growse

11 ms·

151.
by growse 2y ago
> I don't think it's the responsibility of the author to make any constructive input to the passkey problem. Oh, it's not their responsibility, sure. But moaning about the UX without considering the trade-offs and decision
152.
by growse 2y ago
If you show it on a screen, someone will read it out and type it into a website. We don't need to guess at this, it happens a lot in the real world. No matter how many UX barriers you put in place, an exportable credential will be ha
153.
by growse 2y ago
We're not aiming for "perfect", we're just trying to make some progress on the phishing problem. The irony here is that many of the complaints in this thread seem to be complaining about how imperfect passkeys are. No-on
154.
by growse 2y ago
I share accounts with my spouse using passkeys just fine. We just register our own passkeys. shrug .
155.
by growse 2y ago
> My wife and I share passwords fairly regularly. Usually in a context where one of us is busy and wants the other to log into something they set up (e.g. to pay a bill), so the entire point is to not spend a few minutes going through an
156.
by growse 2y ago
What stops the user pasting their password out of their password manager into a random evil site? Auto-fill isn't infallible. This isn't a controversial topic, the data is pretty unambiguous. If you give humans a secret they can p
157.
by growse 2y ago
Which?
158.
by growse 2y ago
I don't disagree with you about the UX. It could be better. It could be worse. What's your proposal on what a better UX might look like (along with getting everyone to adopt it)? > They want to share them across devices I do th
159.
by growse 2y ago
One of the primary, explicit design goals of webauthn is that they're not phishable. Passwords are phishable. What are the other ways that people want passkeys to be better?
160.
by growse 2y ago
Lots of criticism in the article, some of it valid, none of it constructive. Sure, there's UX problems as we're still trying to figure out what good looks like here. But in the absence of specific, concrete suggestions about how w
161.
by growse 2y ago
> Most passkey stores refuse to let you export them, and the real reason is vendor lockin. (They also did this with TOTP keys.) Does this mean that any HSM where inability to export the private key is a feature is also doing it for &qu
162.
by growse 2y ago
Passkey is just a fancy brand/marketing name for a specific mode of webauthn (resident). Saying that "WebAuthn was much more public, but passkey was not." shows that you don't really have a clear and accurate mental mode
163.
by growse 2y ago
Yeah, you're missing the point of why attestation is in the spec in the first place. Show me a widely available service that filters authenticators based on attestation attributes?
164.
by growse 2y ago
I think Apple deliberately don't add any attestation data in their implementation, precisely to stop services detecting (and filtering) on the fact that it's an apple-made authenticator.
165.
by growse 2y ago
Agree, but people often miss that there's two different use cases here, with different requirements. "2 days from now" could either mean "after 2*86400 seconds have ticked" or it could mean "when the wall clo
166.
by growse 2y ago
We're talking about webauthn, not recovery codes.
167.
by growse 2y ago
Sure, but you're moving the goalposts. We're comparing a system that relies exclusively on passwords Vs one that relies on webauthn. The operational competence of the dba is the same in both cases.
168.
by growse 2y ago
There's a difference between fluffy that's phishable (passwords) and fluff that isn't (webauthn). Not all fluff is equal.
169.
by growse 2y ago
> I don't give a fuck if other people can't manage secure passwords. Sure you do. When your local tax office / hospital / large data holder of your personal data has an administrative interface that only uses password
170.
by growse 2y ago
We have leap seconds to save us from having leap minutes, or leap hours. Generally, it's useful for midnight to be at night, and midday during the day. UT1 is not regular, so you need some form of correction. Then the debate is about h
171.
by growse 2y ago
I guess this hinges on whether you think Unix time is an integer or a float. If you think it's just an integer, then yes, you can't get a negative delta. If, however, you think it's a float, then you can.
172.
by growse 2y ago
From IEE 1003.1 (and TFA): > If year < 1970 or the value is negative, the relationship is undefined.
173.
by growse 2y ago
Fair, it's often one of those hidden, implicit design assumptions. Google explicitly built spanner (?) around the idea that you can get distributed consistency and availability iff you control All The Clocks. Smearing is fine, as lon
174.
by growse 2y ago
This feels like semantics. If a counter repeats a value, it's effectively gone backwards and by definition is not monatomic. A delta between two monatomic values should always be non-negative. This is not true for Unix time.
175.
by growse 2y ago
Sure, but that doesn't mean that we invented and practise leap seconds for the sheer fun of it. There's very good reasons that are important behind why we try and keep UTC near UT1, so saying "it doesn't matter to anyone
176.
by growse 2y ago
Unix time is not monatomic . It sometimes goes backwards .
177.
by growse 2y ago
Did you ask everyone? It most certainly matters to a lot of people. It sounds like you've never met those people.
178.
by growse 2y ago
With hindsight, we'd do lots of things differently :) I guess they just didn't foresee the problem, or misjudged the impact. I can imagine it being very "let's kick that problem down the road and just do a simple thing f
179.
by growse 2y ago
> I suppose using Unix time for dates in the far future isn't a good idea. I guess I'll file that away. Not just Unix time, converting future local time to UTC and storing that is also fraught with risk, as there's no guar
180.
by growse 2y ago
Smearing is alluring as a concept right up until you try and implement it in the real world. If you control all the computers that all your other computers talk to (and also their time sync sources), then smearing works great. You're e

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