cryptbe

16 ms·

61.
Bad life advice – Replay attacks against HTTPS(blog.valverde.me)
1 points by cryptbe 11y ago|0 comments
62.
A Whirlwind Tour of Galois Theory(vnhacker.blogspot.com)
2 points by cryptbe 11y ago|0 comments
63.
Why not validate Curve25519 public keys could be harmful(vnhacker.blogspot.com)
1 points by cryptbe 11y ago|0 comments
64.
by cryptbe 11y ago
Prior art: https://plus.sandbox.google.com/+AleksandrDobkin-Google/post... .
65.
Vietnam: A Hacker's Report(vnhacker.blogspot.com)
2 points by cryptbe 11y ago|0 comments
66.
by cryptbe 12y ago
> 3. For some historical reasons, many people feel the need to change keys regularly. This is rather misguided: key rotation makes sense in an army or spy network where there are many keys, and partial compromissions are the normal
67.
by cryptbe 12y ago
While I'm not 100% sure, it's likely that VNNIC has been 0wned. Rationale: VNNIC doesn't provide any online DNS management tools. One has to submit a paper request in person to change any DNS records. Edit: it looks like it&#
68.
by cryptbe 12y ago
POODLE worked not only against SSLv3, but also against any TLS implementations that check padding in SSLv3's style (e.g., just checking the last byte, and ignoring the rest of the padding). SSL accelerators from F5 and A10 were vulnera
69.
by cryptbe 12y ago
Speed. Key generation (and most other operations) in ECC is order of magnitude faster than in RSA, DSA or ElGamal. Last time I checked it took End-To-End's Javascript library seconds to generate a key pair in RSA, but only milliseconds
70.
by cryptbe 12y ago
Great question. The core crypto library in End-To-End has already supported ECDH on Curve25519 and Ed25519 since day one [1]. We're discussing with GnuPG team on extending RFC 6637 to include these algorithms in the OpenPGP standard. [
71.
by cryptbe 12y ago
Congratulations Werner and GnuPG team! > GnuPG now support Elliptic Curve keys for public key encryption. This is defined in RFC-6637. Because there is no other mainstream OpenPGP implementation yet available which supports ECC, the use
72.
by cryptbe 12y ago
> Sure you have control over the first N bytes. Look at the request-line: "GET /hello/world/this/is/my/url HTTP/1.1". Sure, you don't control the spaces, but you can assume any practical
73.
by cryptbe 12y ago
When Pornin disclosed CRIME I was telling myself: "Wait a minute, I saw this name somewhere." Then I remembered that it was Pornin's article [1] that helped me understand how zlib flush modes work. I thought that was pretty f
74.
by cryptbe 12y ago
If you want to learn the math, check out http://www.amazon.com/Introduction-Mathematical-Cryptography... .
75.
by cryptbe 12y ago
What might happen if r = s = -n? I think it's pure luck that this doesn't lead to a signature forgery.
76.
by cryptbe 12y ago
I took a quick look at your implementation of ECDSA and I think it has a bug at line 311 [1]. It looks like I could bypass the check if r or s is negative. One thing that I don't understand is why big integer libraries developed exclus
77.
by cryptbe 12y ago
Oh yeah, it was restricted to my team. I'll make it public, and notify you via email. BTW IDEA is not enabled/registered.
78.
by cryptbe 12y ago
Thanks for the report. I'll take a look and get back to you. Where can I contact you? Edit: I've just filed https://code.google.com/p/end-to-end/issues/detail?id=82 . We can discuss the problems of I
79.
by cryptbe 12y ago
> None of this bickering changes a simple truth: when a web mail provider claims to provide "NSA-proof" end-to-end encryption, hosted in Switzerland just to be safe, using software that you don't have to install on your co
80.
by cryptbe 12y ago
> So, it isn't actually a bit more challenging then? More challenging, yes. Riskier, no. I don't like that Javascript doesn't have native support for big integers (like Python does), or that it stores numbers as floating p
81.
by cryptbe 12y ago
> Seriously? It makes it more difficult to get things right, but the risk of getting it wrong is not increased? And that after you just described how the challenges of JS have already directly led to vulnerabilities? Well it seems that y
82.
by cryptbe 12y ago
Thanks for posting this article. I wrote it was a response to the Matasano's article that I saw on Hacker News a few days ago. I want to introduce many useful applications of Javascript crypto that I've seen, and I want to explain
83.
by cryptbe 12y ago
Interesting coincidence. I just wrote http://vnhacker.blogspot.com/2014/06/why-javascript-crypto-i... , in which I explain the threat model implied in the Matasano's article doesn't apply to most applicat
84.
by cryptbe 12y ago
Yes. This is something we or at least I would do in a few months.
85.
by cryptbe 12y ago
> Thanks for for reply. I'm wondering if you know if it's possible to use the AES-CFB mode from the Web Crypto Apis, since the OpenPGP CFB (resync) mode seems to have special requirements? I haven't looked into it. > Th
86.
by cryptbe 12y ago
DSA: https://code.google.com/p/end-to-end/source/browse/javascrip... .
87.
by cryptbe 12y ago
> I do expect users to hash the message before passing it to ECDSA, this way you could use any hashing library with it. Though, elliptic.js does actually depends on hash.js to seed it's PRNG. I think this isn't a good design be
88.
by cryptbe 12y ago
Thanks for the update on OpenPGP.js. > What are your plans in regards to web crypto? The plan is to use WebCrypto if it's available. We've moved RSA to WebCrypto, and the next targets are ECDH and ECDSA. > Also what is the p
89.
by cryptbe 12y ago
> his infamous's Crypto I class s/infamous/famous.
90.
by cryptbe 12y ago
Oh we haven't. Looks like it's a nice library. One question: it seems that you use the message directly, instead of its hash, in ECDSA? [1]. [1] https://github.com/indutny/elliptic/blob/master/l

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