agwa

55 ms·

601.
by agwa 10y ago
It really is :-(
602.
by agwa 10y ago
I used to be a Symantec reseller too before I realized how bad they were. I only do business with CAs which I actually believe are good.
603.
by agwa 10y ago
This is not accurate. To pass, a ballot must receive a 2/3 majority from CAs AND a 1/2 majority from browsers. While there have been some contentious votes along CA-browser lines, you can see from the ballot history that most ba
604.
by agwa 10y ago
> I may be being a bit dense, but if your client device contains a root that goes off-reservation, how does it ever receive a revocation notice? Doesn't everything that chains to that root via a valid chain still get trusted? Yes, i
605.
by agwa 10y ago
One of Comodo's registration authorities was breached, but not Comodo themselves. Comodo were able to detect the breach and cut off the compromised RA because they were monitoring what their RAs were doing. Symantec, on the other han
606.
by agwa 10y ago
The exception process used by payment processors such as First Data were for SHA-1 certificates chaining to a root that was still publicly-trusted. They couldn't use an off-reservation root because their client devices didn't tru
607.
by agwa 10y ago
It's more than that. The ensuing thread uncovered that Symantec had exercised very lacking oversight over their partners (called Registration Authorities, or RAs) who were allowed to perform certificate validation on Symantec's b
608.
by agwa 10y ago
https://www.mail-archive.com/dev-security-policy@lists.mozil...
609.
by agwa 10y ago
The certificate at no-subject.badssl.com has an empty subject field, but it still contains the subject domain name in the Subject Alternative Names (SAN) extension. Using the original X.509 subject field for the domain name has been depreca
610.
by agwa 10y ago
Aurora is not globally distributed. Spanner is, and is based on Google research which takes advantage of atomic clocks installed in each server: https://research.google.com/archive/spanner-osdi2012.pdf Edit: not every
611.
by agwa 10y ago
Do you still have to stripe over multiple volumes to get good performance?
612.
by agwa 10y ago
I wasn't replying to you.
613.
by agwa 10y ago
> But the difference here with respect to management, presumably, would be that when this is loaded/compiled in the kernel, less userspace setup would be required -- correct? I'm assuming it would just show up like an available
614.
by agwa 10y ago
A VPN does not need to be in the kernel for that; userspace TUN/TAP VPNs can also take advantage of standard system tools for policy and management. The actual motivation for running in kernel space is performance.
615.
by agwa 10y ago
Learn, but don't go around teaching others if you haven't a clue, like the author of this book is doing. That harms potential learners - not to mention everyone who is put at risk when insecure crypto inevitably ends up in produc
616.
by agwa 10y ago
> If this turns out actually to be a problem, introduce a second wrapper EXE that you spawn, supplying environment stuff and arguments for subchild EXE. Fork, exec the wrapper, have it do its thing, then have it exec the EXE you actually
617.
by agwa 10y ago
> The bug resulted because he missed changing one of the comparison-against-zero validity checks. Yes, that's exactly the kind of mistake that happens when you use magic values to represent invalid values instead of distinct types.
618.
by agwa 10y ago
Non-DNS resolution protocols like LLMNR are almost entirely irrelevant, particularly on servers. Even if you do need asynchronous LLMNR support, you do not need dbus and a particular process running as PID 1 to get it - applications can ma
619.
by agwa 10y ago
CAs would not be allowed to use those TLDs under the current rules. They have two options for testing: 1. Use domains they own. 2. Use a testing environment that doesn't issue publicly-trusted certificates.
620.
Already on probation, Symantec issues more illegit HTTPS certificates(arstechnica.com)
60 points by agwa 10y ago|3 comments
621.
Incident Report – Certificates issued without proper domain validation(mail-archive.com)
3 points by agwa 10y ago|0 comments
622.
by agwa 10y ago
Thanks for the reply. The unified set of credentials makes a lot of sense. Short lived certs are nice too. You can issue short-lived certificates for keys stored on smart cards as well.
623.
by agwa 10y ago
What's the advantage of using U2F for SSH compared to using public-key authentication with a password-protected smart card (e.g. a Yubikey 4)? I can think of one big disadvantage, which is that with U2F the password has to be shared w
624.
by agwa 10y ago
No, because there's a simple solution to state actors doing massive computations: make the parameters so large (2048 bits in the case of DH) that the computations are infeasible. DH precomputation attacks are only a problem with smalle
625.
by agwa 10y ago
Your comment shows a very dangerous misunderstanding of this issue. One of the reasons WeakDH/Logjam was so bad is because OpenSSL is so low-level that it forces application developers to supply their own DH parameters if they want to
626.
by agwa 10y ago
SMS-based 2FA doesn't stop phishing, which is a significant security benefit of U2F.
627.
by agwa 10y ago
That's an Internet-Draft, which is a work-in-progress of the IETF. It's not a formal specification. https://www.ietf.org/id-info/
628.
by agwa 10y ago
DJB has espoused this point repeatedly - it's more than a motivator for the rest of the article.
629.
by agwa 10y ago
I think this is the essential paragraph: > What the attacker hopes to find inside the AES attack is a key collision. This means that a key guessed by the attack matches a key chosen by a user. Any particular guessed key has chance only 1
630.
by agwa 10y ago
Huh? That attack works with random keys. Are you confusing it with a related-key attack?

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