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g_p
searching PlanetScale…
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50 ms
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451.
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by
g_p
6y ago
This would normally be the role of a forensic accountant. My suspicion is that the Post Office wanted to do this "at scale" and "automate", and just assumed blindly their own records were accurate, because well... They m
452.
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by
g_p
6y ago
Given this appeal took place in England (and not in the Supreme Court), it was all English verdicts which were overturned as I understand. The requirement for corroboration in such a situation would probably be met by having someone "s
453.
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by
g_p
6y ago
The difference I tend to see is that the outcome of the UK viva (oral) examination is far less of a foregone conclusion, and can still be quite traditional in that students are expected to be able to have a broad and well-informed discussio
454.
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by
g_p
6y ago
Some UK programmes differ in that there isn't the same formal concept of "candidacy" like you see in other places. The end-of-first-year review is often a written report, sometimes with a "mini-viva". The common fac
455.
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by
g_p
6y ago
As you say, different departments and institutions have different approaches, but I'd definitely emphasise that outside of Europe (where I've seen more ceremonial "exams"), there are still robust and vigorous "final
456.
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by
g_p
6y ago
Have been overseeing some exams being run at a well regarded university. No remote proctoring software (i.e. spyware) is in use. Students are taking their exams in the web browser of their choosing, on the platform of their choosing. They a
457.
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by
g_p
6y ago
Thanks, that's the correct link. Looks like it's too late to edit the original now. One interesting aspect is this is also a "regulation", so it takes effect "automatically" without implementing legislation in
458.
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by
g_p
6y ago
If you are based in Europe, you may want to look at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32... This (not well known about) regulation applies across the EU, and introduces a number of obl
459.
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by
g_p
6y ago
One thing businesses should be aware of here, if they go for this, is the legal risk that such transcripts end up being disclosed in a legal discovery process. Most businesses wouldn't want every word that's said in a meeting to b
460.
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by
g_p
6y ago
Absolutely. Solarwinds is a great example that if you can become important enough, and in with the bricks, the rats won't flee the sinking ship, even as the deck goes below the waterline. If investors lost confidence in a company, and
461.
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by
g_p
6y ago
Surely the "simple" fix for this is that Codecov runs (for public projects) by pulling the source from the public repo, like anyone else can, and gets a scoped "token" to post back a comment on the Github/Gitlab API
462.
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by
g_p
6y ago
At risk of over-fitting these observations to this scenario, there seem to be a few common trends here which compound into situations like this one: 1. The move to cloud means the "edge corporate firewall" monitoring point is forg
463.
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by
g_p
6y ago
It's not a publicly facing service that's on offer, but some smaller telcos and sketchy VoIP providers with legacy access often re-sell it. There's some good CCC talks on the subject if it's of interest.
464.
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by
g_p
6y ago
That's promising! It's now 5 years ago, but Telenor had a fairly big outage caused by malformed SS7 inbound signalling. Not sure if there's been anything since, but it certainly was an issue relatively recently. Hopefully wit
465.
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by
g_p
6y ago
They should all be running filtering, although not all filtering is as effective as each other. As you say, this is the legacy system, but it's still a huge problem for them!
466.
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by
g_p
6y ago
That's one approach, but some operators have SS7 connections to unknown providers. And turning off connections is a great way to discover that a whole host of services (think Twilio etc) suddenly stop working, as they were using some s
467.
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by
g_p
6y ago
Indeed, SS7 is based on a whole host of assumptions that just can't be relied upon. Since SS7 doesn't even bother to try to verify who anyone is (you'd only peer with trustworthy people, right?!), it's also very hard to
468.
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by
g_p
6y ago
Much of this is fairly widely known in the telecoms sector, and is "open secrets". The sector is a pretty "closed shop" though, full of trade secrets and "proprietary" things. Underneath it all though, actually
469.
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by
g_p
6y ago
There's actually a really interesting field of (serious) academic and scientific endeavour into the study of "pseudo profound bullshit" - a search for that will find you some of the papers available freely online. It seems th
470.
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by
g_p
6y ago
I hadn't either, and I'm keen to see if it makes any difference on a local PC (as opposite to a large file server with huge numbers of files stored). It strikes me Microsoft struggles with significant legacy across much of their p
471.
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by
g_p
6y ago
Big telcos need to do SS7 filtering and (based on the interface they receive the message from) limit what can be done. The trouble is that SS7 lacks proper authentication, so it's like setting Linux iptables rules only based on the int
472.
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by
g_p
6y ago
Indeed! And if you have access to SS7, you can do it without the middle-man $15 service! These systems are really designed for use in a world where only trusted actors have any access to the system! That's clearly not true with all the
473.
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by
g_p
6y ago
There's definitely a "side of the pond" aspect to this - US operators pay for media companies, but they likely do so to raise their margins, and I presume they're borrowing the funds from institutional investors to do th
474.
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by
g_p
6y ago
At transit layer to an extent yes, but with every underlying user of the connectivity considering the connection compromised, and therefore using their own measures on the untrusted link. Hence IPsec and site to site/road warrior VPN -
475.
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by
g_p
6y ago
Absolutely, but to build a suitable independent logging system that understands the protocols used, and all the relevant fields, would be hugely complex. Ultimately, you'd need to log every packet in full if you don't trust the co
476.
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by
g_p
6y ago
One tell-tale sign I've noticed is sentences that don't go anywhere - the last sentence of the first paragraph starts going somewhere, then suddenly stops. If we assume people communicate for the reason of conveying some meaning,
477.
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by
g_p
6y ago
The bigger they are, the harder they fall... On the whole, the technical standards should allow the kind of interoperability you described. That's the kind of fun real-world engineering that techies love. The bean-counters don't,
478.
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by
g_p
6y ago
This is more common than many think. Once a managed provider steps in, they want to "own" the configuration. You end up with the operator itself actually having to raise tickets with the MSP to change things on their own network.
479.
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by
g_p
6y ago
For background context around telecoms for anyone reading this, there is an underlying difference in how telecoms networks are designed and architected - in the Telco world, links between networks were predicated on trust. Originally, telec
480.
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by
g_p
6y ago
You are right, although I'd add one observation - when you have hardware from a supplier, and give that same supplier managed service provider access, you are giving them access beyond that which you understand - processes and procedur
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