logicchop

11 ms·

61.
by logicchop 6y ago
Not to defend the judge in that case in any way, but there is a question about whether/when it is OK or even desirable for judges to intervene "indirectly" with their power. For example (just an example, not suggesting this i
62.
by logicchop 7y ago
I used to work on lower level stuff a place with a large C++ codebase designed by a bunch of C guys. We had tight memory requirements, so a custom operator new (not nothrow) was supplied; but exceptions were also disabled, so the supplier o
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by logicchop 7y ago
> although they are caught at run time, not compile time Not if the compiler got to it first. If the compiler does what Chen points out it can do, you won't be indexing anything at run time.
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by logicchop 7y ago
It's not clear what you mean or are complaining about. Feel free to provide your own example. Just come up with two empirical claims (A and B) such that you think A contradicts B. It should then be relatively easy to come up with a C t
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by logicchop 7y ago
It's easy to go read Popper. Look for his discussions of Adler.
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by logicchop 7y ago
Popper heavily criticizes the value of explanation. He gives examples of really great "explanations" that have almost zero empirical value (things like psychoanalysis). Hard to see how it could be a "straw man."
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by logicchop 7y ago
The response (from Duhem, Quine and others) is this: Suppose you think A contradicts B. You would surely admit that, there is likely some other C that, if C were true, A wouldn't contradict B. But if that's the "logic" o
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by logicchop 11y ago
Yes, we know that preference involves more than ordering and that "strengths" are relevant to decision making. We know this because it explains an obvious empirical matter, that there are scenarios like the one you cite where we p
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by logicchop 11y ago
I think you are a bit confused. What would Arrow's theorem explain? There is no empirical phenomena that we are puzzled about that Arrow's theorem solves (unless you are wondering: Why is it so hard to come up with a voting system
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by logicchop 11y ago
indifferent rankings already indicate ties, and what does a 'strong preference' value amount to here? I'd suggest that it only makes sense if you try to understand the "score" as being a relative ranking of N imagin
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by logicchop 11y ago
I recall that Bordes and Tideman were a good source on this issue; I believe the (relevant) paper is "Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives in the Theory of Voting." -- The upshot is that the condition known as IIA (I think it i
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by logicchop 11y ago
(1) Not quite. The "deliberative democracy" camp is not interested in the measurement of group preference, and are instead interested in consensus building, political "rationality" (in hopefully some eventually-stabilizi
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by logicchop 11y ago
The "worry" is not that this-or-that fantastical scenario might play out. It is that, as it turns out, the very mechanisms we use to measure group preferences simply cannot satisfy a list of very basic requirements. For example,
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by logicchop 11y ago
Here's the version of the story with respect to voting: Democracy requires voting. Voting involves an objective measurement of group preference with respect to choices. Arrow's theorem and related theorems (see Gibbard-Satterthwa
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by logicchop 11y ago
In the context of voting, all IIA represents is the requirement that we only take into account the information on the ballots..
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by logicchop 11y ago
I don't follow this "loophole" you mention. Afaik there are proofs of Gibbard-Satterthwaite that allow indifference in the rankings, and this "distinction" between rankings and scores is methodologically dubious: Ar
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by logicchop 11y ago
Morgenbesser is always great, but a defense against criticisms of IIA is much simpler to mount in the context of voting: it simply amounts to the requirement that our voting procedure only takes into account information from the ballots.
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by logicchop 15y ago
This just rehashes an old (and fallacious) argument under the guise of neuroscience. Bobert Blatchford tried to push the same view 100 years ago (see his article "Defense of the Bottom Dog"). He didn't convince many, though. There are some
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by logicchop 15y ago
I teach philosophy at a university. Whenever we discuss basic issues about the mind, my computer science students are always dismissive about any and all positions that don't simply say "the brain is a computer, the mind is software." It tu
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by logicchop 15y ago
Many of the "geeks" I know like to talk about quarks, politics, theory of mind, nature of reality, etc, but few (none) really take those issues seriously, as worthy of inquiry, and most are content with letting Wikipedia supply their inform
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by logicchop 15y ago
Even if this is a necessary condition for a perfect voting system, it doesn't change the underlying problem. Even if everyone voted, you wouldn't consider it a system that "truly reflected the will of the people" unless that voting system s
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by logicchop 15y ago
This isn't a different voting system; it's only a special case of the current system. Keep in mind, in your system it's got to be possible to NOT delegate your vote; it has to be possible for everyone to just vote on their own without deleg
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by logicchop 15y ago
Not to be dismissive, but this is a pretty unhelpful approach to the voting problem. The idea of picking a random person is motivated by the thought that the more support a candidate has the greater chance they have of being selected. But t
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by logicchop 15y ago
The condition you identify as "IIA" isn't Arrow's condition. IIA in Arrow's theorem is best understood as the principle that only information on the ballot is relevant to the vote. The condition you cite is a much stronger counterfactual pr