ademarre

30 ms·

271.
by ademarre 12y ago
Interesting. Perhaps an alternative to the keyword warning system you describe (for SSL certs only) could be to scan the candidate CN for existing SSL certs. If any are found, flag it for manual review, or possibly come up with a proof syst
272.
by ademarre 12y ago
If enough people colluded to use the same unknown word, say "foobar", then couldn't they train recaptcha to believe that is the true value of the word? If I understand recaptcha correctly, and assuming they don't detect
273.
by ademarre 12y ago
> Captcha's are not going anywhere anytime soon. You're probably right. But the fact remains that captchas aren't good enough. They can be partially automated; blackhats can use captcha solving farms which will be at lea
274.
by ademarre 12y ago
I expect people would not understand this. They would start to get confused between their Google password and that of the service they are trying to access. Also, after users learn the new process, it opens up a new phishing attack vector f
275.
Is Coding Speech?(avc.com)
1 points by ademarre 12y ago|0 comments
276.
by ademarre 12y ago
HDF is cool, no doubt; but I have mixed feelings about using some of these TLDs for important projects. I simply haven't decided how much to trust these small registries. Awhile back I bought tra.gd when I thought I needed a short doma
277.
by ademarre 12y ago
Not news, really, but I didn't realize the history until I stumbled on it. Of course you could also read the more concise Wikipedia version: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bluetooth#Name_and_logo
278.
Bluetooth Technology is Named After a King(brokensecrets.com)
1 points by ademarre 12y ago|2 comments
279.
A Trip in a Self-Driving Car Now Seems Routine(bits.blogs.nytimes.com)
6 points by ademarre 12y ago|0 comments
280.
by ademarre 12y ago
Mozilla should implement the closed-source portion as an official addon. They can give the user a choice to include it or not during the installation. Maybe this is what they're doing; their post wasn't completely clear on that.
281.
by ademarre 12y ago
Agreed. But I think it's a stretch to conclude that Fielding doesn't think the hypermedia principle is an important distinction between RPC and REST: From his blog post I linked to earlier, titled REST APIs must be hypertext-driv
282.
by ademarre 12y ago
Interesting, thank you; but in that quote isn't Fielding actually comparing RPC and HTTP , not REST?
283.
by ademarre 12y ago
Have you reported these HN bugs?
284.
by ademarre 12y ago
The problem with REST is that many (I dare say most ) who think they are applying it really aren't. I think this is quite relevant: http://roy.gbiv.com/untangled/2008/rest-apis-must-be-hyperte... What sets R
285.
by ademarre 12y ago
Yes. The scrolling hack is very dissapointing. I only got through the first section before scrolling problems rendered the page unreadable on my phone.
286.
by ademarre 12y ago
I suppose another incarnation of this problem, albeit less likely to occur in the wild, is to use an input name that is also the id of a different input in the same form.
287.
by ademarre 12y ago
The site looks nice, but the loading indicator is disappointing. I expect they will lose visitors whose knee-jerk reaction is to back out instead of wait one more second.
288.
by ademarre 12y ago
It's interesting to read old introductory posts like this, and then look ahead at future blog posts to see how his opinion evolved. He still loves Haskell: http://newartisans.com/category/haskell/
289.
by ademarre 12y ago
> law-abiding implementations Are you referring to category laws?
290.
What Your Internet Plan Will Look Like Without Net Neutrality(willchatham.com)
4 points by ademarre 12y ago|2 comments
291.
by ademarre 12y ago
Weak, yes. But trivial? The article does not convince me of that. > In this context, the telephone network itself may no longer be the weakest link in the chain. The diligent attacker only needs to look for the cloud operator with an un
292.
by ademarre 12y ago
SMS security tokens have significant weaknesses; yes. The reason for multi-factor authentication is to compensate for the weaknesses of any single factor. This works reasonably well as long as the factors aren't so weak as to be trivia
293.
by ademarre 12y ago
I think it's important to distinguish between the use of SMS in two-factor authentication vs. single-factor. The author is referring to single-factor authentication in the form of SMS one-time passwords. He has some great points, but I
294.
by ademarre 12y ago
I would have skipped over if this if I didn't notice what it really was: "Handycipher is [...] simple enough to permit pencil-and-paper encrypting and decrypting of messages" Interesting.
295.
Handycipher: a Low-tech, Randomized, Symmetric-key Cryptosystem(eprint.iacr.org)
1 points by ademarre 12y ago|1 comments
296.
by ademarre 13y ago
In his book Tubes: A Journey to the Center of the Internet , Andrew Blum presents a partial defense of the late senator's analogy: "I have confirmed with my own eyes that the Internet is many things, in many places. But one thin
297.
by ademarre 13y ago
The primary article source, Claudia Goldin's research paper: http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/goldin/files/goldin_aeapres...
298.
Unequal Wages: For Women in Tech, Pay Gap Is Unusually Small(nytimes.com)
5 points by ademarre 13y ago|1 comments
299.
by ademarre 13y ago
Fair enough, but what about periods where there is little or no competition between connections of different priorities? Could low-priority transmissions be throttled well before they begin to experience packet loss?
300.
by ademarre 13y ago
In this video Erik Hinton talks about using Haskell in the fast-paced New York Times environment: http://www.infoq.com/presentations/haskell-newsroom-nyt

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