cpgxiii

56 ms·

301.
by cpgxiii 6y ago
If you have a vision system that "just works" and produces high-quality pointclouds in an actual kitchen environment, with reflective appliances, silverware, shiny countertops, shiny ceramic dishware, and glasses, we would absolut
302.
by cpgxiii 6y ago
It's generally understood that motion planning for nontrivial problems is very non-convex, and it's basically impossible to predict if a given initial condition can be optimized to the global optima. Even simple convex 3D geomet
303.
by cpgxiii 6y ago
Of course we don't need full optimality for most problems, that's why RRTs and PRMs have proven useful on practical problems despite (RRTs especially) providing obviously suboptimal solutions. The problem is that really suboptimal
304.
by cpgxiii 6y ago
Depth estimation I wish it were as solved as vendors would like to believe it is. If you want a sensor for medium-range applications, say order 0.5m to 10m depth with better than 1cm accuracy, that works indoors and outdoors, with reflect
305.
by cpgxiii 6y ago
Purely in the space of geometry and simple motion planning, there are reasonable methods with guaranteed correct solutions, provided their sensor data is correct. Of course, combining correctness (the solution is actually safe), completenes
306.
by cpgxiii 6y ago
If you have high-quality 3D sensors (or in some cases, good-enough 2D cameras) and usable IMU/odometry, you can assemble quite reasonable 3D models for many small environments. The biggest challenges in a home environment are that many
307.
by cpgxiii 6y ago
In the area of Motion Planning (my own area of research), the most that can be said is that practical solutions exist for a tiny subset of cases, workable methods exist for a larger subset, expensive methods exist for a still larger s
308.
by cpgxiii 6y ago
In my experience with several Bazel projects, when everything works, it's great. But, the case where it doesn't work are way more painful than anything I've encountered from CMake + (make, ninja). Bazel is basically patho
309.
by cpgxiii 6y ago
It doesn't, at least not in any form you'd want to rely on. Bazel makes it easier than CMake to pull in externals in source form, but you'll still want to write Bazel build rules for them in most cases. In practice for C&#x2F
310.
by cpgxiii 6y ago
Allowing "unreachable" unsigned data to be appended to a MSI isn't really a threat in and of itself, since the data shouldn't be reachable from any of the valid parts of the file. I could easily see some tools appending
311.
by cpgxiii 6y ago
Well, then you've still destroyed small independent software vendors, open source projects, and individual projects for which the cost and complications of running an LLC as a liability shield is unsustainable. The issue with defining
312.
by cpgxiii 6y ago
To be fair, all Windows knows that a program, in this case the JRE, is registered to open the file. Nothing about that necessarily means "this file will be executed", nor that that program will interpret the file differently than
313.
by cpgxiii 6y ago
Java applets did actually have their own security model using signatures, which did not necessarily require the host OS to be part of that verification.
314.
by cpgxiii 6y ago
In this case the defect is with how Microsoft handles MSI files Except, of course, that Windows is absolutely correct in validating them as a MSI file. It just happens that it fails to correctly validate a file that is both a valid MSI
315.
by cpgxiii 6y ago
Sure, one would want Adobe to be the liable party in such a case. But that case wouldn't be too different from the current one, where the problem is Windows failing to warn on a file that is otherwise harmless which becomes harmful whe
316.
by cpgxiii 6y ago
Even better, those users are probably suffering from alert fatigue already due to all the security warnings about the ancient kvm software, so using a technique like this to bypass AV scans would probably be enough to compromise some major
317.
by cpgxiii 6y ago
In this case, the worst extent of the flaw is that Windows doesn't warn that a file used by a piece of third-party software could be dangerous. If you want a case like this to involve liability, that's what you have to include. I
318.
by cpgxiii 6y ago
It's not a bug in the JRE, but the bug is a problem because Windows itself doesn't see the file as dangerous, while the JRE invoked on it treats it as code to execute. Windows, on its own, is not aware that the file represents exe
319.
by cpgxiii 6y ago
To be specific, in that case the NSA wanted to install a malicious driver on Windows machines that required driver signature enforcement, so there was no other way to get a driver installed except to steal a certificate to sign their driver
320.
by cpgxiii 6y ago
I don't think it's too many assumptions. The number of personal Windows users with Java itself installed (rather than programs with their own bundled JRE) is probably very low at this point, so it means targets for this are either
321.
by cpgxiii 6y ago
Laws don't necessarily need to be specific, but if you rely solely on interpretation to distinguish between different types of responsibility involving third-party software, you will either achieve (1) appeals courts defining responsib
322.
by cpgxiii 6y ago
Hiding your malware in some other file is a good idea, although sticking it in an executable file format is only going to invite more attention and relies on your target only using security tools that assume Windows signed == safe. It str
323.
by cpgxiii 6y ago
How would you define criminal liability to achieve this? You have a bug that, at best allows a third-party runtime to execute a malicious program without warning the user that the program is untrusted. Practically, how would you write a s
324.
by cpgxiii 6y ago
I'm familiar with the concept of chaining multiple exploits to default different layers of security. That said, for step (2) to work, you need either: a) A separate vulnerability that provides arbitrary code execution to run your trigg
325.
by cpgxiii 6y ago
Sure, but if you already have code execution on the target to run the rename or directly invoke the JRE, either (1) you've already exploited the target or (2) lack of signature validation (since the rename script or equivalent to invok
326.
by cpgxiii 6y ago
Exactly, you can't have it be an MSI and a JAR, it has to be a JAR to invoke the JRE automatically. In terms of practical impact, it sounds like you need a target where the JAR file will be run, but also where you'd expect Window
327.
by cpgxiii 6y ago
Because you told the target "if you have trouble running it, right click and open it with Java" and you assume they'll do it? Not clear how you could automate without using a different vulnerability to invoke the JRE on the f
328.
by cpgxiii 6y ago
I don't see any way it would be possible for such a file to be simultaneously executed by the system as a MSI and as a JAR (you can probably always invoke the JRE on a .msi file, just not through the system file associations).
329.
by cpgxiii 6y ago
I don't think that follows from what's been disclosed. What seems to be the case, based on the disclosures, is that the signature validation code does a correct job validating the parts of the file the MSI header describes, but do
330.
by cpgxiii 6y ago
So if I get this right, the attack vector here is 1) Take signed .MSI 2) Add my JAR of malware to the end of it 3) Send file to target 4) Target's computer recognizes the file as a signed MSI, ignoring the extra stuff at the end that&#

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