dvzk

15 ms·

121.
by dvzk 4y ago
Is the monarch just a figurehead, or a failsafe? I know nothing about UK politics, but sometimes I wonder if sovereign influence would re-emerge if democracy or society were to fail.
122.
by dvzk 4y ago
No, I do think Kiwifarms should have been prosecuted and unhosted, for failing to curtail frequent mass harassment threads against ordinary and mentally ill individuals, which led to real-world harm. I'm just not going to defend deplat
123.
by dvzk 4y ago
Just say that you want Kiwifarms deleted from the internet. There is nothing tenuous or uncertain about that stance, if you own it openly. Hiding behind concern over a false and un-serious threat is a coward's strategy.
124.
by dvzk 4y ago
It is kind of irritating for a commuter to dismiss competitive and fitness sports as hobbies, but that aside, the aforementioned trail parallels a major highway and it’s used by thousands of cyclists and commuters each day for the majority
125.
by dvzk 4y ago
It's a different cycling experience to live in an area with 30+ continuous miles of a paved and forested riverside bike trail and 50+ miles of interlaced dirt trails. Cars can barely be a threat consideration most of the time.
126.
by dvzk 4y ago
I disabled iCloud Photos sync some time ago, and even though there are some pain points, it's surprisingly easy to work without it. Just do a manual direct sync every so often. Run borg or bupstash to encrypt and backup the copied phot
127.
by dvzk 4y ago
I ended up hand sewing several patches onto my synthetic $100 MTB shorts just last week. No guides, and the process was excruciatingly long, but it turned out fine. Give it a shot! I gained a newfound respect for sewing.
128.
by dvzk 4y ago
I’ll let you know the outcome when someone jacks my custom $7000 bike from its truck bed rack for the second time.
129.
by dvzk 4y ago
Actually, it's more that many of us frequently risk the likely theft of our precious items, the permanent loss of which would be extremely damaging or upending. And the contrived examples of abuse cases are much less compelling, especi
130.
by dvzk 4y ago
This is the line which remotely stores your contacts encrypted E.164-formatted phone numbers: https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Android/blob/main/app/sr...
131.
by dvzk 4y ago
protobuf files just contain data structure definitions. StorageService.proto contains only one reference to StorageRecord, but Signal actually syncs hundreds of StorageRecords. Instead of linking to source code examples, which is easily mis
132.
by dvzk 4y ago
From my 5-minute reading of the Signal source code it seems that disabling the PIN results in the generation of a random 256-bit master key for cloud storage encryption: https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-iOS/blob
133.
by dvzk 4y ago
I do think considering the average use case is paramount. That's why I think remote encrypted contacts storage should have never been implemented: most people won't choose strong passwords. Giving them the false notion that their
134.
by dvzk 4y ago
Basically there are many options, none of them perfect: 1. Support phone number contact discovery, with persistence provided by the contacts provider. This is seamless and causes the least amount of complaints. 2. Support username discovery
135.
by dvzk 4y ago
Most people will choose weak passwords given the option. And so I think it's the responsibility of the developer to enforce strong requirements ( edit: when dealing with data encryption susceptible to brute-force attacks ): entropy est
136.
by dvzk 4y ago
I think developers have a moral responsibility to make their products as secure as possible, within reason and while still being usable. It doesn't matter if the users care about the benefits. To your second question: no, not yet.
137.
by dvzk 4y ago
It was because of over-represented complaints about phone number requirements that Signal implemented the mistake that is SGX and server-side contact lists. Now the social graph of millions of Signal users is instead centrally protected by
138.
by dvzk 4y ago
It won't prevent theft of ephemeral SSH session keys, but consider using a HSM or at least a TPM (with Termius, or Secretive) for long-term private key storage. 2FA will situationally help with the other concerns. (You can and probably
139.
by dvzk 4y ago
I’m torn between thinking it’s voting manipulation or the network effect of creating a desirable product so simple nearly anyone can use it. A huge amount of Tailscale comments are from people who find configuring trivial Wireguard tunnels
140.
by dvzk 4y ago
Sadly almost none of that is complex or surprising if you’re used to dealing with DNS deployments on Linux or BSD. What’s new is bundling a custom system name resolver for machines that can’t forward matching domain requests to specific nam
141.
by dvzk 4y ago
Custom peer to peer networks over Wireguard are theoretically more secure. A list of additional potential adversaries who can remotely access your Tailscale network without client manipulation: - Tailscale’s coordination server - Tailscale’
142.
by dvzk 4y ago
It doesn’t matter if they are real. If the topic is about practical suggestions for reducing the attack surface of current systems, it’s the wrong place to bring up global surveillance and vague allegations about vendor trust and world gove
143.
by dvzk 4y ago
Distinguishing between security and privacy is important, because otherwise you get a bunch of uninformed conspiracists who insist that hardening a machine involves installing Tor; or that using Google is bad, in a topic about using cryptog
144.
by dvzk 4y ago
If you use uBlock's advanced mode to default-deny scripts or third-party resources then no other extension comes close. (Except for uMatrix, which is by the same developer.)
145.
by dvzk 4y ago
Requiring an administrator or other device to pre-authorize or manually approve a new device, by signing the new device key with a client signature key. Why would you expect anything else? That’s like saying Wireguard or SSH servers should
146.
by dvzk 4y ago
I've never used or examined Tailscale either, but I assumed that: - Tailnet traffic needs to be associated with an approved device key - Tailnet device addition needs to be signed by the offline key of another approved device If a comp
147.
by dvzk 4y ago
And? This just proves you lack a fundamental principle for or against discrimination. That’s fine, you do not need one. But you can’t refute a categorical opposition to discrimination by listing more subcategories of discrimination.
148.
by dvzk 4y ago
It’s rare to find any ethics professors who argue in favor of moral relativism in this manner. A vast majority are realists or constructivists who would easily claim that Romans were bad for practicing slavery and forced combat for fun.
149.
by dvzk 4y ago
The inconsistency gotchas in this thread are hilarious. “What if you replace religion with race or gender?” “What if you replace AI with god?” If your answers change then you have no principles.
150.
by dvzk 4y ago
Have you described your reasons for not migrating to Wireguard in v2.0? Is it partially because Wireguard only really has a portable (and heavyweight) Go implementation that's also tightly bound to OS networking primitives? I'm ma

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