djao

11 ms·

91.
by djao 4y ago
1. No current system is truly hands-free. The GM and Ford systems technically allow you to take your hands off the wheel, but this compromises safety. Tesla could do the exact same thing (they have an in-cabin camera which can tell if your
92.
by djao 5y ago
> Most PAKE systems nowadays use Diffie-Hellman assumptions, which can be broken by a quantum computer. There are some ideas on how to transition their underlying algorithms to the post-quantum world; but these seem to be so inefficient
93.
by djao 5y ago
This is absurd. The timeline is irrelevant. Andrew is committing gross abuse of power. Regardless of why or how such abuse is "justified", the abuse in and of itself is reason to leave the network.
94.
by djao 5y ago
If WhatsApp users want to switch en masse to a new platform, they have to manually reconstruct their chat groups and their contact lists, install an entire new app, learn how to use the new app, work around any features that WhatsApp had wh
95.
by djao 12y ago
In 1980, about 2% of R01 recipients were under age 30. So yeah, it's early, but not totally impossible. In 2010, about 0.1% of R01 recipients were under age 30. That's bordering on impossible.
96.
by djao 13y ago
The part about having to use HMAC for keyed hashing is (hopefully) going to be obsolete soon. SHA-3 is explicitly designed to be safe under the H(key+message) usage.
97.
by djao 13y ago
That makes it slightly harder. Still, Apple will sign anything that is successfully submitted to the App Store for approval, right? So you just need to slip a single trojan past their approval process. Normally, the transport layer provides
98.
by djao 13y ago
Doesn't matter, the system updater can blow away Chrome or anything else.
99.
by djao 13y ago
Anyone who thinks Chrome and Firefox are safe from this bug doesn't understand the issue. SecureTransport is used for updating software. So an attacker could trick you into installing a malicious update to Chrome, FireFox, or for that
100.
by djao 13y ago
Generally speaking, attacks which rely on more structure are hard to adapt to situations where there is less structure. Conversely, attacks which require no structure are easy to generalize to a wide variety of situations. Something like Po
101.
by djao 13y ago
The thing is, some people think we're already on a 10-year clock. Quantum computers represent a very real threat, and there are no theoretical obstacles to their implementation. So yes, we should be migrating to something else. These l
102.
by djao 13y ago
My experience as someone who is active in research in this exact field (mathematical cryptanalysis) is that generic techniques for discrete logarithms, such as Pollard rho or the number field sieve, do transfer well to integer factorization
103.
by djao 13y ago
Attaching specific numbers to an expression like L(1/4) is meaningless, because L(1/4) is an asymptotic expression. Asymptotic expressions contain implied constants, whose values are not explicit. There's also no particular r
104.
by djao 13y ago
There is a difference between "Here's an example of a cryptosystem that got attacked" and "Here's an example of an attack against RSA."
105.
by djao 13y ago
You are perhaps referring to Boneh's comments at the RSA conference last February. Boneh cited the new attacks in the context of arguing that we should diversify away from RSA and DH. The implication, to me, was one of general caution
106.
by djao 13y ago
Well, now you're changing the goalposts. You originally said 64kbit, not 16kbit. Key generation is roughly O(n^4) in the bit size. If you quadruple the key length, the time goes up by a factor of 4^4, or 256. Key generation time is not
107.
by djao 13y ago
The only relation between the two problems is that they involve the same type of equation. The underlying number systems are totally different. There is no reason to expect the two problems to be of comparable difficulty. As an illustrative
108.
by djao 13y ago
You're assuming unrestricted discrete logarithms over a composite modulus. This is a much stronger assumption than discrete logarithms over prime moduli. Even if someone found a fast way to break discrete logarithms modulo primes, your
109.
by djao 13y ago
RSA with 65536-bit keys is quite secure, but it's hugely impractical. Try it in OpenSSL. Key generation alone will take you several hours on a fast, current-generation machine.
110.
by djao 14y ago
Also among the blog commenters is NDE (Noam Elkies), who was my Ph.D advisor.