f_klem

7 ms·

31.
by f_klem 4mo ago
None of the works I mentioned solved or try to solve the mind/body problem or the issue of consciousness. They are a frame of reference for not stepping into the common fallacies that the AI research field is based on.
32.
by f_klem 4mo ago
Nothing. It is just that they are so incredibly complex, that after +100 years of research we still don't know how they work or why. Will there be a time when we finally understand them 100% and could replicate them? Could be. That doe
33.
by f_klem 4mo ago
There is no need to assume the supernatural. They are machines based on what? By definition, a machine is something build by humans, or any intelligent life form (because we extend the definition from our own experience as self defined &#x2
34.
by f_klem 4mo ago
> Do you disagree with the assumption that cells are machines? They seem pretty machine-like to me. You just said it: they are machine-like. No, cells aren't machines for two reasons: 1) machines, by definition, are artifacts creat
35.
by f_klem 4mo ago
> More meta, all of the threads on this page are just people playing games with definitions. Eg, “qualia is something I have as a human but machines don’t have it. Therefore, LLMs do not have qualia.” True. For me, the actual interesting
36.
by f_klem 4mo ago
> For just about every "failure mode that confirms they're not thinking", you see one of two things. The first is that a new LLM releases a few months after and the "fundamental" issue abruptly goes away. The sec
37.
by f_klem 4mo ago
I agree, we can miss the forest for the trees. 1) This definition could actually be expanded (for example, with definitions from Mumford or Reuleaux). But still this definition cannot be applied directly to living organisms. 2) This is in m
38.
by f_klem 4mo ago
Refuting the "subjective experience" axiom does not lead to 'any "subjective experience" is completely tied to neurons', you also need to explain why the subjective experience is tied to neurons. And that'
39.
by f_klem 4mo ago
After reading Being and Time from Martin Heidegger, What Computers can't still do by Hubert Dreyfus, and some authors in cognitive linguistics (Langacker and Lakoff mainly), I strongly tend to disagree with any theory about emergent co
40.
by f_klem 11mo ago
I just clicked... indeed, the article is so misinformed that even some simple half-trues (whatever that might be) mentioned in the article are completely out of place... But this kind of articles show me a different problem: the relation be
41.
Some Thoughts on Software Architecture(medium.com)
6 points by f_klem 4y ago|1 comments