agwa

61 ms·

781.
by agwa 11y ago
Here are some examples of HMAC canonicalization vulnerabilities: http://www.daemonology.net/blog/2008-12-18-AWS-signature-ver... http://daeken.com/confusing-crypto-blobs
782.
by agwa 11y ago
You could use libsodium instead of NaCl, which has an AEAD interface: https://download.libsodium.org/doc/secret-key_cryptography/a...
783.
by agwa 11y ago
You're conflating private keys and parameters. The random number that ECDH requires you to generate is the private key, just as FFDH requires you to generate a random private key (which is also fast). If you were actually generating
784.
by agwa 11y ago
Java, before version 8, couldn't handle DH parameters larger than 1024 bits, so that may be a motive. But I suspect a large part of it has to do with the fact that OpenSSL left DH parameter configuration (also ECDH curve selection) up
785.
by agwa 11y ago
What do you (and pbsd) think of the site's recommendation to use custom 2048-bit parameters as opposed to a well-known 2048-bit group such as group 14 from RFC3526? Is it really that likely a nation-level adversary could break 2048-bi
786.
by agwa 11y ago
They collected and stored data unnecessarily, so former management absolutely shares blame.
787.
by agwa 11y ago
Yes, that's essentially the difference between a one-way function and a trapdoor function. I'm sure you knew this already, but for completeness, another property of the trapdoor function is: - Easy: given f and x find y.
788.
by agwa 11y ago
No, because in elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman, the private key isn't used to invert anything, as opposed to RSA (a true example of a trapdoor), where it is.
789.
by agwa 11y ago
That JSON export is cool - how did you generate it?
790.
by agwa 11y ago
When I try to import HPA's key from the public key servers, I get an "invalid subkey binding" error and the weak sub key isn't imported. That error means that the sub key isn't properly signed by HPA's master
791.
by agwa 11y ago
Indeed. And to be clear, I'm not saying we shouldn't be moving away from the CBC ciphers as fast as possible - just that dishing out a B grade for supporting a large number of users is not a good way of accomplishing that.
792.
by agwa 11y ago
Which flaw, specifically, would the latest version of Safari be vulnerable to?
793.
by agwa 11y ago
There are still many clients out there that do not support AE ciphersuites (e.g. literally every version of Safari). If SSL Labs capped the grade at B for supporting these clients, then the top grade at SSL Labs would effectively become a
794.
by agwa 11y ago
Indeed. Debian is one OS which is affected by this, because they shipped an outdated version of NSS (the crypto library used by Chrome) which does the suboptimal path generation. Yesterday, the latest version of NSS was finally uploaded to
795.
by agwa 11y ago
> There are no known security vulnerabilities with HTTP/1.x's style of compression That's because HTTP/1.x only supports compressing response bodies You are completely wrong. The BREACH attack showed that you can be
796.
by agwa 11y ago
Indeed, and they have been a source of some nasty security vulnerabilities in the past. If you're using libcurl, it's a very good idea to restrict redirects to HTTP and HTTPS only (with CURLOPT_REDIR_PROTOCOLS), lest a malicious
797.
by agwa 11y ago
It sounds like the list of people you're willing to receive calls from is pretty small. Have you ever actually received a phone call which spoofed the caller ID of someone you know? I haven't - all the spoofed calls I receive ar
798.
by agwa 12y ago
There are significant downsides to technically prohibiting caller ID spoofing. First, you would no longer be able to preserve caller ID when forwarding calls. Consider how much less useful Google Voice would have been if you couldn't
799.
by agwa 12y ago
> In the first link, the case is about a memo written on duty as part of the employee's role; a uniform is irrelevant (and the word 'uniform' is mentioned zero times in the document). The facts are not identical, but the f
800.
by agwa 12y ago
> Yes, they should be free to express their opinions. But free speech doesn't mean freedom from consequences. That's bad analysis. Free speech means freedom from government-imposed consequences, and since their employer is the
801.
by agwa 12y ago
Legally, they do not have the right of free speech when in uniform. See Garcetti v. Ceballos: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6711908971660042... And as a matter of principle, they should not. When in uniform,
802.
by agwa 12y ago
Since we're talking about aviation, that same overflow bug caused a meltdown of Southern California air traffic control in 2010 after someone forgot to preemptively reboot their Windows servers every 30 days: http://www.tech
803.
by agwa 12y ago
If you're interested in how you might isolate the private key in a separate process, as proposed by this article, I sketched out an implementation a year ago: https://www.agwa.name/blog/post/protecting_the_ope
804.
by agwa 12y ago
True, pinning the end-entity cert would require the attacker to factor the end-entity cert. But pinning the end-entity cert is like pointing a loaded gun at your foot (if you lose the key, and all your backups, you are screwed), and EFF is
805.
by agwa 12y ago
Not true. My sites have an A+ on SSL Labs with a 2048-bit RSA cert. Edit: you may be thinking of one of the numeric scores, which probably requires 4096-bit RSA to max out. But you'd be best served ignoring the numeric scores and jus
806.
by agwa 12y ago
Using 4096-bit RSA for the end-entity certificate is pointless. First, it's unlikely that an attacker will ever be able to break 2048-bit RSA but not 4096-bit RSA, either in the near or distant future. But for the sake of discussion,
807.
by agwa 12y ago
Why is something that you profess to hate suddenly acceptable in this situation?
808.
by agwa 12y ago
Indeed, the site is being served without a proper certificate chain: https://whatsmychaincert.com/?blankslate.io
809.
by agwa 12y ago
You're talking about the Facebook website, which is irrelevant to this discussion. If someone sends an insecure HTTP URL through Facebook chat, then Facebook has to make an insecure HTTP connection to that URL in order to scan it, whi
810.
by agwa 12y ago
Question: was the URL sent through Facebook chat an HTTPS URL? If it was, that would imply Facebook's involvement. But if it wasn't, it's possible that Facebook's scan was sniffed in transit and the URL was then sent o

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