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So the hack is a classic kiosk mode breakout, like you could try to do with poorly secured public computers. The wonder here is not in the hack, because it's ju
by striking 11y ago
So the hack is a classic kiosk mode breakout, like you could try to do with poorly secured public computers. The wonder here is not in the hack, because it's just a set of keypresses and mouse clicks. The wonder instead lies with the the manufacturer who made a safe stupid enough to be bypassed with a mouse and keyboard.
- wil421 11y agoWho put the USB port on the outside? The article made it seem like they didnt need to use the USB port for normal operations (unlocking/locking). So why didnt they face it toward the safe or disable access somehow until the safe is unlocked. I'm not going to even touch on the Windows XP issue.
- gambiting 11y agoWindows XP is completely safe if: 1) is not connected to the internet 2) you can't add external storage I see people getting upset all the time about cashier tills running windows xp - but that doesn't make any sense. If the software works fine in that situation then it could be just as well running windows 3.11 and I don't see a problem.
- kefka 11y agoKeep telling yourself that. There are unpatched 0-days that go back years that still make WinXP dangerous to have on any sort of network. Not only that, but they will never be fixed. Nor can you fix them yourself (no source code). And yes, cash registers will be networked because of data mining. I can get an accurate picture of store utilization solely by watching registers. And also by seeing what was purchased, I can change inventory appropriately. So yes, networking is essential. Perhaps it's not for the small business that handles flea markets and such.
- gambiting 11y agoSo the machine connected to your Windows XP tills has internet access and/or external storage enabled. Of course that's not safe....if I said "not connected to a network" would that be better?
- kbenson 11y agoYou can say that... but I think GP's point is that there's an obvious behavioral pattern to that, which is less data mining of your sales info and customer's buying habits, compared to the sometimes unobvious but major downside of the terminals being hacked. I think we've seem what choices businesses make when presented with the obvious upside over the poorly understood downside.
- kefka 11y agoNope. You just flipped one of your caveats: no internet connectivity. I only specified networking. Its also how Target was attacked. Their registers are networked yet there was a hole from the internet to their corporate net. That hole was through their HVAC control system. The Tl;Dr. Is that you design a secure system, so that if one part fails, the whole system doesn't fall like a house of cards. Security through layers.
- eli 11y agoWindows XP Embedded is still supported and still gets security patches. I'm also pretty sure you can get the source to it too, if you pay Microsoft and sign an NDA.
- goldmouth 11y agoWindows XP; the security researchers favorite distro. There are few things better than showing up to a security review gig and have them running XP. Makes my job super easy and clients love when I rain down bugs. It's even better because we can actually write exploits in a short time frame. Love XP.
- emcrazyone 11y agoSomewhat related, check this out. In the video they theorize that the power line attack is obfuscated by software techniques. An old OS may have buggy USB drivers I can imagine but they claim the OS does not matter. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mdnHHNeesPE https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mdnHHNeesPE and this https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HxQUKAjq-7w https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HxQUKAjq-7w
- recursive 11y ago> 0-days that go back years does not compute....
- kefka 11y agoAs in there were 0-day exploits that have not been, and will never be patched.
- whoopdedo 11y agoInsert Inigo Montoya quote here. "0-day" is a vulnerability that's discovered at the same time there are already exploits in the wild. It means you have zero days to get a patch deployed before the target is vulnerable to attack. Obviously a very bad situation to be in. And yet these days it gets thrown around as if it describes the severity of the vulnerability itself. Thus the above scoffing at "0-days that go back years". What does that mean? It's like saying you have a matinee movie on blue-ray that you'll watch tonight.
- grkvlt 11y ago> unpatched 0-days [...] I suppose one could have a patched 0-day? It would need to be be fixed by the vendor without them ever acknowledging the underlying issue existed, right? As for the "go back years" bit, the guy just has some XP vulns that were found ages back and he's never released them, and of course they still work.
- deleted 11y ago[deleted]
- pjc50 11y agoEvidently it's not completely secure if you can add an external keyboard and it's in kiosk mode. (Having worked somewhere close to the field of XP-for-POS, the answer appears to be that the customers really do not like having to do updates. They'd much rather just firewall the tills and hope they don't suffer a stuxnet. They're attacked surprisingly rarely because you can't steal money over the internet this way.)
- x0054 11y agoI am guessing it's a failsafe in case the touch screen on the safe fails and they need to plug in a keyboard to open it / diagnose it. It's a legitimate thing to do, but you would think that the USB port would have protection. For instance, the USB port could be on a daughter board, and requires you to enter a password on the plugged in keyboard before the daughter board would complete the connection to the main motherboard. The really simple method would be to at least have a USB Lock that plugs into the USB port, and once locked it hooks into a USB port and if physically ripped out without unlocking, it would rip out the USB port with it. This is something they can retrofit quickly while figuring out other problems with their software problems.
- allworknoplay 11y agoAuto-enabling keyboard input at all is totally crazy; if you can type you can compromise something. my last startup (it's still around, just without me) makes kiosks with touch displays and accessible usb ports, and disabling that shit was the first obvious move. We then allowed them to be re-enabled selectively based on a challenge-response touch screen input (didn't require connectivity, just pre-shared keys to verify the response) or via our server (if connectivity was stable and the touch screen had an issue). Assuming you have a team competent enough to build a platform that you can at minimum reboot and ensure it'll always come back up, you'd never, ever want to automatically let someone access your system.
- timboslice 11y ago10+ years ago I was at a public library with terminals that were in kiosk mode with IE in fullscreen, hidden start menu etc. I used a paperclip to eject the cd drive, put in a CD with autorun, and voila, visible start menu and was able to get to the internet from IE
- mtuncer 11y agoanything exposed outside is a potential risk. If there is a button you press it. If it is a hole, you stick something inside. Having a usb outside is invitation to do something with it.
- amalag 11y agoI hear Brink's QA department is hiring.
- golergka 11y agoI hope they are also firing.
- juliangregorian 11y agothatsthejoke.gif
- mannykannot 11y agoQA is not the solution - this is a design failure.
- sliverstorm 11y agoKiosk breakouts were fun as a kid. I used to get around time limits on library computers by breaking out via the volume control tray icon.
- allworknoplay 11y agoSeriously -- this is ludicrous. I founded a hardware tech company a few years back that does a similar thing (machines in very public places) and -- knowing approximately dick about building robust hardware -- auto mounting of input devices was basically the first thing I locked down once I had the basics up and running. What a stupid vulnerability.