dwattttt

28 ms·

481.
by dwattttt 1y ago
Even then, you know what's a good way to learn about how the current system works etc, maybe even the best way? I've got many failed projects behind me, and 0 regrets.
482.
by dwattttt 1y ago
Melting it removes _a_ legal risk. I'm sure if someone looks they can find a risk or two still there somewhere.
483.
by dwattttt 1y ago
> You claim it is fine-tuned, but it has happened in the real world. Sure, but it seems like his comment is still responsive; if DNSSEC is deployed, they perform a BGP hijack & can impersonate everyone, and they just impersonate the
484.
by dwattttt 1y ago
> No disk encryption algorithm can solve the issue if the user does not have the correct password, and so the recommendation was to not use it. This problem is accurate, but it's the framing that makes it wrong. No disk encryption a
485.
by dwattttt 1y ago
Do you have any reason to think their numbers are wrong, or is your argument "someone else once lied, maybe they are too"?
486.
by dwattttt 1y ago
You're missing general problem solving. If all people do is encounter problems they've already seen before, well, we have lookup tables for that kind of thing.
487.
by dwattttt 1y ago
Allowing SIMD instructions to be used arbitrarily in kernel actually has a fair penalty to it. I'm not sure what Linux does specifically, but: When a syscall is made, the kernel has to backup the user mode state of the thread, so it ca
488.
by dwattttt 1y ago
It sure isn't. Although its competition is stuff like chmod (way less granular), and SELinux, and SELinux isn't winning any usability competitions either.
489.
by dwattttt 1y ago
I don't think anyone would be surprised to hear that if a biased coin can only give one result, you can't extract randomness from it. And if it can only give the second result one in a million times, you could be flipping millions
490.
by dwattttt 1y ago
There's plenty of actually granular permissions; they're just not used by anyone. How many people on Windows create separate user accounts, run programs as those accounts (hello runas), & set ACLs?
491.
by dwattttt 1y ago
> the moment you hit something like that, it becomes a massive pain, and requires either "unsafe" (which is strictly more dangerous than even C, never mind Zig) or patterns like using indices instead of pointers If you need to
492.
by dwattttt 1y ago
I mean, there's only 30 bits available for HANDLEs in the handle table, so you've got a limit there. You'd have to work pretty hard to reach it without running out of resources though.
493.
by dwattttt 1y ago
If you have two interfaces connected to two separate networks, you can absolutely have another host connected to the same two networks. That host will have a different IP for each of their interfaces, you could reach it on either, and DNS o
494.
by dwattttt 1y ago
If you had a case that implicated every transaction Mastercard was making? Unless you needed every single one, I'm sure an order would be limited to whatever transactions are potentially relevant. Mastercard wouldn't get away with
495.
by dwattttt 1y ago
Issue 8 (2024, https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9799919799/basedefs/sy... ) relaxed the language there. st_ino and st_dev still uniquely identify a file, but it now notes that the duration it identifies i
496.
by dwattttt 1y ago
Have you checked what POSIX has to say about inode numbers? It may say less than you think.
497.
by dwattttt 1y ago
They don't, but a Linux userland sure does. WSL1 was plagued by a change glibc made around nsleep & realtime clock usage, causing random programs to just fail under WSL1. At that point, either Linux distros have to consider Windows
498.
by dwattttt 1y ago
> There are easy ways to implement stuff like enums with members in C++, just put an anonymous enum inside a class/struct, its possible but marked as not possible. This guide does exactly that in C++ for methods on enums. For member
499.
by dwattttt 1y ago
We also don't aim to elevate them. We instead try not to give them responsibility until they're able to handle it.
500.
by dwattttt 1y ago
It's really impressive how much worked out of the box, decompiling a C# binary, then recompiling it for a target as different as WASM.
501.
by dwattttt 1y ago
Application Verifier provides fault injection, as well as detection for a bunch of conditions ( https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/d... ). It's only intended for native/unmanag
502.
by dwattttt 1y ago
You do have to be aware of endianness, although it's really not hard to handle it: pick one. Your code always knows what endian the file format is, so it always knows how to read it.
503.
by dwattttt 1y ago
Time for a trip to the Abbey of Hidden Absurdities. http://www.thecodelesscode.com/case/161
504.
by dwattttt 1y ago
As sibling notes, executable memory is not by default writable. If desired, you can also further disallow any executable memory to me allocated or modified by your process, even via the normal APIs, by calling SetProcessMitigationPolicy wit
505.
by dwattttt 1y ago
> why do you believe existing software should break? What value do you see in it? Does it have any value at all? How exactly can a _new_ standard cause existing software compiling on an old standard to break? EDIT: As to the value, I&#x2
506.
by dwattttt 1y ago
C++ is supposed to be an extension of <thing with bad default>, so I wouldn't expect <a good default>. Things can change & grow, that's why we make new standards in the first place.
507.
by dwattttt 1y ago
> You're arguing about static code analysis being able to identify uninitialized var reads. (Safe) Rust does guarantee to identify uninitialised variable reads, but I believe the point is that you can get the optimisation of not for
508.
by dwattttt 1y ago
> If you expect anyone to adopt your new standard revision, the very least you need to do is ensure their code won't break just by flipping s flag. Why would you expect that a new revision can't cause existing code to compile?
509.
by dwattttt 1y ago
> injecting C# dependencies via function pointers or an abstract interface This is the opposite of what I was suggesting though; those function pointers or abstract interfaces inhibit the kind of optimisations I was suggesting (e.g. inli
510.
by dwattttt 1y ago
It does sound like quite a similar model; unsafe Rust in self contained regions, safe in the majority of areas. FWIW in the case where you're not separating code via a dynamic library boundary, you give the compiler an opportunity to o

More ›