jude-

75 ms·

631.
by jude- 12y ago
Out of curiosity, why shouldn't some level of device I/O be handled by the kernel? If the alternative is putting all device I/O responsibility in userspace processes, then wouldn't the kernel still need to do basic driv
632.
by jude- 12y ago
I don't think it's the paradox of choice at work. I think instead that the set of file operations happens to permit arbitrary interaction with an object. Specifically, file operations already represent: * data accesses (read), *
633.
by jude- 12y ago
Thanks for your reply. Just a couple of other things: First, I see from your code that you don't specify an absolute path to gpg. If I can write to a directory in your PATH that gets searched before the location of your desired gpg b
634.
by jude- 12y ago
Hi ckennelly, Looks interesting! I have a couple of security-related questions. Now, I've only skimmed the code, so you may have addressed these already, but I was hoping you could clarify a few things: * Do you take any measures to
635.
by jude- 12y ago
I believe these are the definitions used in software engineering. Someone please correct me if I'm wrong. A "monolithic" system is a system that cannot be factored into stand-alone components. That is, there is a high degre
636.
by jude- 12y ago
The difference between coreutils' and systemd's components is that changing the implementation of one coreutils program (let's say "ls") will not require you to modify others (like "cat"). Not only are th
637.
by jude- 12y ago
I think the reason they don't say Namecoin explicitly is because at the end of the day, it doesn't particularly matter which *coin's blockchain gets used. At this point in the course of distributed system design, a "blo
638.
by jude- 12y ago
I'm surprised the whitepaper didn't cite PermaCoin [1], which addresses the same problem with proofs-of-retrievability and uses the BitCoin blockchain for storage. Would the authors like to comment on how their work differs? [1]
639.
by jude- 12y ago
What made the American Revolution succeed through violence were the facts that (1) it was a war of attrition against a foreign, remote power, and (2) it was bolstered by another foreign, rival remote power. Due to its far-flung nature, it
640.
by jude- 12y ago
Secure implementations require more than formal, logical correctness. They must also not leak information to adversaries--i.e. the must be free of side-channels. Unfortunately, ensuring this usually requires the developers to be aware of
641.
by jude- 12y ago
Shameless plug: I'm working on such a system right now. It gives you the security of PGP, but makes key management transparent to the user without compromising security. The gist is that we designed an automatic key distribution and
642.
by jude- 12y ago
The problem with this line of thinking is that low educational attainment is strongly correlated (and causally related) to low family income levels. Low family income levels mean that parents can't afford to send their kids to the &qu
643.
by jude- 12y ago
More like a tightly-coupled (monolithic) vs loosely-coupled (non-monolithic) debate. Systemd is modular, but its components are tightly-coupled. The key difference between systemd vs the existing userspace, and Linux vs Minix, is that the
644.
by jude- 12y ago
So, GNOME made two mistakes. First, they moved to logind as a hard dependency with no deprecation plan for users who must continue to rely on ConsoleKit in the near-term (basically a "fuck you" to !systemd users). Second, they a
645.
by jude- 12y ago
> Anything that wanted to pretend to be one of the various daemons can simply speak the dbus protocol. The internal DBus API that these components use is not stable and will not be stable for the foreseeable future; according to the syst
646.
by jude- 12y ago
None of the things you mentioned meet criterion (3) in my original question. Therefore, you have not convinced me that there is a need for systemd. > Socket activation (and related features like bus activation) are one of systemd's
647.
by jude- 12y ago
> And yet nothing integrated all those features well enough to get people to widely adopt them. I guess I'm an outlier these days in that I learned how to do all these things before systemd existed (and don't need any further i
648.
by jude- 12y ago
Also, I'm not sure what you mean by "massive integration issues." Can you identify a "massive" (i.e. show-stopping) problem in Linux-based operating systems that (1) is due to software A not correctly interacting w
649.
by jude- 12y ago
I think OpenBSD is working on that this summer. http://www.openbsdfoundation.org/gsoc2014.html#systemd
650.
by jude- 12y ago
> systemd goes out of its way to fix the massive integration failures we've had for decades (and seen as almost unfixable) because Linux is so focused on modularity to a fault. Windows goes out of the way to fix the massive integrat
651.
by jude- 13y ago
Serious question: why not strive to make a filesystem the universal service API? Filesystems offer built-in CRUD semantics, notions of listing/grouping data by key (i.e. directory), notions of read/write/search permissions,
652.
by jude- 13y ago
I didn't know about those videos. Thanks for the links!
653.
by jude- 13y ago
One strategy I've found works for me is to keep a document explaining why you designed the system the way you did. What were the alternative possibilities? Why didn't you pursue them instead? Do so without referencing project
654.
by jude- 13y ago
Thank you for your reply. 1) First, it doesn't particularly matter as long as they are not powerful enough to execute a 51% attack. Second, government security agencies (or rather, the laws granting them their powers) do get rolle
655.
by jude- 13y ago
A more recent version of the COPS system is described here: http://www.cs.princeton.edu/~wlloyd/papers/eiger-nsdi13.pdf Github for the more recent system: https://github.com/wlloyd/eiger You
656.
by jude- 13y ago
I've had an idea rattling around in my head for a while now about how this might be achieved. * CAVEATS * (Not directed at anyone in particular, but I always state these when I talk about security in detail). "Security" and &
657.
by jude- 13y ago
Okay, that was not immediately clear. Thanks! :)
658.
by jude- 13y ago
So, I read a few of the papers. I'm hoping the Ethos OS folks are on this forum, since I have a couple questions and concerns. First, my current understanding of the OS: Networking TL;DR: Their protocol is called MinimaLT, and it eff
659.
by jude- 13y ago
> Those side-channel attacks are largely theoretical. Before you write secure software, you have to consider who your adversaries are, and what they are capable of doing. Side-channel attacks over the network are definitely practical
660.
by jude- 13y ago
Right--this will work on some types of side-channel attacks. For example, I could prove that my decryption function runs in a constant amount of time no matter the input. However, you can't proactively defend against side-channel atta

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