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grugq
searching PlanetScale…
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19 ms
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151.
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by
grugq
13y ago
Informants are the greatest fear of all clandestine organisations. The reason for this is that they are privy to sensitive information that can be used to damage other members of the organisation. Read the links I posted. Read this analysis
152.
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by
grugq
13y ago
Without performing "lessons learned" analysis on failures, how will we ever learn? Conducting this sort of exercise is critical to improving the capabilities of everyone who engages in clandestine activities. Dismissing it out of
153.
▲
by
grugq
13y ago
Yeah. He should have lammed it as soon as the feds first talked to him. Really he should have run much sooner. At that point, the only option for him would have been life as a fugitive on the FBIs most wanted list. It was too late. The key
154.
▲
by
grugq
13y ago
It is covered in the Complaint. Essentially someone using the alias FriendlyChemist (FC) gained illegal access to a vendor's account, and possibly to a lot more. This gave FC a large trove of PII on SilkRoad buyers and sellers (names,
155.
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by
grugq
13y ago
Yes, particularly for the second "hit" that he arranged (the one in the Complaint). However, the first "hit" (outlined in the Maryland indictment) seems to have been more of a set piece entrapment-alike. This was when he
156.
▲
by
grugq
13y ago
There are almost no organisations that expect a code of silence indefinitely. It is not really a practical expectation of a human being. Most covert organisations (e.g. Hizbollah [0], KGB [1], IRA [2]) will expect their agents to remain sil
157.
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by
grugq
13y ago
Start with this piece "observations on OPSEC" http://grugq.tumblr.com/post/61960027685/observations-on-ops... which sets out some broad outlines of what is involved.
158.
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by
grugq
13y ago
Yeah, it is.
159.
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by
grugq
13y ago
Sorry.
160.
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by
grugq
13y ago
Now, yes. But Dread Pirate Roberts should have fled as soon as the first Congressman said "why can't we shut down Silk Road?"
161.
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by
grugq
13y ago
I am very surprised he remained in the US. I would have thought he'd take his BTC and run off to live with McAfee in Belize.
162.
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by
grugq
13y ago
ta.
163.
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by
grugq
13y ago
The issue is less about any specific ideology, but rather the social environment he was immersed in. Other than radicals, drug seekers, drug dealers and undercover law enforcement officials, he doesnt seem have had much social interaction.
164.
▲
by
grugq
13y ago
For "basestation" read "the network". The partitioning of responsibility within a GSM network is relevant to this attack only in regards to which component maintains the "signals-pending table". There are a num
165.
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by
grugq
13y ago
This is a simple race condition exploiting the baroque way that GSM signalling works. When a call (or an SMS) comes in: * the basestation will send an alert to the mobile phone ("contact me, I've got something for you") * the
166.
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by
grugq
13y ago
You got that so close, but wrong. Cloud services are inherently insecure because you don't have physical control over the devices containing your data. You have to trust that the remote end is secure, and exploiting trust is what intel
167.
▲
by
grugq
13y ago
There is some more indepth info on problems with trusting Tor (or any off the shelf "anonymity" solution) here: http://grugq.github.io/blog/2013/06/14/you-cant-get-there-fr... Also there's