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You don't need to be so condescending; I understand js crypto is typically a fools game. Your example does fail for one of my examples; the case of a poorly se
by TheDong 11y ago
You don't need to be so condescending; I understand js crypto is typically a fools game.
Your example does fail for one of my examples; the case of a poorly secured log from the passive MITM of all connections at a company / university.
If the MITM was simply passive, without encryption the password (possibly valid for other things as well) has been leaked, but with the above encryption scheme it will not have been.
Anyways, the main client to this mechanism is not the browser, but the steam client which very well could verify the hash of the javascript files provided to it or their signature since valve has significantly tighter control over it.
I'm not saying that this scheme is a good idea or significantly more secure, I'm just trying to explain what could justify it.
- codexon 11y agoIf you are logging passwords, you've got bigger problems than worrying about attackers being able to middleman your TLS connection and somehow not able to modify it. I know what you are trying to explain, and you are simply bending over backwards to make it look like this wasn't another example of how clueless about security Valve is.
- nly 11y agoYou can't do passive MITM of TLS if the server is properly configured to use ephemeral key exchange, even if you have its private key. And even without ephemeral kex, and you somehow obtain a secondary trusted CA-signed cert for Steams domain, you still can't do passive MITM. JS crypto really is worthless if you can't trust the connection.