digiown

10 ms·

151.
by digiown 9mo ago
I meant the platform openness aspect, that you are allowed to use alternate clients, but the identity is centralized E2EE is largely independent of this choice.
152.
by digiown 9mo ago
4-way stops are terrible in general. They train people to think "I stopped, now I can go", which is dangerous when someone confuses a normal stop for a 4-way stop. It also wastes a good bit of energy.
153.
by digiown 9mo ago
It works better here than most other types of blacklists, since networks take time to build up, and the "value" of social media is mostly derived from the fact that you can use it to interact with other people, not the software it
154.
by digiown 9mo ago
The relative lack of dark patterns is true, but the more distinguishing feature is that HN is boring to the majority of people, and isn't destructive because not using it doesn't make you excluded from society, and hence it has li
155.
by digiown 9mo ago
We probably can't make it free for all, but for something like a messaging app, we also need to recognize that it isn't optional to function in society. It should be regulated more like a utility: - Facebook can still control the
156.
by digiown 9mo ago
You need a passport associated with it, you don't necessarily need to be an adult I think. Or the parent's is fine. Either way you will have to try quite hard to get a FB account not associated with a real life identity. And then
157.
by digiown 9mo ago
You already basically can't use most mainstream platforms anonymously. Try registering a Facebook without a phone number (you need to give a passport to get one in most of Europe).
158.
by digiown 9mo ago
I'd draw a line using some of these aspects: - Algorithmic recommendation / "engagement" engineering - Profit/business model - Images/Videos - Real-life identity
159.
by digiown 9mo ago
> Attestation is also a security feature I don't actually disagree with this. The auditor is a perfectly valid use of it. It's good to be able to verify cryptographically your device is running what it's supposed to. The
160.
by digiown 9mo ago
> teach apps who they should trust Ah, the apps^Wgovernment (look at that page, most of it is government IDs) should be able to discriminate against me for daring to assert control over my own device. And GrapheneOS is saying: Hey govern
161.
by digiown 9mo ago
I secretly wish it would use a verification scheme that's so invasive/annoying, that even adults would stop using it anyway.
162.
by digiown 9mo ago
Can't this can be done in a less invasive way by whitelisting the emergency numbers and putting an extra button somewhere that sends the location?
163.
by digiown 9mo ago
You can re-sign it using https://github.com/chenxiaolong/avbroot I don't currently have any root on the phone, but I reserve the right to add it or run the userdebug build at a later date
164.
by digiown 9mo ago
GrapheneOS also doesn't give you the encryption keys. If you run the official version, there is no way for you to extract the data from your device at all beyond what app developers will let you access. This means that you do not own t
165.
by digiown 9mo ago
Or Apple can also push an update, which you can't refuse, that upon first message to iCloud just uploads your private key. It's a bit foolish to count on encryption implemented by the adversary you're trying to hide from. Of
166.
by digiown 9mo ago
You can grab a data export from privacy.apple.com
167.
by digiown 9mo ago
Dunno, building a Google competitor? How do you think Google got started?
168.
by digiown 9mo ago
That's not permissionless afaik. "Users" can't really do it. It's frustrating that all these legislations appear to view it as a business problem rather than a private individual's right to communicate securely
169.
by digiown 9mo ago
What kind of RF can travel through a few mm of metal?
170.
by digiown 9mo ago
GrapheneOS by default autoreboots after 18 hours. You can reduce it much further, to as little as 10 minutes. This deletes the keys from memory and prevents a whole range of AFU attacks that sometimes happens.
171.
by digiown 9mo ago
For an organization, a better strategy is to never store anything of value on the phone, and have a remote server in a safe place. The phone acts as a thin client to access server. The key in turn is easy to hide in a plausibly-deniable way
172.
by digiown 9mo ago
xkcd 538 can be defeated by a duress wipe feature like the one GrapheneOS has. Your life might be in jeopardy, but the data will be safe.
173.
by digiown 9mo ago
> a different finger Though with all the devices GrapheneOS supports, there are only two fingers you can plausibly use with the device: the thumb, usually on your dominant hand. It is quite awkward to be using anything else.
174.
by digiown 9mo ago
Obviously it will work. But it's fairly likely this will get you arrested for destroying evidence.
175.
by digiown 9mo ago
It's not quite settled whether the FBI is able to demand you to decrypt data for now. If this becomes widespread enough, they might try to get SCOTUS to decide this, which may or may not end privacy once and for all.
176.
by digiown 9mo ago
GrapheneOS has a nice feature where you can use both the fingerprint and a short passcode to avoid having to type out your longer/more valuable password all the time. Seems like a good solution to the problem. Also, iirc iphones have t
177.
by digiown 9mo ago
Can you remove the modem or sim card to prevent it from phoning home without disabling these features?
178.
by digiown 9mo ago
A lot fewer people should be behind the wheel than is currently the case in most countries. Unfortunately in the world we live in we need to make do with less than perfect solutions for this.
179.
by digiown 9mo ago
Yeah, but the whole point of Google's locked down system and integrity APIs is to offer a way to subjugate users and transfer power from the users to the providers. Arguably it shouldn't work in an ideal competitive market where m
180.
by digiown 9mo ago
They are putting their money behind their words, unless there is some backroom deal we don't know about. If a human operator + FSD is twice safer than human operator alone, then FSD is still a large safety improvement. Considering how

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