lrvick

20 ms·

331.
by lrvick 5mo ago
It is hard enough for people to keep up with one keychain, let alone a dozen of them for every use case in their lives. PGP keychains allow you to have a single 24 word mnemonic seed to recover your entire digital identity, data access, etc
332.
by lrvick 5mo ago
Having a public graph is critical for trust in Linux distributions. All it means is a human met you and agreed you are human and signed your key. It does not imply you are friends. It is pretty useful for someone totally outside the trust g
333.
by lrvick 5mo ago
Self-sovereign PKI identity, key discovery, file encryption, artifact, code, review signing, security disclosures, boot signing etc etc.
334.
by lrvick 5mo ago
Everyone is trying so hard to re-invent PGP, while parroting that PGP is dead because some security influencers said so. Well, there is a LOT of ongoing PGP modernization work on both specifications and implementations in recent years and m
335.
by lrvick 5mo ago
But a maintainer could merge their own PR created by a pseudonym, and signing is not required, so in effect, they can ship any changes to their own packages they wish. This is a major supply chain security risk.
336.
by lrvick 5mo ago
Anyone with contributor rights can make a fake identity, make a PR with it, then merge their own PR. Effectively no oversight. Also, because there is no signing, git history can be rewritten easily or people can impersonate each other in gi
337.
by lrvick 5mo ago
You would need to prevent an attacker from installing shell aliases, or shell config files, or altering any binaries in PATH. Like, sure you could, but you end up with a very useless system. Easier to just use VMs for each security context.
338.
by lrvick 5mo ago
Secure boot protects against evil maid attacks, but no one would ever need use an evil maid attack on a NixOS user because anyone can merge whatever they want to NixOS without signature or review, particularly given that any maintainer can
339.
by lrvick 5mo ago
The way many including me manage systems without root privileges at runtime is by compiling immutable rootfs images that run in ram with kernel, init, mounting filesystems and assigning any users and privilege assignments, then drop to user
340.
by lrvick 5mo ago
Neither would actually help in this case though. Malware could manipulate both of those as an unprivileged user to run malicious code the next time you elevate privileges. Remember that malware can replace or modify your shell
341.
by lrvick 5mo ago
If you set the appropriate linux capabilities flag on a binary such as sshd at bootup then unprivileged users can bind to 22, no problem. setcap 'cap_net_bind_service=+ep' /usr/sbin/sshd Could even run it as a daemo
342.
by lrvick 5mo ago
Plenty of package managers can install to an arbitrary directory like ~/.local. Each user, or even each project, can have its own rootfs full of software. The only things I tend to have running at the system level are a kernel and init
343.
by lrvick 5mo ago
A simple LD_PRELOAD command can cause your shell to run "rm -rf /" when you type "/sudo". If your unprivileged user is compromised, you are pretty hosed.
344.
by lrvick 5mo ago
You do not need sudo for installing software. Can just install to ~/.local. Many package managers require sudo, sure, but there is no good reason for them to in a modern linux system, and not all require this. Even with systemd, you ca
345.
by lrvick 5mo ago
And then the moment you authenticate, the fake sudo still executes its payload. Yubikeys do not fix this issue.
346.
by lrvick 5mo ago
In my case I use QubesOS so sudo is useless even if present since every security domain is isolated by hypervisor. For servers, sudo or a package manager etc should not exist. There is no good reason for servers to run any processes as root
347.
by lrvick 5mo ago
Someone that can wrap your sudo binary can wrap you git binary too. Once your OS is compromised all bets are off.
348.
by lrvick 5mo ago
No exploits needed. A simple shell alias will suffice. See my example in sibling comment.
349.
by lrvick 5mo ago
Endless ways, which is why I do not understand why sudo is ever used anymore, especially in production. You do not need root to do anything in Linux these days anyway between Namespaces and Capabilities so there is really no reason for root
350.
by lrvick 5mo ago
Every user, since privesc is so easy on most operating systems.
351.
by lrvick 5mo ago
This could for instance be injected into your .bashrc when you do an "npm install" of a package that has a deeply nested supply chain attack. Then the next time you run sudo, phase2 triggers installing a rootkit, etc.
352.
by lrvick 5mo ago
Sudo is security theater. Malware can make a fake unprivileged sudo that sniffs your password. function sudo () { realsudo=$(which sudo); read -r -s -p "[sudo] password for $USER: " password; echo "$USER: $pas
353.
by lrvick 5mo ago
Guix did a full source bootstrap first, credit where well due, but it does not apply to their whole tree. E.g haskell is bootstrapped with a binary, qemu includes binary firmware blobs, etc. Guix is not fully bootstrapped or reproducible. T
354.
by lrvick 5mo ago
The qwen models not only have good OCR, they will describe pictures to you.
355.
by lrvick 5mo ago
While we are bragging, stagex was the first to hit 100% full source bootstrapped deterministic and hermetic builds last year and the first to make multiple signed reproductions by different maintainers on their own hardware mandatory for ev
356.
by lrvick 5mo ago
Any community that cares could then at least make the right choice of client for their community. The masses never care, but what matters is that privacy is actually a choice.
357.
by lrvick 5mo ago
If it was open source people could fork.
358.
by lrvick 5mo ago
While I agree reproducible builds are a huge part of the answer, if you get your builds from Google Play or the App Store you have no idea if anyone has reproduced the particular build that was served to your device. A solution to this woul
359.
by lrvick 5mo ago
Centralized proprietary software on on proprietary platforms can always be opted into a special update that makes all the private keys deterministic making end to end encryption useless for anyone with knowledge of that targeted backdoor. O
360.
by lrvick 5mo ago
With supply chain attacks in the news daily now wreaking havoc across the whole industry, ignoring them is negligent in all cases where software is written for the consumption of anyone other than the author. The entire medical industry was

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