properly placed https://www.ecoustics.com/electronics&
102.
by maqp 1y ago
Yeah I mostly wanted to show the idea. Very interesting to hear it's used outside PA too. Thanks!
103.
by maqp 1y ago
Yeah it depends on where the producer expects the CD to be played. 99% of music is made to be played on radio / in car etc., a noisy environment, where you don't want to be adjusting the volume knob all the time. So the dynamics a
104.
by maqp 1y ago
Slightly unrelated, but the coolest audio-ethernet cable I've seen is one that goes inside an XLR shell Socket: https://www.amazon.com/Cable-Matters-Snake-Over-Ethernet/dp/... Plug: https://www.gea
105.
by maqp 1y ago
Yeah sure, but this guy was talking about luxury cars. I've seen B&W bundled in Maseratis, Aston Martins and McLarens. BMWs and Volvos too but that's a more recent market expansion. Personally I think think the soundbars are a
106.
by maqp 1y ago
Dali isn't as fancy on the outside as stuff like B&W but oh boy the sound. Zensor 3s sounded a lot better than CM5s, that cost quite a bit more. Still the best budget 2-way I've ever heard. Also the Oberon 7s pack incredible s
107.
by maqp 1y ago
>an expensive home audio setup has limited appeal The thing is a sound bar can cost more than 2 grand, which gets you nice pair of B&W two-way speakers and an entry-level Marantz, a setup that beats the sound bar any day. Of course
108.
by maqp 1y ago
They're really not. All you need is an angle guide you stick to the knife. Something like https://setamono.co.za/products/knife-sharpening-angle-retai... With that all you need to do is pretty much go back and for
109.
by maqp 1y ago
>paranoidal So either you're too young or too ignorant to have read the Snowden docs.
110.
by maqp 1y ago
>Future secrecy? Meaning --if-- when your keys get compromised the system recovers. PGP lacks even forward secrecy, meaning key compromise alone allows retrospective decryption of every message you've ever sent. OTR fixed that in...
111.
by maqp 1y ago
Shoutout to Signal team for another fantastic achievement! As a fun evening read I'd like to remind everyone of Pavel Durov's gaslighting on how their approach of everything-leaks-to-server was the right way to implement "clo
112.
by maqp 1y ago
>Signal is known for its cutting-edge cryptographic protocol, but this feature has the effect of throwing that out the window and replacing it with a single static key The exfiltration of which is as easy as exfiltration of database on d
113.
by maqp 1y ago
Messages: Encrypted on device. Keys stay on device. Server has access to ciphertexts. Backups: Encrypted on device. Key stays on device. Server has access to ciphertext. Yapyaps: Is the backup a backdoor?
114.
by maqp 1y ago
>"Telegram is not fully e2ee but it's way more convenient here." Yeah convenient way to hand your data to a Russian oligarch. PGP has no forward secrecy and OTR in XMPP lacks future secrecy, multi-device support etc. Signa
115.
by maqp 1y ago
Ok smarty-pants. Explain exactly how the encrypted cloud backup leaks to NSA when the key to decrypt it sits on your device and safe alone?
116.
by maqp 1y ago
>You can have all the talent in the world but if you can't get 100k H100s and a dedicated power plant, you're out. I really have to wonder, how long will it be before the competition moves into who has the most wafer-scale engi
117.
by maqp 1y ago
https://soitis.dev/ai-overview-hider-for-google seems to work nicely too
118.
by maqp 1y ago
>I thought the "domain name" was already the hash of some public key With v3 it's the ed25519 key with a checksum. For something like a Cwtch address or your personal dissident blog criticizing Emutopia, it's enough y
119.
by maqp 1y ago
So it goes something like this 1. Attacker does TLS-MITM with rogue certificate to replace the the public key of user B on their website with the attacker's public key in real time 2. A gets the MITM attacker's public key instead.
120.
by maqp 1y ago
No I did not joke. If you bother to open one of the playlists I referred to, you can find e.g. 10 rear delt exercises demonstrated in under 15 second videos with extremely good tldr advice. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=34

More ›