lrvick

21 ms·

481.
by lrvick 7mo ago
Is a doctor doing volunteer work still obligated to wash their hands between patients? Is a food pantry giving away free food obligated to check expiration dates and make sure the food is properly sealed? Volunteer work absolutely has oblig
482.
by lrvick 7mo ago
They have basic obligations as highly trusted FOSS software maintainers, a role they allowed themselves to be elected into, to make sure their hard earned goodwill and trust is not stolen by a bad actor. They also have a basic obligation to
483.
by lrvick 7mo ago
I agree that would be nice, but NPM absolutely will not do any basic supply chain integrity work. They are actively opposed to it citing concerns that it might turn off lower skill developers that would be too annoyed by tapping a yubikey t
484.
by lrvick 7mo ago
Like I said. One must sign commits -universally- and -also- sign reviews/merges (multi-party) and then -also- do multi party signing on releases. The code in the release must match the code from git, or no publish. Until NPM can enforc
485.
by lrvick 7mo ago
It scales just fine for thousands of maintainers of thousands of packages for every major linux distribution that powers the internet. You just have to automate enforcement so people do not have a choice. Are you really saying there is just
486.
by lrvick 7mo ago
To prevent supply chain attacks you need multi party cryptographic attestation at every layer, which is pretty straight forward, but you are correct, NPM and GitHub controls absolutely will not save you. Microsoft insists their centralized
487.
by lrvick 7mo ago
I can not find a single signed recent commit on the axios repo. It is totally yolo mode. Those "signed by github" signatures are meaningless. I stand by my comment in full. One must sign commits -universally- and -also- sign revie
488.
by lrvick 7mo ago
Strix Halo 128 w/ linux 7x
489.
by lrvick 7mo ago
All maintainers need to do is code signing. This is a solved problem but the NPM team has been actively rejecting optional signing support for over a decade now. Even so maintainers could sign their commits anyway, but most are too lazy to
490.
by lrvick 7mo ago
While I think anyone unwilling to sign their code is negligent, I also feel anyone unwilling to ensure credible review of code has been done before pushing it to production is equally negligent.
491.
by lrvick 7mo ago
Anyone that maintains code for others to consume has a basic obligation to do the bare minimum to make sure their reputations are not hijacked by bad actors. Just sign commits and reviews. It is so easy to stop these attacks that not doing
492.
by lrvick 7mo ago
An owner being compromised is absolutely survivable on a responsibly run FOSS project with proper commit/review/push signing. This and every other recent supply chain attack was completely preventable. So much so I am very comfort
493.
by lrvick 7mo ago
I ask this on every supply chain security fail: Can we please mandate signing packages? Or at least commits? NPM rejected PRs to support optional signing multiple times more than a decade ago now, and this choice has not aged well. Anyone t
494.
by lrvick 7mo ago
A separate machine.
495.
by lrvick 7mo ago
About 10 seconds for a 1024x1024 on one, but not found a nice way to scale processing a single image across both.
496.
by lrvick 7mo ago
Have a Strix Halo 128 running Qwen 3.5 122b at 35t/s using Vulkan and kernel 7.0.0 on a 400w PSU. Pretty hard to beat for the price and power consumption IMO. But to be fair I compile everything myself so proprietary drivers required b
497.
by lrvick 7mo ago
I exclusively buy AMD hardware for local inference. For open drivers, power efficiency, and cost AMD beats Nvidia easily for consumers.
498.
by lrvick 7mo ago
I have had way better perf with Vulcan than ROCm on kernel 7.0.0. They made some major improvements. 20%+ speedups for me.
499.
by lrvick 7mo ago
As another data point. Running Qwen3.5 122B at 35t/s as a daily driver using Vulcan llama.cpp on kernel 7.0.0rc5 on a Framework Desktop board (Strix Halo 128). Also a pair of AMD AI Pro r9700 cards as my workhorses for zimageturbo, qwe
500.
by lrvick 7mo ago
I suppose you are correct. I am agreeing that if one widely deployed the defense tactics projects like stagex use, then asshats using things like undercover will not be trusted. Unfortunately outside of classic Linux packaging platforms, us
501.
by lrvick 7mo ago
I am reasonably confident it is the current industry best effort, and way beyond the status quo, not that it is perfect. We combine many tactics for defense in depth that I strongly suspect if widely deployed would put a stop to the daily s
502.
by lrvick 7mo ago
It is not a silver bullet by itself, but when combined with the other tactics in stagex I believe it gives us a very strong supply chain attack defense. I can not prove the tools used, but I can prove multiple humans signed off on code with
503.
by lrvick 7mo ago
They need to go to generate their key, ideally offline with an offline CA backup on and subkeys on a nitrokey or yubikey smartcard with touch requirement enabled for all key operations for safe workstation use. One can use keyfork on Airgap
504.
by lrvick 7mo ago
https://hashbang.sh - "underground" for over 20 years and still running strong.
505.
by lrvick 7mo ago
I can prove that code was signed by a key that was verified to belong to a single human body by lots of in-person high reputation humans. How the code was authored, who cares, but I can prove it had multiple explicit cryptographic human sig
506.
by lrvick 7mo ago
If we were talking about any linux distribution before stagex, I would agree with you. Stagex however expects at least one maintainer may at any time engage in reputation-ending dishonesty or simply they were threatened or coerced. This is
507.
by lrvick 7mo ago
Do you think it is likely that the majority of the people that spent decades building this trust graph and gaining the trust needed to be release engineers on the packages that power the whole internet are just going to hand off control of
508.
by lrvick 7mo ago
I absolutely do not care what autocomplete tools someone used. Only that they as humans own and sign what is submitted so it is attached to their very expensive reputations they do not want to lose.
509.
by lrvick 7mo ago
Of course! There are always edge cases, but I would suspect the number of bots signed by reputable keys to be near 0%, and the honest human score in this trust graph to be well over 90%. Compare to how much we should trust any random unsign
510.
by lrvick 7mo ago
The people who signed my keys trust me to be an honest human actor that chose this as the singular identity they signed for the human body they met in person. I -could- burn my 16+ years of reputation by letting a bot start signing commits

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