dlubarov

55 ms·

781.
by dlubarov 8y ago
Another flaw we can abuse is Java's covariant array types: Object[] objects = new Integer[] {1, 2, 3}; objects[0] = "hello"; Also compiles but fails at runtime.
782.
by dlubarov 8y ago
I don't think circuit depth matters for SNARKs? Though there are other proof systems where AND depth matters. Also, though I haven't read the CODA paper either, I think they would only need a single fixed circuit containing a SNAR
783.
by dlubarov 8y ago
I don't quite understand where the doubt is coming from; why would recursion depth affect security?
784.
by dlubarov 8y ago
> I think that the security of recursively computed snarks decreases as the recursion depth increases These proof systems are parameterized to ensure a certain soundness error, like 2^-128. So as long as certain cryptographic assumptions
785.
by dlubarov 8y ago
I would add Katz et al's proof system: https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/475 It has very practical proof times and sizes for a certain range of circuit sizes. E.g. we can prove knowledge of a LowMC-256 key with ~40kb,
786.
by dlubarov 8y ago
There are some working solutions now, like NEO, Dash, and NXT. Ethereum is sure to adopt it as well; a lot of details are TBD but there's little question that the community will adopt some form of PoS. I'm not saying it's per
787.
by dlubarov 8y ago
That used to be the case, but the build tools have supported lambdas for a while now, and it works even on very old devices. On the other hand, Java 8 classes like java.util.Stream only exist on API 24+ devices. So if you want to support ol
788.
by dlubarov 9y ago
That's pretty accurate. One minor thing: > developers wouldn't feel any difference The details haven't been decided yet, but developers will need to deal with some kind of locking or "yanking" [1] mechanism in or
789.
by dlubarov 9y ago
Another approach is to have several parties (perhaps every block creator) contribute a number. Then we concatenate the numbers and feed them through a delay function, which should take everybody a certain minimum amount of time to compute,
790.
by dlubarov 9y ago
It seems like your criticizing his analogous use of "identity", but not the underlying idea. Perhaps the idea is more clear if it's framed in terms of votes rather than identities. Mining on top of a particular fork can be vi
791.
by dlubarov 9y ago
Not sure what you mean by blobs? If Slack implemented a scheme like this, they should sign a message which includes metadata like the org name, channel name and timestamps in addition to text.
792.
by dlubarov 9y ago
I haven't read most of the paper (59 pages!) so I might be missing something, but let's say I'm receiving Lightning payments from my employer and sending Lightning payments to my landlord. When my channel to my landlord runs
793.
by dlubarov 9y ago
I think it's okay if users could settle reasonably often, but unless the main chain's capacity is greatly increased, that won't be the case. If 7 billion people used Bitcoin today, the current ~4 TPS capacity would only be en
794.
by dlubarov 9y ago
Lightning Network isn't really a satisfying solution in my opinion. It means that Bitcoin will just be a low-capacity settlement layer, and regular purchases will need to use PayPal-like middlemen to avoid hefty fees. There are a few o
795.
by dlubarov 9y ago
Assuming a flawless CSRNG, 128 bits of entropy is more than enough to withstand current attack power. It's hard to predict the future -- quantum computers employing Grover's algorithm could conceivably have 2x or more attack power
796.
by dlubarov 9y ago
Thanks for clarifying; I didn't realize that was Windows' behavior.
797.
by dlubarov 9y ago
> So if that creation certificate expires (or is revoked) it calls into question the validity of the signature(s) created from that certificate. Are you arguing that already-installed drivers should no longer be trusted? I can't tel
798.
by dlubarov 9y ago
> If an attacker has access to the cable outside your home they have already won, it's game over. Not if I'm looking at the block times or PoS participation rates. The attacker can feed me their own fork while preventing me fro
799.
by dlubarov 9y ago
Isn't relying on IP diversity as a measure of attack difficulty a bad assumption in the first place? If an attacker has access to the cable outside my home, then they can pretend to control as many IPs as they want. It seems to me that
800.
by dlubarov 9y ago
I've also been looking but haven't found any better communities. A cryptocurrency StackExchange has been suggested [1], but hasn't happened. Bitcoin.SE and Ethereum.SE do have some good general content, but you have to filter
801.
by dlubarov 9y ago
According to figure 2 in your second link, a blockchain with 1.5 rounds per block (or one block every ~19 seconds, based on their round length estimate) can withstand at least 40% hash power attacks. That seems like a reasonable tradeoff to
802.
by dlubarov 9y ago
10 minutes was Satoshi's very rough guess at what a reasonable compromise might be. He didn't have any empirical data and probably didn't give it much thought. Since then we have some real data about propagation times, e.g. [
803.
by dlubarov 9y ago
Such contracts would not really add any net costs to the system, since they cost virtually no resources. Whereas if I send $100 to the winner of a PoW contest, then $99 worth of electricity will be expended. Even if the contracts did add so
804.
by dlubarov 9y ago
> the value diverted to coin purchases ultimately has a cost in goods and services I see what you mean, but that opportunity cost applies to all currencies. Every dollar we hold in currency (be it fiat, PoW or PoS) could have been invest
805.
by dlubarov 9y ago
True but at the end of the day, someone is going to be holding the coins, and that entity is better off holding PoS coins that PoW coins. We can tweak the scenario to say that you're forced to buy and simply hold one of the currencies,
806.
by dlubarov 9y ago
That's true, but PoW currencies have the same opportunity cost -- if you buy Bitcoin you can't invest the same funds else. Let's say you were forced to invest all your savings in either a PoW or a PoS currency; no other inves
807.
by dlubarov 9y ago
You're right, I missed that, but > The coins will have to be rewarded on a completely effort-blind basis He's right that an effort-blind system is impossible, but that doesn't matter as long as the expected costs of influe
808.
by dlubarov 9y ago
> can't I send one of the 10 people $99 today, and he pays me out in 10 days? But if he already received the $100, why would he trade his $100 for your $99? Are you saying the recipient might want $99 now rather than $100 later? Let
809.
by dlubarov 9y ago
I see how you could read it that way based on the first half-sentence, but if you read the rest, it's saying that C=R is not always true.
810.
by dlubarov 9y ago
The idea that marginal costs necessarily approach marginal revenues is plain wrong. The Ethereum wiki [1] says it best: > It's not enough to simply say that marginal cost approaches marginal revenue; one must also posit a plausible

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