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aw1621107
searching PlanetScale…
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31.
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aw1621107
2mo ago
> Carbon seems to have gone nowhere. At least as far as public info goes it's still being worked on. The GitHub repo [0] has pretty consistent activity and some recent-ish talks [1], one of which says that they are considering a 0.1
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aw1621107
2mo ago
Previous HN discussion here ( https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=42231489 ); 2024-11-24, 554 points, 653 comments
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aw1621107
2mo ago
> But it still depends on the requirements of the specific user project, whether the default is sufficiently fast I mean, "by default" means " by default ", not "in all cases". Situations that the default do
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aw1621107
2mo ago
> It claims to be "sufficiently fast by default", yet "sufficiently fast" depends entirely on the requirements of a specific user project. I think that's why the "by default" is there; the goal is to of
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aw1621107
2mo ago
> However, such an approach has previously not really worked for C++ with LLVM offload. Why would it work for Rust? I think that will depend on the exact reason(s) C++ with LLVM offload didn't work out? If Rust differs from C++ in a
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aw1621107
2mo ago
Oil self-sufficiency isn't quite as simple as oil production > oil exports because not all crude is the same and refineries generally aren't completely crude-type-agnostic. IIRC US refineries prefer processing "heavy"
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aw1621107
2mo ago
I'm not sure you need to? Rust references don't exist in C, after all. That being said I wouldn't be surprised if there were other factors that would weigh against considering FFI calls to Fil-C safe by default (e.g., Fil-C&#
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aw1621107
2mo ago
> Depends on a specific definition of "sanitizer" though. Hrm, I suppose a general definition would be something that you use to check for certain (unintended?) runtime behaviors? Though I also feel that could include hardened
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aw1621107
2mo ago
Multiple mutable pointers are fine. You need to be careful to ensure you don't turn them into multiple coexisting mutable references, though.
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aw1621107
2mo ago
> IANAL but is CircuitSeuss not committing a crime here by giving the advice > "If you are discussing illegal shit, don’t do it around people or devices you don’t completely trust. Retain plausible deniability." > Or is
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aw1621107
2mo ago
> Which would imply that's not the case, i.e., that we're not considering every pointer in every GC sweep. I think "every one of those pointers has to be followed on every cycle" as a blanket statement is not correct.
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aw1621107
2mo ago
> Not being able to exhaustively test simple problem absolutely means you can't exhaustively test massively more complex problem. "Simple"/"complex" doesn't necessarily imply "small"/&quo
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aw1621107
2mo ago
> If we only traced young objects Careful; just because you only collect in the new generation doesn't mean that you only trace the new generation. From my understanding a rudimentary generational GC design is to include the old gen
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aw1621107
2mo ago
Just because you can't exhaustively test one thing doesn't mean you can't exhaustively test anything.
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aw1621107
2mo ago
I was thinking that CDSChecker [0]-like tools like Rust's Loom [1] might be able to prune the write+checkpoint search space enough to make exhaustive checking feasible, though I'm far from knowledgeable enough about the implementa
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aw1621107
2mo ago
I mean, exhaustive tests are one way you can prove something.
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aw1621107
2mo ago
> what if this bug is still there but the timing window is now one CPU instruction? I think a model checker or something similar that can exhaustively cover a search space would suffice, though at that point I think the boundary between
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aw1621107
2mo ago
Ah, I see. Thanks for taking the time to elaborate!
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aw1621107
2mo ago
What recent change(s) were made?
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aw1621107
2mo ago
Making signed overflow EB would preclude using signed overflow for optimization though, which seems to be (correctly or not) considered an important use case.
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aw1621107
2mo ago
> It just becomes less a "sanitizer" you can always recommend everyone everywhere use, and more of just a heuristic thing that only really works if you design your code for its arbitrary desires. Sure, and that's basically
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aw1621107
2mo ago
> Of course, -fsanitize=unsigned-integer-overflow isn't enabled by default, and few people use it Sure, but it's still a counterexample for "you can't define it because it means sanitizers can't warn for it"
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aw1621107
2mo ago
> and also allows sanitizers to continue to flag it to developers so that they fix their bugs I've never really found this argument particularly convincing; as you say, sanitizers don't have to strictly adhere to the standard,
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aw1621107
2mo ago
For lack of the creativity needed for better wording (and hoping I'm not inadvertently going in circles here) - how so?
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aw1621107
2mo ago
Neither of those appear to say anything about treating floating point operations as associative nor reordering them as a standard optimization, let alone allowing the programmer to opt into such an optimization.
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aw1621107
2mo ago
> those optimisations are available on the respective JITs. I'd assume they aren't applied by default and/or without the programmer explicitly opting in to those altered semantics, though. Would you be able to show otherwi
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aw1621107
2mo ago
> But what problem is this then really solving? Well, I'd presume that's what the paper's "Introduction & Motivation" section is for. Do you take issue with the authors' statements there?
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aw1621107
2mo ago
> Compiler interoperability is the only ABI related problem area that's remotely in the scope for the C standard idk, given how ABI impacts the evolution of C I think it's not unreasonable to provide a mechanism by which ABI ca
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aw1621107
2mo ago
Not yet , at least. There's a paper in the works [0] and it's been continually updated for the past few years so at the very least it doesn't look like this approach has been outright rejected by the committee. [0]: https:&
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aw1621107
2mo ago
I'm... a bit confused? I wasn't thinking about inter-compiler interop at all.
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