agwa

12 ms·

121.
by agwa 2y ago
> It’s working: The price of zero-day exploits has already increased. The only thing they've shipped is no UB in constexpr code - i.e. code that wouldn't have been reachable by attackers in the first place. How could that p
122.
by agwa 2y ago
> Removing the root at `SCTNotAfter + max cert lifetime` is the appropriate thing. Note that Mozilla supports not SCTNotAfter but DistrustAfter, which relies on the certificate's Not Before date. Since this provides no defense agai
123.
by agwa 2y ago
The concern is that if you don't know how many times you should be tapping the YubiKey when you clone a git repo, then an attacker could slip in its own signing requests and you would dutifully tap the YubiKey to authorize them. If yo
124.
by agwa 2y ago
Linux distros universally use the Mozilla root store. So if a CA told Mozilla "to go pound sand" as suggested by likeabatterycar, the CA would end up distrusted not only by the "2.5%" of browser users, but by every Linu
125.
by agwa 2y ago
Their certificate will be automatically replaced 30 times and literally no one will notice or care?
126.
by agwa 2y ago
They are not literally the same, but the point of both measures is to encourage automation by server operators, and are strongly opposed by those who would prefer to keep managing certificates manually. My point is - Apple, like Mozilla, d
127.
by agwa 2y ago
Responding to revocations can be automated, and mature organizations like Amazon are presumably already doing that because revocations can already happen unexpectedly for reasons outside their control.
128.
by agwa 2y ago
Google Chrome also takes a hard line when it comes to revocation requirements, and Apple wants to limit certificate lifetimes to 45 days. Although neither have stated a position on random revocations, they are directionally aligned with Mo
129.
by agwa 2y ago
> If you let a disk run full weird shit happens. Only in buggy software that ignores errors from system calls. Obviously you can expect availability problems when you run out of space, but there's no excuse for losing data from co
130.
by agwa 2y ago
They know about the problem but appear uninterested in improving the situation: https://mariadb.com/kb/en/database-corruption-and-data-loss-...
131.
by agwa 2y ago
For example, try running this Go program: https://go.dev/play/p/atvS3j8Dzg- Or see the Botan documentation that explicitly says "Calling update several times is equivalent to calling it once with all of the a
132.
by agwa 2y ago
What do you mean by "incremental hashing"? Note that the Init-Update-Finalize API provided by many cryptography libraries doesn't protect against this - calling Update multiple times is equivalent to hashing a concatenated st
133.
Tell HN: US companies must file a BOI report by Jan 1 to avoid fines and prison
8 points by agwa 2y ago|1 comments
134.
by agwa 2y ago
https://jmp.chat/ has worked well for me. SMS is delivered over XMPP, and phone calls use either XMPP or SIP (I use SIP). They use person-to-person routes for SMS so none of the TCR BS applies.
135.
by agwa 2y ago
512 bit RSA used to be common in publicly-trusted certificates. That's very easily breakable on today's hardware. If quantum computers happen, all existing keys in the WebPKI will be broken.
136.
by agwa 2y ago
Every single CA - including non-profit CAs like Let's Encrypt - have made mistakes that require cert rotation. And sometimes it isn't mistakes that require cert rotation, but cryptographic breakthroughs that render the algorithms
137.
by agwa 2y ago
The author would be fine with vendoring. The problem is that Debian doesn't allow it.
138.
by agwa 2y ago
I predicted problems with STARTTLS 10 years ago: https://www.agwa.name/blog/post/starttls_considered_harmful (HN discussion at the time: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=8171838 ) I'm very
139.
by agwa 2y ago
To be clear, the new toolchain doesn't replace the old toolchain, but is installed alongside it, and is only used for modules that explicitly request the newer toolchain in their go.mod file.
140.
by agwa 2y ago
The binaries are fully reproducible from source[1] and are published in a transparency log to provide assurance that your go command is downloading the same binary as every other go command. This is state-of-the-art in preventing supply ch
141.
by agwa 2y ago
I just tested that and the trigger causes the INSERT to return no rows if the row already exists. It basically turns the ON CONFLICT DO UPDATE into ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING.
142.
by agwa 2y ago
The Master Services Agreement ( https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.utd.149... ) states: > The Service Specific Terms are incorporated by reference into this Agreement > “Service Specific Terms” me
143.
by agwa 2y ago
That only affects 72 certificates. They've delayed revocation for all 83,000+.
144.
by agwa 2y ago
> I definitely commend DigiCert for pledging to revoke the certificates within 24 hours and not having a delayed revocation or trying to language lawyer their way to a 5 day revocation as other CAs have tried. It seems I spoke too soon
145.
by agwa 2y ago
Interesting, that truly is issued by DigiCert. The end-entity certificates I see for microsoft.com, azure.microsoft.com, portal.azure.com are all issued by: C = US, O = Microsoft Corporation, CN = Microsoft Azure RSA TLS Issuing CA 0X [wher
146.
by agwa 2y ago
You're probably seeing the root certificate, which is operated by DigiCert. The intermediate CAs which issue the end-entity certificates are operated by Microsoft. Figuring out who truly issued a certificate is tricky business: https:
147.
by agwa 2y ago
Unlikely. Microsoft operates their own CAs. Although some of their CAs have been cross-signed by DigiCert, Microsoft is responsible for the domain validation.
148.
by agwa 2y ago
Unlikely. Microsoft operates their own CAs. Some of their CAs have been cross-signed by a DigiCert root, but Microsoft is responsible for the domain validation. I don't think they extensively use certificates issued directly by a DigiC
149.
by agwa 2y ago
There's no prohibition against issuing certificates for names on the Public Suffix List. BR 3.2.2.6 prohibits issuing a wildcard certificate for an entire public suffix unless the "Applicant proves its rightful control of the enti
150.
by agwa 2y ago
> The underscore prefix ensures that the random value cannot collide with an actual domain name that uses the same random value. While the odds of that happening are practically negligible, the validation is still deemed as non-complian

More ›