briansmith

10 ms·

61.
by briansmith 11y ago
The idea is that the DSL compiler would be responsible for ensuring constant-timeness. Note that C, C++, and Rust offer no guarantee of constant-timeness. Even processors don't offer constant-timeness guarantees and some instructions (
62.
by briansmith 11y ago
I see I didn't do a good job of explaining why that doesn't work so well. See, papers on high-performance elliptic curve cryptography tend to give formulas for implementing calculations using the three-operand style I mentioned. O
63.
by briansmith 11y ago
I am not like Google, but I'm already doing something like that: https://github.com/briansmith/ring and https://github.com/briansmith/webpki .
64.
by briansmith 11y ago
> 6. Someone points out that in higher level languages it's hard to write code that is resistant against timing attacks. The discussion dies. This doesn't matter, because the code that should be resistant to timing attacks shou
65.
by briansmith 11y ago
> 5. People poo poo any alternative to OpenSSL because it's not 100% feature complete and besides the best crypto people are already working on OpenSSL so what do these schmucks know? Here's a strategy: Take OpenSSL, remove a b
66.
by briansmith 11y ago
If Rust doesn't work on Windows XP then generally Firefox can't use Rust, because Windows XP support is a requirement for Firefox.
67.
Tor Exit Nodes in Libraries – Pilot(blog.torproject.org)
215 points by briansmith 11y ago|58 comments
68.
by briansmith 11y ago
I'm glad y'all are working it out. The licensing for that stuff really is confusing, and discourages the use of that code. It's worse in OpenSSL because the x86 and ARM adaptations are licensed under the OpenSSL/Cryptogr
69.
by briansmith 11y ago
Not if the computer is configured to only run signed code, which is an option on Windows.
70.
by briansmith 12y ago
Some implementations--most unfortunately, Apple's--do not implement name constraints. Speaking from personal experience, writing code to correctly validate x509 certificates isn't as hard as it looks.
71.
by briansmith 12y ago
In Mozilla's implementation, name constraints are applied to the CN field. I believe Chrome is the same way. Also, browsers "validate domain names" against the CN attribute and the dNSName entries in the subjectAltName extens
72.
by briansmith 12y ago
There is something called "name constraints" in X.509 that can be used to control which domain names, email addresses, etc. a sub-CA certificate can issue certificates for. See [1]. CAs are using them more and more frequently, esp
73.
by briansmith 12y ago
I made the change to remove the version UI from Firefox. I made that change for two reasons: (1) It sped up the implementation of TLS 1.1 and TLS 1.2. Removing the UI meant I didn't have to redo the UI when I added TLS 1.1 and TLS 1.2
74.
by briansmith 12y ago
If you are referring to https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1036765 , that was an unrelated change that was made well in advance of my knowledge of this issue.
75.
by briansmith 12y ago
> There are a lot of places where it's totally not important. See my other replies on this page for some reasons why I think there are no pages where HTTPS is not important. I agree with you regarding the UI issues and the potential
76.
by briansmith 12y ago
Regarding (B): A few years ago Mozilla did some user research that showed that a significant percentage of people do perceive the passive[1] negative security indicators as indicating a problem with Firefox instead of the web page. Thus, su
77.
by briansmith 12y ago
FWIW, ~33% of all pages are loaded over HTTPS already in Firefox, according to the metrics collected by the browser. And, over 50% of all HTTP requests (including subresources like images and scripts embedded on a page) are over HTTPS, agai
78.
by briansmith 12y ago
Browsers completely stop the page from loading and show a full-page error for a certificate error. There's a huge difference between that and a small icon in the location bar. Plus, if the red icon that is suggested in that bug report
79.
by briansmith 12y ago
Aggregating the content of the web pages you have read can be used to deduce your identity, and/or the content of the web pages can be used to select you for targeting, like in the article I linked to above. For example, let's say
80.
by briansmith 12y ago
http://arstechnica.com/security/2014/07/the-nsa-thinks-linux...
81.
by briansmith 13y ago
You can see the CT peoples' comparison of CT to other technologies here: http://www.certificate-transparency.org/comparison One serious concern I see about TACK from the browser's perspective is the support burden
82.
by briansmith 13y ago
Mozilla tends to announce projects when they begin so people can contribute to them right away. I think that's a good thing and that's one of the reasons I work for Mozilla. By the way, I think this is an awesome effort by Josh an
83.
by briansmith 13y ago
I believe this merge shows the C code that implements the crush functionality: https://github.com/mozilla/mozjpeg/commit/c31dea21188b48498d...
84.
by briansmith 13y ago
First, define "properly."
85.
by briansmith 13y ago
Even though Firefox and Chrome both use the same TLS implementation (NSS's libssl), the ways in which Firefox and Chrome use it differ. Based on discussions with the credited researchers and with other members of the NSS team, Firefox
86.
by briansmith 13y ago
> (it's the TLS library for Firefox and Chrome) The False Start bug in NSS that you are talking about (CVE-2013-1740) never affected a released version of Firefox; we found the bug during testing of False Start in preparation for en
87.
by briansmith 13y ago
It would be hard to convince them to line up.
88.
by briansmith 13y ago
Firefox stopped using it on 2011-08-16. If you've seen Firefox using it recently when connecting through proxies, please let me know.
89.
by briansmith 13y ago
Ivan, it would be helpful to define what a "long max-age" is, exactly. In order to qualify for Firefox's HSTS preload list, max-age=10886400 or higher is required. Are you using the same boundary, or a different one?
90.
by briansmith 13y ago
Regarding #1 & #2: We need to find a way to drastically reduce (literally to zero) exploitable defects. Browsers, and especially Firefox, can go a lot farther here than they historically have. In the case of Firefox in particular, we&#x

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