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dchest
searching PlanetScale…
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25 ms
·
331.
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by
dchest
5y ago
Yeah, this paper is a good representation of the whole "chaos cryptography" theme — snake oil cryptography invented by authors who don't even attempt to study cryptography before producing their bullshit and publishing it in
332.
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Until iOS 6, every bit of editable styled text on the system was a web page
(twitter.com)
4 points
by
dchest
5y ago
|
0 comments
333.
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by
dchest
5y ago
Perhaps, you can start by learning what WASM is: https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/WebAssembly As for vulnerabilities, here are nccgroup's slides about WASM explots: https://i.blackhat.com&#
334.
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by
dchest
5y ago
No, on the contrary, it makes the attack surface larger.
335.
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by
dchest
5y ago
Got integrated into JPEG XL.
336.
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by
dchest
5y ago
Right, nosniff doesn't apply to images.
337.
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by
dchest
5y ago
Thanks!
338.
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by
dchest
5y ago
That's probably because OP's server doesn't serve a correct Content-Type header for AVIF and also disables content type sniffing. Needs: AddType image/avif .avif
339.
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by
dchest
5y ago
It's easier to do this on the server side based on Accept header, e.g. for Apache to serve image.jpg.webp instead of image.jpg: RewriteCond %{HTTP_ACCEPT} image/webp RewriteCond %{REQUEST_FILENAME}.webp -f RewriteRule ^&#x
340.
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by
dchest
5y ago
Ceci n’est pas une pipe.
341.
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by
dchest
5y ago
Hiring more developers is overrated.
342.
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Usability Test Demo by Steve Krug
(youtube.com)
2 points
by
dchest
5y ago
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0 comments
343.
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by
dchest
5y ago
Please stop harassing open source developers.
344.
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by
dchest
5y ago
More like "100 ASCII characters. Unknown number of emojis." You'll get codepoints truncated if you use bytes.
345.
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by
dchest
5y ago
They all have a fixed-length internal state and will have internal state collisions regardless of the output size. (Basically, they "consume" input into the state and then "expand" the resulting state into the output.) S
346.
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by
dchest
5y ago
Probably their video player has DRM plugin enabled ( https://player.support.brightcove.com/plugins/configuring-br... ) just in case they need to publish a DRMed video and probes Firefox for DRM support for all videos, wh
347.
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by
dchest
5y ago
Gmail always had a loading screen.
348.
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by
dchest
5y ago
There were multiple emails with multiple fake identities from these domains: envoiemail.fr novatormail.ru potomacmail.com princetondmarcstudy.org princetonprivacystudy.org yosemitemail.com They also send different messages
349.
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by
dchest
5y ago
Is this for Apple's data collaboration with OpenStreetMaps? I don't get it — both countries seem have very good coverage in OSM, but not in Apple Maps.
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by
dchest
5y ago
OpenStreetMap is indeed awesome in this area. I wonder why Apple can't just import their fresh data for a few years already.
351.
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by
dchest
5y ago
As far as I know, there are no border disputes related to the area I posted about.
352.
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by
dchest
5y ago
Meanwhile, in other parts of the world it cannot even get the shape of land and country borders right. Here's an example on the border of Montenegro and Albania: https://imgur.com/a/B3aVJYH
353.
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by
dchest
5y ago
Hm, you're right: they even had a big "Earlier Today" label when they showed this piece live.
354.
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by
dchest
5y ago
Biking to the spaceport was in the promotional video released a few days before the flight (where they announced "astronauts"), obviously it couldn't be filmed on the flight day.
355.
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by
dchest
5y ago
Facial and fingerprint authentication is the most successful and practical security feature protecting billions of computers which would have been unprotected otherwise. It should not be dismissed like that, and I’m glad the work is being d
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by
dchest
5y ago
If an extension can modify getRandomValues, then all your other code is also untrusted, you can't work around it by using other methods to generate randomness.
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by
dchest
5y ago
I can't imagine a situation when you don't trust getRandomValues, but trust touch/mouse inputs. If your getRandomValues is untrusted, why would you trust the whole JS runtime that implements it? If you think there's a De
358.
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by
dchest
5y ago
getRandomValues() already takes input from keyboard and mouse interrupts (via the OS PRNG) and lots of other sources, no need to create own bug-ridden implementations of the same thing.
359.
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by
dchest
5y ago
There is no better solution for the client-side web. getRandomValues() generates cryptographically secure random bytes in all current popular browsers.
360.
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by
dchest
5y ago
This looks like https://codemadness.org/stagit.html Other popular choices are gitweb and cgit (both dynamic).
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