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Very interesting. If I'm reading this correctly, he says that the idea that human will is deterministic is obsolete. The idea came because it was thought the u
by ars 17y ago
Very interesting.
If I'm reading this correctly, he says that the idea that human will is deterministic is obsolete. The idea came because it was thought the universe is deterministic, but modern quantum mechanics shows the universe is not deterministic, and neither is human will.
- deleted 17y ago[deleted]
- jomoba 17y agoI'm not sure how you got that. In both the original theorem and the new "strong" theorem, the theory is a conditional statement (if-then), and that humans have free will is part of the condition, not part of the conclusion. In describing the original theorem they write: "It asserts, roughly, that if indeed we humans have free will, then elementary particles already have their own small share of this valuable commodity." And in describing the new theorem, they write: "The axioms SPIN, TWIN and MIN imply that..." Where the axiom MIN is: "Assume that the experiments performed by A and B are space-like separated. Then experimenter B can freely choose..." That "then" clause occurs inside the axiom, so is part of what is assumed. The axioms are assumed - in particular, the free will of experimenter B is assumed - and a conclusion is drawn.
- ars 17y ago"It asserts, roughly, that if indeed we humans have free will, then elementary particles already have their own small share of this valuable commodity." He goes on to show the reverse of this. This line is a teaser, not a conclusion. It doesn't really make sense than human free will should affect elementary particles, but the reverse does make (some) sense. The experimental setup of having a human choose something is to correlate the two, not to mean that a human choosing the setup give the particles free will. (Unless I totally misunderstood this article, which is certainly possible.)
- gnosis 17y agoThere's a difference between humans not being able to guess the future beyond a probability measure, and the future not being determined from the "beginning" (or some time far enough in the past that humans don't really have a say in what will happen). In other words, it's quite possible that humans can't guess the future beyond a probability measure and at the same time have the universe (including their own actions, of course) being completely determined.
- camccann 17y agoI think you've essentially reduced free will to the Halting Problem.
- IsaacL 17y agoHume pretty much refuted this point of view 300 years ago. Lack of determinism does not create free will; if your actions were totally random and uncaused, then they could not be said to be free. They'd just be the equivalent of unconscious muscle spasms. His belief (Compatibilism) was that free will was not only compatible with determinism, but required it; your actions can be said to be free if they proceed from your personal thoughts and characteristics. Example: if pg had a choice between using Java and Lisp, we could quite confidently predict that he would use Lisp, even if we ran the experiment infinite times. It would still be his free choice, however. It's a quibble over the definition of 'free', but then most philosophical arguments are over definitions of words.