bascule

31 ms·

241.
by bascule 12y ago
If it is actually referring to IE6, in some ways IE's stagnation was helpful. Prior to IE6 was an arms race-like flurry of different browser vendors haphazardly slapping on features to their products, and the IE6 code freeze we saw the
242.
by bascule 12y ago
Pretty viable when you do statistical analysis across a large number of requests: http://matasano.com/research/TimeTrial.pdf https://github.com/dmayer/time_trial
243.
by bascule 12y ago
Nobody is questioning whether AES-GCM is a good algorithm or not, however you are using AES-GCM as part of a hand-rolled transport encryption protocol, and this is what's worrisome. Designing a transport encryption protocol is a diffic
244.
by bascule 12y ago
It isn't used for symmetric encryption algorithms. They're more easily made verifiably constant time as described in the blog post. It's a common way to protect something like RSA from timing sidechannels, however.
245.
by bascule 12y ago
Consul looks awesome. The only thing I don't like about it is they chose to use a homebrew encryption scheme for Serf's gossip protocol: http://www.serfdom.io/docs/internals/security.html (If you're
246.
by bascule 12y ago
Normally I'd agree the way an attack makes the leap from an academic paper to a cute name is a real-world PoC||GTFO, but c'mon, is this not the perfect name?
247.
by bascule 12y ago
Yes, okay, however my point was we don't actually need constant-time operation if the timing is uniformly random. Clearly that doesn't mean we introduce a random sleep, but it means we carry out computations in a way that timings
248.
by bascule 12y ago
> I understand the problems with adding a random delay to try to add "noise" to the measurements Actually, this isn't problematic at all... it's called random blinding: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki&#x
249.
by bascule 12y ago
AES-NI can be used to accelerate AES on Intel CPUs. CLMUL instructions (namely PCLMULQDQ) can be used to accelerate GCM. You need to use both in conjunction for a fast, constant-time AES implementation. However, the conclusion to draw is mo
250.
CREAM: the SSL attack you’ve probably never heard of(tonyarcieri.com)
90 points by bascule 12y ago|48 comments
251.
by bascule 12y ago
They already paid $100,000 for finding flaws in their system before: https://vk.com/wall-52630202_7858
252.
by bascule 12y ago
Postgres has great developer ergonomics but can be extremely challenging operationally at scale. Also: finding good Postgres DBAs is difficult.
253.
by bascule 12y ago
Maybe Node will finally get a free operator now: https://mail.mozilla.org/pipermail/es-discuss/2012-October/0...
254.
by bascule 12y ago
Not to mention that a large set of keys are known to be reflectively weak under Blowfish: http://iacr.org/archive/fse2007/45930168/45930168.pdf And of course there's ciphertext malleability attacks as it
255.
by bascule 12y ago
I guess you're a fan of rewriting type thunks over and over and over again, and don't care about the standard library implementing functionality or reusably. Whatever floats your boat, but in both C++ and Java people got tired of
256.
by bascule 12y ago
The lack of generics is definitely a problem. You can't write generic code, and end up having to write your own thunks for each type you want to use. The standard library can't expose generic facilities that work on any type. This
257.
by bascule 12y ago
I constantly see users of Go running into these problems. If you haven't, good for you I suppose.
258.
by bascule 12y ago
You can still send mutable state across channels, at which point it is shared and potentially racy. Race detectors only help you catch data races in the act (e.g. in production), they don't prevent them from happening in the first plac
259.
by bascule 12y ago
"Go feels under-engineered because it only solves real problems" This belies a multitude of real problems Go doesn't solve, like generics or preventing data races
260.
by bascule 12y ago
Simpsons Did It: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simpsons_Already_Did_It
261.
by bascule 12y ago
Agent forwarding is an antipattern, and insecure usage of it is prevalent. Forwarding it allows anyone who has root access on the remote system to impersonate you, and it can therefore be used to escalate privileges after a single system co
262.
by bascule 12y ago
Mosh implements a delta algorithm between the server's buffer and the client's buffer. This means if packet loss is occurring, to sync back up, the server only needs to send the delta of its state to the client. SSH, on the other
263.
by bascule 12y ago
You're correct there's a better term than "he-said, she-said" for accusing someone of a dirty tactic that you've used yourself. It's called "hypocrisy". Lyft is being a hypocrite.
264.
by bascule 12y ago
If the NSA can't attack the crypto (not saying they can, but maybe) they'll attack endpoint. Systems like QUANTUMINSERT allow them to selectively MitM your plaintext HTTP connections, directing your browser to load some asset that
265.
by bascule 12y ago
All that is old is new again: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mnet_(peer-to-peer_network)
266.
by bascule 12y ago
It definitely is a technical issue: Python simply doesn't support multiline expressions. Anything utilizing an indent block must be a statement by the nature of the Python grammar, and since lambdas pretty much require returning a va
267.
by bascule 12y ago
I thought this was a good post, but I wasn't impressed with the criticisms of other blog posts. Okay, perhaps I'm biased, because I wrote one of them, but how about I try to defend the other? The Matasano post is here: http:&#x2F
268.
by bascule 12y ago
tl;dr: these are a joke on the NIST curves and the "verifiably random" way in which they were defined. While being safe curves, they've been tweaked to include the hex string "BADA55" in the "verifiably random&
269.
by bascule 12y ago
See also http://cryptosphere.org
270.
by bascule 12y ago
We aim to make it an explicit goal, rather than implicit. Wherein other projects this is a "would be nice", in this project it's an absolute necessity for the project's security and therefore success.

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