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Avamander
searching PlanetScale…
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121.
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by
Avamander
9mo ago
You think no bad actor thinks of that, using subdomains or whatnot? Nor did I say anything about wanting a registry acting on it, it's just that the motivations and reasons are incredibly clear. At least to me. And let me also reiter
122.
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Avamander
9mo ago
Usually not, just look at for example SpamHaus's top abusive TLDs. New TLDs dominate.
123.
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Avamander
9mo ago
I'm fairly sure that Safe Browsing's false-positive rate is extremely low otherwise it'd be unusable in Chrome. Which also means that acting on positive results is very likely a correct approach.
124.
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Avamander
9mo ago
At the same time given the already terrible reputation of such vanity TLDs, being this hard on abuse might be the only survivable way. That's not me saying there shouldn't be a warning and a recourse, but the time-to-profit for do
125.
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Avamander
9mo ago
It's not just about being common, it's also about the share of abuse coming from such domains.
126.
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Avamander
9mo ago
What's the benefit over Trusted Types?
127.
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Avamander
9mo ago
Primarily because OP can't verify that the patch is truly correct. There's also the fact that anything LLM-generated will likely be frowned upon (for the same reason). With some effort OP could review it manually and then try to s
128.
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Avamander
9mo ago
It heavily depends on what you mean by "not the code", if all the code does is implement the necessary steps for the interface, then it's part of the interface. It's an interpretation of an interpretation of a datasheet.
129.
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Avamander
9mo ago
Yes, but how on earth is their malicious compliance at providing parental controls a good reason to go for the surveillance state that hurts absolutely everyone? Social media operators love the surveillance state idea. That's why they
130.
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Avamander
9mo ago
I have seen LLMs be surprisingly effective at figuring out such oddities. After all it has ingested knowledge of a myriad of data formats, encryption schemes and obfuscation methods. If anything, complex logic is what'll defeat an LLM.
131.
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Avamander
9mo ago
They're more likely to put in the least amount of effort or care the least about the reasons how the header is used later on.
132.
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Avamander
9mo ago
Other anti-spam implementations also punish the lack of Message-ID. There are tools online that highlight this as an issue. This here is a trivial case of simply not testing deliverability at all.
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Avamander
9mo ago
The biggest war on small providers is waged by other small providers. They can be ancient and outdated or simply extremely picky. Which makes everything Google or others require a piece of cake, which it actually kinda is.
134.
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Avamander
10mo ago
I do call it cherry-picking because you chose scenarios that either apply to it also without TLS or the scenarios are just (intentionally) extremely narrow in scope. You have repeatedly ignored that we're speaking about protections aga
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Avamander
10mo ago
Relying on an accidental feature and its removal causing work is a perfect example why it shouldn't be there in the first place. The XMPP community can continue to adapt other infrastructure for their purposes and do the thing they do.
136.
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Avamander
10mo ago
So you understand that there are different purposes as well. Are you saying that you can't get a client auth certificate any more?
137.
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Avamander
10mo ago
The idea of a PKI was of course designed independently, there are many very large PKIs beyond WebPKI. However the one used by browsers is what we call WebPKI and that has its own CAs and rules. You're trying to make it sound like there
138.
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Avamander
10mo ago
I think you're confusing different actors here. The change was made by the CA/B Forum, the recommendation is just how it is if you want to use a certificate not for the purposes intended.
139.
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Avamander
10mo ago
That's being overly pedantic. PKIs for different purposes have been separate for a while, if not from the start. LE is still giving you a "TLS cert".
140.
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Avamander
10mo ago
Can you point out at which point in time exactly it was designed to serve every use-case?
141.
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Avamander
10mo ago
This post here is the demonstration, that some non-WebPKI purpose is causing issues and complaints. This has happened before with SHA-1 deprecation. WebPKI does not want this burden and should not have this burden.
142.
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Avamander
10mo ago
> Rolling out a private PKI for XMPP, with a dedicated Root CA, would be a significant effort Rolling out a change that removes the EKU check would not be that much effort however.
143.
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Avamander
10mo ago
Not forbidden, just not going to be a part of WebPKI. It's one of those things that has just piggybacked on top of WebPKI and things just piggybacking is a bad idea. There have been multiple cases in the past where this has caused a lo
144.
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Avamander
10mo ago
No, not really. Unless you consider basic accountability "extra effort".
145.
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Avamander
10mo ago
Which is almost exactly why WebPKI doesn't want to support such use-cases. Just this EKU change alone demonstrates how it can hinder WebPKI changes.
146.
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Avamander
10mo ago
Code can just ignore the EKU. Especially if the ecosystem consists of things that are already using certificates in odd ways, as it shouldn't be making outgoing connections without it in the first place.
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Avamander
10mo ago
No, you want to move goalposts, but we're not speaking of some arbitrary "total attack surface". The article itself is also about a potential MITM. Then you list three cherry-picked cases, none of which actually touch upon th
148.
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Avamander
10mo ago
I have implemented parts of all three. I doubt you have. > Adding TLS in front of HTTP when talking to an untrusted third-party server, can only ever increase your attack surface. No, against a MITM it instantly subtracts the surface ins
149.
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Avamander
10mo ago
Some providers do that. But you still have to dynamically allow or disallow external content such as images. It also makes any operations based on the content more convoluted. Like adding event invites to calendar and so on.
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Avamander
10mo ago
SVGs are just the tip of the iceberg of how hard it is to sanitize email content. There aren't any purpose-built good libraries for email sanitization either. Something that would handle SVG, CSS, HTML, everything.
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