andreyf

13 ms·

91.
by andreyf 9y ago
Not at all. You're making bets based on public information only you have realized is meaningful before informing the rest of the public to make money off that discovery. Quite a few folks make a lot of money this way and (nearly) every
92.
by andreyf 9y ago
If you're on a malicious site, LastPass will likely auto-fill all your passwords into the site. And also give them to the hackers who have root on all their cloud servers. They have a horrible track record of horrific bugs due to negli
93.
by andreyf 9y ago
:-(
94.
by andreyf 9y ago
If you use a password manager, it most likely won't auto-fill apple.com's passwords on https://www.xn--80ak6aa92e.com/
95.
by andreyf 9y ago
Pay for YT Red?
96.
by andreyf 9y ago
Only examples I have seen are closed source / available as services (e.g. http://en.savefrom.net/ )
97.
by andreyf 9y ago
Proper solution is to use something like this: http://wwwhtml5rockscom.readthedocs.io/en/latest/content/tut...
98.
by andreyf 10y ago
Care to name a point where a blockchain stood between MSS and Chinese dissidents? NSA and islamic radicalizers? SVR and someone Putin wants dead? I'm stoked about blockchains as much as anyone else (heck, I quit a job at Google and spe
99.
by andreyf 10y ago
Not with a programatic standard I can't. I'm saying they should make the equivalent of key server for GPG -- something simple. Problems with relying on a blockchain to validate domains against sophisticated adversaries range from
100.
by andreyf 10y ago
hate to be tinfoil-hat about this, but I2P seems sane in every way that Tor seems all-but-intentionally insecure in the face of sophisticated adversaries. this seems a good example of "fruitful surface area" for security vulns. an
101.
by andreyf 10y ago
never said they should. saying the kind of complexity presented by a blockchain is an insane way to work in low-trust environments with competent adversaries. they should be working on reducing the complexity in the trust model. I trust the
102.
by andreyf 10y ago
ew. gross. CAs : Web of Trust :: domains : what Tor should do
103.
by andreyf 10y ago
Yeah, I would only be a little surprised if it turns out to be feasible to reconstruct 3D shapes to freakish accuracy via wifi signals. Perhaps not anytime soon, though.
104.
by andreyf 10y ago
Fair. Although I'd presume he was genuinely unaware of the prior art here. A lot about wifi traffic is not what most people assume.
105.
by andreyf 10y ago
Your neighbor's wifi scale can't see your car, but it can "see" your wifi packets.
106.
by andreyf 10y ago
He explains his reasoning at the end.
107.
by andreyf 10y ago
Why?
108.
by andreyf 10y ago
Yes. Your bottleneck will most likely be network and CPU speed as that's used for encryption. Google around for specific numbers, but my intuition is that network will max out before CPU does even on the $5/mo instance.
109.
by andreyf 10y ago
If my ISP were to sell my data, how would they refer to me to the buyers? Would it be legal for them to use a cookie identifier in HTTP traffic they routed?
110.
by andreyf 10y ago
Why does he refer to OpenVPN as a "risky server"? Does it have a history of embarrassing security vulns?
111.
by andreyf 10y ago
Seems clear the question assumes you're generating code that actually increments the integer (i.e. repeating a single add instruction). An anecdote defending the question on a non-technical level: when I was a kid around 4 or 5 my dad
112.
by andreyf 10y ago
> At the very minimum it fosters distrust. why? how is someone who has been vetted by the IC as a trustworthy keeper of their secrets become less trustworthy? > CIA isn't stupid and tends to maintain relationships with former e
113.
by andreyf 10y ago
Someone posted a little early — apparently the default is coming in 58: http://www.androidpolice.com/2017/01/24/webassembly-enabled-...
114.
by andreyf 10y ago
1. Makes no difference. 2. Makes no difference. How do you know the CIA found these vulns, and that they weren't shared from IC partners? You are, at best, advocating a policy which would lead to an absolutely disastrous disadvantage t
115.
by andreyf 10y ago
1. It's the CIA and the NSA, as well as a host of friendly non-US intelligence agencies. They develop vulnerabilities, share them, and release them when the improvement to the defensive advantage the release provides outweighs the hind
116.
by andreyf 10y ago
Of course the NSA looks for software vulnerabilities, and it's a vital part of both their core missions. And of course they don't neutralize their offensive capabilities by immediately revealing all of them to software makers. The
117.
by andreyf 10y ago
The article does not mention specific exploits. I'll change my mind if they actually close vulnerabilities because of this, but as of now, it seems like a PR move without much substance. Never mind, look like I'm wrong :-) http:&
118.
by andreyf 10y ago
They care, just not as much as they would if it were their flagship product.
119.
by andreyf 10y ago
pretty sure they can afford it ;)
120.
by andreyf 10y ago
This one seems pretty bad: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=10...

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