maqp

24 ms·

271.
by maqp 3y ago
>I don't even know what "The three letter agencies successfully subverted the entire chain of trust" means. For one thing, they're interdicting hardware and inserting hardware implants: https://www.theguard
272.
by maqp 3y ago
>No e2ee app has compromised device part of their threat model. Oh really, here's one I made earlier https://github.com/maqp/tfc :-) >The whole OS can. So how are you backdooring a bash script that comments
273.
by maqp 3y ago
>You don't need to backdoor the protocol, just the specific targeted client. So how are you backdooring the client that -- where ever you download it from -- can be dumped from the phone and compared against self compiled client wit
274.
by maqp 4y ago
Argon2 is built on top of BLAKE2 but the hash function isn't what's making it so effective, it's memory hardness, i.e. it fills the RAM when deriving a key from password, which makes massively parallel attacks impractical bec
275.
by maqp 4y ago
In this case, the reason for not using Argon2 is that it's not available Then it would naturally follow you wouldn't want to implement password-dependent security systems in JS. I can respect the HTML file that stores an encrypted
276.
by maqp 4y ago
How about you explain the problem with password protected archives and explain how you solved it, instead of linking to something and seeing if it sticks.
277.
by maqp 4y ago
There is no reason not to use Argon2 in place of weaker alternative, especially when there's no UX overhead. The threat model "for an average Joe who just wants to stash a secret somewhere and not have it in plaintext" should
278.
by maqp 4y ago
Yeah you can actually just audit the self-extracting code, and create detatched signature for it for every instance. But yeah my bad, apparently the actual problems with this tools are with usage, password hashing, and non-existent secret s
279.
by maqp 4y ago
>Uses current state of art algos. Pro: Resistant to access by known methods. AES-GCM is fine sure, but the password hashing function PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA1, i.e. what turns the user's weak password into the AES-key, is the opposite of sta
280.
by maqp 4y ago
So explain to us the workflow of sharing data to them Problem: Send a file securely Solution: Encrypt file using PortableSecret, send file over unencrypted email. Problem: Send the decryption pasword Solution: I can't use unencrypted e
281.
by maqp 4y ago
The argument your answer makes discusses confidentiality issues with passwords in Zip-files, yet the Portable Secret application doesn't take any major steps or use best practices like Argon2 to solve "brute forcing the password&q
282.
by maqp 4y ago
XChaCha20-Poly1305 will probably never go out of fashion. Argon2 is only making itself in, phasing it out will take decades. OTOH you have a point in that the author's implementation PBKDF2 is being used, and that should already have r
283.
by maqp 4y ago
You're not completely wrong in that it's still possible to f up, even when using misuse resistant primitives. The difference is, you're sort-of allowed to f up if it's an intelligent mistake that teaches the creators of
284.
by maqp 4y ago
Hate to be that guy that ruins parties but there's a couple of obvious issues here Firstly, the repeated Java Script delivery problem The library that generates random numbers is bundled in your browser. However, the code that calls th
285.
by maqp 4y ago
Simplex isn't what you want https://www.reddit.com/r/privacy/comments/vwje57/comment/ift...
286.
by maqp 4y ago
Tox doesn't anonymize by default. You're leaking your IP address to every peer, and you're leaking metadata about to whom you communicate to every entity in the backbone. Also, feel free to participate in the social experimen
287.
by maqp 4y ago
The directory service only receives an anonymous notification behind Tor proxyt chain that "hey, if someone asks for this .onion URL, point them to this node as it can provide further directions". It doesn't know "everyt
288.
by maqp 4y ago
The directory services are the equivalent of DNS. The role of Tor is it facilitates anonymous, end-to-end encrypted connection between client and server, each messaging app is both a client (or a set of clients) and a server (a Tor Onion Se
289.
by maqp 4y ago
It's a work in progress in terms of feature parity but there is: https://briarproject.org/download-briar-desktop/
290.
by maqp 4y ago
Tor hosts a directory service, a (de)centralized repository of rendezvous nodes from which the Onion Service (server) can be reached, thus the IP address is not lost, but since the circuit is rebuilt every 10 minutes or so, the connection
291.
by maqp 4y ago
Briar is one of the most important secure messaging projects currently. Not only does it remove the need to trust the vendor about content (like with all E2EE messaging apps), you also get to keep the metadata about communication to yoursel
292.
by maqp 5y ago
>That's for 16KiB inputs. Oh that's a good point. >But the question was why BLAKE2s instead of SHA-256, not SHA-1. SHA-256 has the same digest length as BLAKE2s. Two things come to mind. Firstly, does it really matter to spe
293.
by maqp 5y ago
https://github.com/BLAKE3-team/BLAKE3/blob/master/media/spee... argues BLAKE2s is twice as fast compared to SHA256. One aspect switching from SHA1 to BLAKE2s does is it increases the total entropy a
294.
by maqp 5y ago
The actual DRNG algorithm Linux kernel uses is ChaCha20, which runs in constant time regardless of underlying hardware. BLAKE2 is below ChaCha20: it reseeds the ChaCha20 DRNG from a 4096-byte input_pool every 300 seconds.
295.
by maqp 5y ago
Not to nitpick but BLAKE was the SHA3 finalist, not BLAKE2 which is an improvement. To quote Wikipedia: >BLAKE2 removes addition of constants to message words from BLAKE round function, changes two rotation constants, simplifies padding,
296.
by maqp 5y ago
You're probably right. Still, that doesn't make up for the fact Durov made his fortune with VKontakte that has the exact same toxic business model as Facebook. He began by exploiting tens of millions of VKontatke users. Now he&#x2
297.
by maqp 5y ago
"Who is "my adversary" exactly and what do they want with me?" He will extort money from you based on your private message history, when they eventually leak from Telegram's effectively plaintext database. >I thi
298.
by maqp 5y ago
>Most will never be under threat of a state actor that necessitates getting their friends and family "the hell out of Telegram as soon as possible". This isn't just about nation states. Companies get hacked by common crimi
299.
by maqp 5y ago
Sure, you do you. Personally I haven't seen anyone in e.g. the major infosec expert bubble abandon Signal for introducing mobilecoin. It's an opt-in feature, it doesn't make the message side security code harder to audit, and
300.
by maqp 5y ago
There are indeed. It's not just spies. My work wrt endpoint secure comms is FOSS and free for anyone to use https://github.com/maqp/tfc (the HW costs a bit naturally but in other respects).

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