Veserv

124 ms·

1531.
by Veserv 7y ago
I agree, critical software should be written to a high quality standard. In fact, I will take it one step further and say that critical software must be written to an OBJECTIVE quality level that is sufficient for the problem at hand. If th
1532.
by Veserv 7y ago
No, it indicates that the problem domain is sufficiently dangerous that the risk of fixing must be balanced against the risk of the fix causing a different unknown error. There were ~500,000 787 flights in 2017 with an average of 200 people
1533.
by Veserv 7y ago
I am not who you replied to, but since you seem to sincerely want an answer, let me help you out by adding the missing words I see when I read the original poster statement: > ... but these two top choices really do seem incompatible. Is
1534.
by Veserv 7y ago
For any of these multi-billion dollar organizations you have worked at or have sufficient trustworthy information about, do you think any of them would be able to withstand a competent pentesting organization with a $1 Million contract to b
1535.
by Veserv 7y ago
Although you are technically correct in that the cost of system calls on most systems is high, your post also implies to a casual reader that the cost is fundamental. This is not true. As demonstrated in the benchmark, the hardware cost of
1536.
by Veserv 7y ago
Anybody who said that about EAL4+ systems mischaracterized the standard. The standard only specifies resistance to casual and inadvertent attack at that level which is consistent with the observed outcomes. It is only at EAL5 that the stand
1537.
by Veserv 8y ago
Not to excuse poor hardware, but rowhammer can be pretty easily mitigated in software by using guard rows as mentioned in the paper. To explain, rowhammer allows you to flip bits in adjacent memory rows. So, we if we just put an unused row