bri3d

36 ms·

241.
by bri3d 9mo ago
The roadmap feature is light on details too: "When users connect to their organization's Wi-Fi, Teams will soon be able to automatically update their work location to reflect the building they're working from. This feature wi
242.
by bri3d 9mo ago
Here's the actual "roadmap" feature (scroll to the bottom where the filtered list is): https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/roadmap?search... The actual feature brief is: "When users c
243.
by bri3d 9mo ago
Yeah, at least in the case of most Naughty Dog games the main ELF binary is in itself a little binary format loader that fixes up and relocates proprietary binaries (compiled GOAL LISP) as they are streamed in by the IOP. It would probably
244.
by bri3d 9mo ago
JIT isn't _that_ common in games (although it is certainly present in some, even from the PS2 era), but self-modifying or even self-referencing executables were a quite common memory saving trick that lingered into the PS2 era - binari
245.
by bri3d 9mo ago
This is PS2 emulation, where most engines were still bespoke and every hack in the book was still on the table.
246.
by bri3d 9mo ago
A lot of PS2-era games unfortunately used various self-modifying executable tricks to swap code in and out of memory; Naughty Dog games are notorious for this. This got easier in the Xbox 360 and PS3 era where the vendors started banning se
247.
by bri3d 9mo ago
See also: XenonRecomp, which does the same thing for Xbox 360, and N64:Recompiled which does the same thing for N64. Note that this "recompilation" and the "decompilation" projects like the famous Super Mario 64 one are
248.
by bri3d 9mo ago
> If all they cared for was security, they would have worked with other Android-based operating system vendors that support bootloader locking to come with an industry-wide standard. Google actually "gave" customers the choice
249.
by bri3d 9mo ago
> it will be used for movies, government services, banks I really, really don't think these entities care enough about desktop Linux. I'd be way more worried about some kind of Windows web-based attestation appearing. If that h
250.
by bri3d 9mo ago
> There is: corporate will fund this project and enforce its usage for their users not for the sake of the users and not for the sake of doing any good. I'd really love to see this scenario actually explained. The only place I could
251.
by bri3d 9mo ago
It's the same train of thought as the modern cloud software notion that deploying small changes more often is safer than bundling "releases"; if you upgrade 3 packages 3x a week (or deploy 50 lines of code 3x a week), you cat
252.
by bri3d 9mo ago
The idea is that by protecting boot path you build a platform from which you can attest the content of the application. The goal here is usually that a cloud provider can say “this cryptographic material confirms that we are running the app
253.
by bri3d 9mo ago
I don’t see anyone investing in this for general purpose desktop Linux in the state desktop Linux exists today; the harbinger of the Desktop Linux Apocalypse would be web-based Windows attestation (just as Android attestation is eroding alt
254.
by bri3d 9mo ago
Yes, I reference Android client attestation in my comments in this thread frequently. I actually see this company as likely to be the flip side of the “bad” client attestation coin; server attestation actually provides a lot of nice propert
255.
by bri3d 9mo ago
> The technology already exists and also there is unmet industrial market demand for the technology. The "bad" version, client attestation, is already implemented on Android, and could be implemented elsewhere but is only a par
256.
by bri3d 9mo ago
The technology needed to implement DRM has been there for 20+ years and has already evolved in the space where it makes sense from an "evil" standpoint (if you're on that particular side of the fence - Android client attestat
257.
by bri3d 9mo ago
I am fairly confident that this company is going to assure corporations that their own code is running on their own computers (ie - to secure datacenter workloads), to allow _you_ (or auditors) to assure that only _your_ asserted code is al
258.
by bri3d 9mo ago
> Before this point in time, Linux never supported being an immutable image. What? As just one example, dm-verity was merged into the mainline kernel 13 years ago. I built immutable, verified Linux systems at least ten years ago, and it
259.
by bri3d 9mo ago
I don't see how this relates in any way to Amutable and it has been a "concern" for 20+ years (which has never come to pass). How do you think this relates at all?
260.
by bri3d 9mo ago
> but considering Windows requirements drive the PC spec, this capability can be used to force Linux distributions in bad ways What do you mean by this? Is the concern that systemd is suddenly going to require that users enable some kind
261.
by bri3d 9mo ago
The typical HN rage-posting about DRM aside, there's no reason that remote attestation can't be used in the opposite direction: to assert that a server is running only the exact code stack it claims to be, avoiding backdoors. This
262.
by bri3d 9mo ago
Hacker News has recently been dominated by conspiracy theorists who believe that all applications of cryptography are evil attempts by shadowy corporate overlords to dominate their use of computing.
263.
by bri3d 9mo ago
I’ve posted about this on HN before; I think that there’s a dangerous second-order enshittification going on where people are so jaded by a few bad corporate actions that they believe that everyone is out to get them and hardware is evil. T
264.
by bri3d 9mo ago
> Surely the marginal revenue from the inconsequential number of sideloading users isn't attractive enough to justify that kind of strategic blunder. Or you could analyze this at the actual face value: the damage to Google’s brand c
265.
by bri3d 9mo ago
The OOBE (out of box experience) uploads the key by default (it tells you it’s doing it, but it’s a bit challenging to figure out how to avoid it) but any other setup method specifically asks where to back up your key, and you can choose no
266.
by bri3d 9mo ago
I've seen the Intel bare-metal stuff in enough automotive products to call it extant in the wild; I've only heard of it being used in video arcade stuff so maybe I was misinformed there. Anyway, I think we're both on the same
267.
by bri3d 9mo ago
You can do that on x86 too, the main difference is a combination of openness and who you need to sign an NDA with (which, granted, is a big difference, since most ARM vendors are more likely to be your friend than Intel). However, there are
268.
by bri3d 9mo ago
They're different problem spaces, TrustZone is a trusted execution environment and TPM is an API for performing key storage and attestation which revolves around system state (PCRs). Essentially, TPM is a standardized API for implement
269.
by bri3d 9mo ago
Note that it's really easy to conflate TPM and hardware root of trust (in part because UEFI Secure Boot was awfully named), and the two things are linked _only_ by measurements. What a TPM does is provides a chip with some root key mat
270.
by bri3d 9mo ago
> their own implementation of Trusted Boot which relies on the cryptography and secrets inside the SoC rather than TPM as in x86/UEFI boot process. TPM and x86 trusted boot / root of trust are completely separate things, linked

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