agwa

55 ms·

691.
by agwa 10y ago
tajen advocated a CA-issued certificate along with the "require" option, which makes sense under no common scenario. If your network really is secure, you don't need TLS at all, so you can use "disable" and not bot
692.
by agwa 10y ago
> Just use ?sslmode=require and a CA-issued certificate. This is not secure. See Table 31-1 here: https://www.postgresql.org/docs/9.5/static/libpq-ssl.html#LI... As you can see, "require" provid
693.
by agwa 10y ago
The blog post raises several distinct issues. Heroku's poor configuration is the most significant issue, but it's also concerning that Postgres is insecure by default, and supports several different options to sslmode with confus
694.
by agwa 10y ago
HPKP is indeed quite rare. But I am very worried to see that you are pinning end-entity keys and have only a single backup pin. If you want to pin end-entity keys, I recommend pinning at least three backup keys, using both RSA and ECDSA o
695.
by agwa 11y ago
RFC6962bis is still a draft and there are no implementations of it yet, so actually they don't have the option to redact labels.
696.
by agwa 11y ago
According to your post, the FBI would only need to do that if they were "completely incompetent." You wrote, "unless they are completely incompetent, having read out the contents of the chip they should be able to decrypt it
697.
by agwa 11y ago
No, there's an essential difference between your post and the ACLU's: you suggested that the FBI would be able to brute-force the key off-chip, which is not true because the encryption key is derived in part from the device ID, wh
698.
by agwa 11y ago
I've been researching this recently and I think the Qubes approach is still the best. Some people use xpra, which is fundamentally very similar to Qubes (a compositor running inside a dummy X server), but xpra has been designed to run
699.
by agwa 11y ago
Yes, but that's not "rootless." The Qubes approach provides much better usability because the windows from the untrusted application appear individually and are managed by the host X server.
700.
by agwa 11y ago
I don't think it would be worthwhile to rewrite all of glibc, at least not initially. We should focus first on libraries that parse attacker-controlled input, such as glibc's DNS resolver, image libraries, font libraries, etc.
701.
by agwa 11y ago
How security sensitive is getaddrinfo? The recent vulnerability was actually in glibc's DNS client library, libresolv, not getaddrinfo itself (but it was triggered when using getaddrinfo). Therefore, I think that rewriting libresolv
702.
Domain Validation Vulnerability in Symantec Certificate Authority(agwa.name)
6 points by agwa 11y ago|0 comments
703.
by agwa 11y ago
This is a vulnerability in socat's TLS support. It has nothing to do with OpenSSL (besides the fact that OpenSSL provided a footgun API by leaving it to application developers to supply DH parameters).
704.
by agwa 11y ago
The crates.io index is in a GitHub repository. Does Cargo fetch it directly from GitHub or from a set of redundant mirrors?
705.
Against Security Nihilism(noncombatant.org)
2 points by agwa 11y ago|0 comments
706.
by agwa 11y ago
Use ARP spoofing to masquerade as the router, use DHCP spoofing to deliver a rogue default gateway or DNS server, or set up your own access point that uses the same SSID.
707.
by agwa 11y ago
An unencrypted connection isn't "absolutely" seen by others. If no one eavesdrops on it, it's private, just as an encrypted-but-unauthenticated connection is private if no one actively attacks it. Theoretically, an untr
708.
by agwa 11y ago
An encrypted-but-unauthenticated connection is not readable just by some unknown entity, but by an arbitrary, unbounded number of unknown entit ies , which is practically the same as "anyone." Anyone who's in a position to pa
709.
by agwa 11y ago
Grep for commit_creds and prepare_kernel_cred in /proc/kallsyms. The address is in the first column.
710.
by agwa 11y ago
> If you were to mandate a key rotation across all employees and mandate all employees use a keypair prepared for work and no other purpose I would rate those mandates as not being excessive. A better mandate would be to use ssh-agent.
711.
by agwa 11y ago
In the latest OpenSSH-portable source, those are considered "unsupported" and "deprecated," respectively (which means they're ignored, essentially). See https://gist.github.com/AGWA/e92d4f5343b
712.
by agwa 11y ago
What's more, it was not documented in the ssh_config(5) man page. If it had been, I probably would have disabled it long ago when hardening my SSH config. Time to head to the source to look for other undocumented options... Update: my
713.
by agwa 11y ago
There was never any pressure to switch to XHTML2 - HTML4/ XHTML1 kept working fine. In contrast, IPv4 is going to become increasingly painful.
714.
by agwa 11y ago
That's correct. They use facility transit everywhere except their newest datacenters (Singapore and maybe Frankfurt), where they operate their own AS and use blended transit.
715.
by agwa 11y ago
I mean certs using post-quantum crypto for signatures (e.g. NTRU, hash-based signatures) rather than RSA or ECC, which are utterly defeated by quantum algorithms.
716.
by agwa 11y ago
That's true, but it's easy to fix by using longer hashes (e.g. SHA-512). RSA and ECC are broken beyond hope.
717.
by agwa 11y ago
It has nothing to do with "reversing" hashes. The attacker would use the quantum computer to determine the CA's private key (e.g. by factoring the RSA modulus using Shor's Algorithm), and would then be able to sign any
718.
by agwa 11y ago
We're lucky that hash collision attacks have a relatively simple mitigation like this. (Although you have to trust CAs to follow the rules and implement it properly, and events of the last few years indicate that CAs need to have as fe
719.
by agwa 11y ago
> I don't generally like being a pedant, but SSL and TLS are different things that attempt to solve the same problem, much like WEP and WPA. That is not really accurate - TLS 1.0 is very similar to SSL 3.0. They're so similar
720.
by agwa 11y ago
Ah, but SHA-1 certs are actually being deprecated for publicly-trusted roots. Symantec wanted to push the deadline back because of their "very large enterprise customers" who had legacy clients, and they didn't get it. I do

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