lappa

14 ms·

91.
by lappa 11y ago
Well if each block has to be signed with 50% of the banks that reduces trust by some degree, however this still can be done more efficiently with a relational database.
92.
by lappa 11y ago
That seems to leave them with the same problem where a single bank can lie and cause problems.
93.
by lappa 11y ago
If they don't have miners or Bitcoin, then who is securing the ledger?
94.
by lappa 11y ago
Latency is one of the problems with regards to creating an economy of scale and centralization. It may actually work better to increase the block size by having 3MB blocks with 20 minute intervals or 1 hour blocks with 20MB caps, though tha
95.
by lappa 11y ago
A smart contract is a contract that can be executed with the trust parameters you set, these parameters are less limited than typical contracts have since they don't have an inherent necessity to trust a government or even a counterpar
96.
by lappa 11y ago
Surely they verify the PoW, otherwise it would be trivial to create a long chain and attack them.
97.
by lappa 11y ago
>Of course consensus is, by definition, whatever the majority is doing. So now it's a battle of dev's trying to cajole enough hashpower into enforcing the rule, or somehow backing off the change. With every new block mined on e
98.
by lappa 11y ago
Leap hours are probably acceptable, but at the point that you're only deviating by an hour every few millenia, can't it be safely accepted that the time has a different meaning and between generations it be accepted that 8PM means
99.
by lappa 11y ago
>It's pretty standardized, especially compared to the mess that is daylight savings time, where changes can be announced only a few days in advanced (e.g., Egypt) and possibly even retroactively. It clearly isn't since the orig
100.
by lappa 11y ago
>How is that different from what's being done now? There is a standardized way of determining when leap seconds are going to happen (they always happen on June 30th or December 31st when the deviation reaches about 0.6s) It's d
101.
by lappa 11y ago
As long as we have a standardized way of determining when leap seconds are going to happen, some authority determining and announcing, there shouldn't be problem. Leap years are predictable, but leap seconds can be accounted for a deca
102.
by lappa 11y ago
This seems to be something that would benefit from standardization and modularity... Pausing for a second, going back a second in time or changing how long a second is all are hacks that are bound to cause some edge case failure somewhere.
103.
by lappa 11y ago
You can cite industry improvements in the manufacturing process that companies say will effect the price at a certain point along with scientific developments and in general claims made by actual corporations.
104.
by lappa 11y ago
I'm not sure I agree with the placement of debt. It is often the case that you can you off the debt, but the money invested properly could increase faster than the debt increases.
105.
by lappa 11y ago
$10k+ isn't "only" $10k.
106.
by lappa 11y ago
You check 3 characters, not 1, but like I said, 80^3 still isn't good.
107.
by lappa 11y ago
They may be storing the three characters as a hash separately, not that that is much better.
108.
by lappa 12y ago
It seems that people lost because they were either speculating blindly or had an algorithm that was working poorly. I don't see reason for these algorithms to be outlawed.
109.
by lappa 12y ago
I've explained stake grinding attacks. Your response was redefining the system opening a new attack vector.
110.
by lappa 12y ago
Yeah, these work great out of consensus systems. Please consider that you're working on a consensus system though. "Simultaneous" has no meaning. There are no means of instant communication, there is latency. There also is no
111.
by lappa 12y ago
Yes, it is pointless for me to argue about an undefined system. If you mean to say that 67% of the validator set must sign every block, then you shouldn't argue with the premise that 100% must sign every block.
112.
by lappa 12y ago
>all validators must sign every block. Well now you're defining a new system. You can't expect me to explain the security of an undefined system, so I am sticking to the system defined in your paper which states that not all va
113.
by lappa 12y ago
>seed(block) = hash(seed(block.parent) + block.proposer.address) No grind capabilities at all. No matter how many times you try, you will always generate the exact same result. The randomness basically comes from absentee proposers, so t
114.
by lappa 12y ago
>Sure, the addresses for the validators should be reused. The more it's used the better. That's not at all what I said, but this is besides the point. >t's not trivial for a traitor to pretend to be all of the generals.
115.
by lappa 12y ago
>Depends on the application and the purpose of the blockchain, but the paper isn't explicitly premoting address reuse. It defines a system in which addresses are reused. >Users don't consider blocks committed until they&#x27
116.
by lappa 12y ago
>I agree with you that the random number generator in tendermint isn't good enough. I am going to add one I have put in a different cryptocurrency before. Each validator gives the hash of a secret, and later gives their secret. All
117.
by lappa 12y ago
Critique follows >They propose a modification to the Bitcoin protocol such that it can tolerate colluding groups that control up to 1/4 of the mining power – less than the previously assumed bound of 1/2 of Byzantine mining pow
118.
by lappa 12y ago
My post wasn't an ad hominem. You don't know what ad hominem means. And no, it isn't just me, I can see there are many others you add to "your list" and incorrectly call out as being fallacious. Once again, here is
119.
by lappa 12y ago
That isn't a refutation of the paper, it is a proposal for an unworkable idea along with mumbo jumbo (weak subjectivity) justifying adding centralized mechanism. The fundamental reason his punitive system doesn't work is because o
120.
by lappa 12y ago
Bitcoin wallets can have their source code audited. A blockchain that you accept regardless of the fact that there is a taller one is not audited by definition.

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