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Time to dust off http://craphound.com/spamsolutions.txt http://craphound.com/spamsolutions.txt "Here is why it won't work. (X) Requires immediate total cooper
by toyg 11y ago
Time to dust off http://craphound.com/spamsolutions.txt http://craphound.com/spamsolutions.txt
"Here is why it won't work.
(X) Requires immediate total cooperation from everybody at once
(X) Anyone could anonymously destroy anyone else's career or business
Specifically, your plan fails to account for
(X) Lack of centrally controlling authority for email
(X) Dishonesty on the part of spammers themselves
and the following philosophical objections may also apply:
(X) Ideas similar to yours are easy to come up with, yet none have ever been shown practical
(X) Blacklists suck
(X) Countermeasures must work if phased in gradually
(X) Why should we have to trust you and your servers?
Furthermore, this is what I think about you:
(X) Sorry dude, but I don't think it would work."
- tomjen3 11y agoPlease don't dust that of. It did way more damage to the web than any spammer ever did. In addition to that you failed to understand what signatures do: there is no way you can have sign a message with anybody else signature. And it doesn't require immediate cooperation if a signed message with a good reputation is used as one of several spam signals. You want to discuss viagra? Well better sign your message with a public key and have a track record of not being a spammer. Blacklists are the de facto solution that we implemented because using that list prevented any consensus of any other method of combating spam.
- toyg 11y agoHow is "a list of bad signatures" different from existing blacklists? It isn't. Spammers can just generate new signatures faster than you can mark them as bad... same as IPs, really. And if I manage to get somebody else's private key (which happens so often these days, it's not even funny), I can ruin someone else's career while I push my spam. Unless, of course, you have a closed system everyone cooperates in; which is nothing like current email and cannot be rolled on gradually. Honestly now? That list hurts because it's true, and you know it. You cannot wipe out spam without losing the decentralization element built into current protocols. Your "solution" would just add yet another "signal" to the long list of hacks spammers routinely implement. (Not that I really care: I use gmail, trading my privacy for some of the best antispam systems money can buy, and I'm happy enough. I'm just a bit too old to still believe spam can be fixed, or that "webs of trust" can work at significant scale.)
- JupiterMoon 11y agoJust so that we're all on the same page I assume by signatures we mean PGP type signing? This would not be spoofible at all (unless a key was lost).
- CodeMage 11y agoWhich is why GP said: "And if I manage to get somebody else's private key (which happens so often these days, it's not even funny), I can ruin someone else's career while I push my spam." Also, the biggest problem with PGP-type signing as a mechanism to control spam is not whether you can spoof the signature or not, it's that there's nothing in it that stops the spammer from generating a new identity once the current identity is tarnished.
- tracker1 11y agoWith NNTP, you pretty much have to login to a system in order to post... this means, you are trackable, and if the origin server is doing the signing, this can be traced... It's generally very easy to trace a message through it's server chain.
- wtbob 11y ago> Unless, of course, you have a closed system everyone cooperates in; which is nothing like current email and cannot be rolled on gradually. I was writing about NNTP, not SMTP—they are different. > You cannot wipe out spam without losing the decentralization element built into current protocols. NNTP was never decentralised like SMTP is. Each NNTP site had a very limited number of feeds, set up on a social basis. There was no concept that anyone could submit articles anywhere; rather, users submitted articles to their local site, which forwarded them on. In this environment, cutting bad feeds out would have worked (or at least, kept spam to a manageable level, which is all anyone really cares about).
- wtbob 11y agoMaybe I should explain the idea in more detail. Recall that the way Usenet works is that each site gets its new feeds from one or more other sites. Imagine that I'm site A, connected to sites B and C. B is connected to D and E; C is connected to D, F & G. Whenever a user at a site submits an article, that site attests 'this message was sent via site X.' Whenever a site sends a message to another site that it received from somewhere else, it attests 'this message was sent via site X.' As part of the setup process, sites exchange signing keys (recall that Usenet peering was fairly static, something arranged by email). So, any messages local to Site A don't (need) any attestation: they were generated locally, and read locally. Any messages submitted to Site B and sent to A are provably from Site B (and A would in fact reject any message claiming to be from Site B but without a signature). Likewise, any message submitted to Site E would be signed by E, then signed by B, then arrive at A. In the normal course of events, A doesn't care about Site E at all; he cares about the quality of his feed from B. Say a spam arrives at A. He knows that it didn't come from C, because it's signed by B. So he returns it to B, stating, 'yo, police your users!' B can see his own signature on the spam, so he knows that he can trust the origination of the message from his point of view (whether it's his own user, or one from Sites D or E); in fact, B could automatically forward the spam notification to the originating site if it weren't his own. Let's say that B is actually malicious, and has invented a hundred fake sites that he pretends to forward messages from. I don't care: any message I get from B is signed by B: if I receive enough spams from him, I can choose to just refuse articles from him. > (X) Requires immediate total cooperation from everybody at once Some solutions do require complete cooperation. Given that Usenet's effectively dead, is an example which kills Usenet and replaces it with Usenet-Prime all that different? > (X) Anyone could anonymously destroy anyone else's career or business Completely and totally wrong, since in the model I'm talking about reputation is local to my site, not shared. > (X) Lack of centrally controlling authority for email Nope: no centrally-controlling authority is needed: each site only cares about the relationships it has established, and doesn't care about downstream relationships ('police yourself!'). > (X) Dishonesty on the part of spammers themselves Nope: dishonesty doesn't matter because each site only cares about the quality of the feed it receives from other sites. A dishonest site will have a poor-quality feed, and may be disciplined by being ignored. > (X) Ideas similar to yours are easy to come up with, yet none have ever been shown practical Seems quite practical to me. 'We've not bothered to try' doesn't count as a proof of impracticality. > (X) Blacklists suck Better than whitelists, no? At some point one has to refuse to do business with bad actors; that's a blacklist. > (X) Countermeasures must work if phased in gradually Why? As noted, Usenet is basically dead by now; how would killing it and recreating a new, more trustworthy one not have been better? > (X) Why should we have to trust you and your servers? I think maybe you thought that I was proposing some sort of centralised reputation system, which would indeed be crazy.