agl

20 ms·

151.
by agl 14y ago
I'm not certain that Javascript isn't similarly `optimised' by such networks, but images are significant for the mixed content case. I believe that we collected some data in Chrome about the efficacy of a content addressable cache in improv
152.
by agl 14y ago
I've coded something similar up in WebKit and considered landing it in Chrome, although I was more concerned with being able to use HTTP resources securely in HTTPS pages. Firstly you need a way to incrementally verify a file: you don't wan
153.
by agl 14y ago
Yes, DNS can be used to direct you to the wrong IP address but that hardly matters: an evil network can give you the correct IP address but then intercept all traffic to it. The key is that the IP address doesn't matter, indeed it shouldn't
154.
by agl 14y ago
Well, now that DANE is nearly an RFC I should change Chrome to use it rather than the TYPE257 records. But the important point is that DNSSEC stapled certificates don't need the browser to perform any extra DNS lookups. The certificate itse
155.
by agl 14y ago
The response is 345 bytes and we used the OS DNS library to send the request, so I'm not sure whether EDNS0 would have been set.
156.
by agl 14y ago
We can't do a blocking DNS lookup other than for A/AAAA records. About 5% of Chrome users cannot resolve TXT records because the network is filtering the DNS requests. (i.e. we know that the network is up and we're asking about a DNS name t
157.
by agl 14y ago
The bypass button only disappears for HSTS sites. Do you have a proxy server that's intercepting these connections and has a broken certificate? You can disable all certificate checking with --ignore-certificate-errors but it is as bad as i
158.
by agl 14y ago
Versions of Android that support SPDY also support SNI.
159.
by agl 14y ago
The OpenSSL advisory contains details of the problematic functions, which are considerably smaller than the full set of ASN.1 functions: http://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20120419.txt
160.
by agl 14y ago
While having a minimal signature verifier is good, you wouldn't have been hit by this bug in any case. This only affects parsing from a BIO or a FILE, and the OpenSSL RSA code parses the signature from memory.
161.
by agl 14y ago
Parsing from PEM isn't affected, nor is parsing of SSL certificates in SSL because libssl doesn't use the BIO functions. It's mostly users of OpenSSL who are calling d2i_XXX_bio or d2i_XXX_fp.
162.
by agl 15y ago
This was actually a different attack on RSA by the same person! tptacek described the padding attack well in a sibling comment.
163.
by agl 15y ago
1) You can address it in Chrome with pinning [1]. Built in pins require that you be a significant site, but you can also set them with HTTP headers [2]. [1] http://www.imperialviolet.org/2011/05/04/pinning.html [2] http://tools.ietf.org/
164.
by agl 15y ago
I assure you that it's true. I haven't reprofiled in that much detail since but I suspect that the numbers look even better now. Partly because computers are faster and partly because of software improvements.
165.
by agl 15y ago
> It's a performance optimisation at the expense of security for Chrome users. I'm arguing that the current, soft-fail revocation checking is useless and that we're not losing anything by switching it off. The actual revocation mechanis
166.
by agl 15y ago
Omaha is a service which we ask questions like: "I've got version $x of $foo, what should I do?". We use it for extensions as well as the main browser update. The CRLSet is packaged as an extension (it's actually a .crx), but with a custom
167.
by agl 15y ago
Patches for stable OpenSSL are linked from: http://technotes.googlecode.com/git/nextprotoneg.html I understand that NPN can be a pain, but it's the right thing to do. Connection: Upgrade is slower and breaks over MITM proxies.
168.
by agl 15y ago
--allow-running-insecure-content on the command line. Although it would be far more useful to fix the site in question. For the stable channel I think we only have it on for google.com so, are, you hitting mixed-scripting on Google sites? I
169.
by agl 15y ago
> Certainly it's not the case that anything is 'broken'. Since others have found the links to the prior papers I don't have to worry about revealing anything by suggesting that there's prior work. What I was trying to hint at (badly) wh
170.
by agl 15y ago
I happen to know the details of this attack since I work on Chrome's SSL/TLS stack. The linked article is sensationalist nonsense, but one should give the authors the benefit of the doubt because the press can be like that. Fundamentally th
171.
by agl 15y ago
If you email me (my username at chromium.org) with the bug link, I can make sure that it gets cc'ed to the correct people. We would also probably want a net-internals dump: restart Chrome, open chrome://net-internals in a tab and leave it o
172.
by agl 15y ago
Oh man. That's a sad, sad, loss if true.
173.
by agl 15y ago
Credit where credit is due: IE9 beat us to this.
174.
by agl 15y ago
Keep in mind that it's lulz sec and that the servers that host the ICE seized page respond for any hostname. So one can just point A records at 74.81.170.110 and be `seized'.
175.
by agl 15y ago
I didn't receive it I'm afraid, not even in spam. Sorry to be a bother. agl at chromium dot org should work. Thanks.
176.
by agl 15y ago
Could you please give details about how this broke? What's special about your school internet connection? I tried hard to make SPDY upgrade not break anything and we've had very few reports of problems so I'm very interested in what when wr
177.
by agl 15y ago
Yes, 400K is a lot of revocations, but we can only download the CRLs and treat them as gospel. Keeping a low false positive rate is important because, in the event of a hit in the filter, the resulting OCSP check has to be hard-fail and, if
178.
by agl 15y ago
We can only use the information that the CAs give us, which is the serial number of the certificate. So we match the serial number and issuer.
179.
by agl 15y ago
I lost several people at that point, so I clearly didn't communicate that point well. Sorry about that, I'll see if I can tweak it tomorrow. But the point was that you can beat a Bloom filter on size, for the same performance, if you use on
180.
by agl 16y ago
Don't forget to enable SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS with OpenSSL 1.0.0 too.

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