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Nah, something like Netgear vulnerability is for government or espionage-conducting clients. They're useful. Whether anyone is buying for $80,000 is another mat
by nickpsecurity 11y ago
Nah, something like Netgear vulnerability is for government or espionage-conducting clients. They're useful. Whether anyone is buying for $80,000 is another matter. I can't comment on it.
- tptacek 11y agoI'm not sure what this has to do with my comment. Can I ask --- because of your HN name --- have you done a lot of vulnerability research work? I'm curious to discover new perspectives on it.
- nickpsecurity 11y agoBout time we had a real intro rather than trolling each other. ;) My job in INFOSEC was high assurance security engineering and systems design. Premium stuff with provable properties to stop attacks by nation states or other High Strength Attackers. I learned from a tiny, elite community in academia and defense that published a lot on what worked vs what didn't. Not a great market in U.S. these days unless suppliers are willing to be very unethical. All I'll say on that. I left & am not doing INFOSEC commercially right now. So, past 7+ years I've been designing solutions to every problem I could spot, mostly giving them away for free on various forums to get our baseline up, and evangelizing strong security methods over the more mainstream ones that I call 0-day generators. Reference copies of most of my stuff posted on Schneier's blog since it reaches many people without any strings attached (i.e. ACM/IEEE's bullshit). Recently, I started doing stuff here too. Hindsight, probably should've done less work to focus on publishing in more mainstream outlets but I stayed too busy to be that wise. ;) My commercial framework [1] said the nation states would hit every layer of the system and any device in the network. All must be protected, monitored, obfuscated, whatever. It's was long known that routers, etc were being used as a beachhead. Anyone on the defense side against strong attackers would see unusual traffic. My perspective was always that, if it's useful & can run code, it will be hacked by pros eventually. That simple, no further imagination required. Mainstream ITSEC people I contacted always said I was too paranoid, no evidence of such attacks, stronger methods were overkill, etc. Post-Snowden, they're getting a bit of a wakeup call but still using same methods & tech that got them there. (sighs) That's background. Back to your comment. You said you were surprised there was a 0-day and huge price tag on Netgear routers. Think like an attacker. Such routers are used by many potential targets as the first line of defense, with visibility into the network, can run code, and have shit security. It was an obvious attack that can facilitate others. The attack requires an exploit, though. So, someone made one and tried to price it quite profitably. Router security sucks so bad that 0-days aren't worth that much based on effort to find but might sell well if limited supply. So, it follows from the existence of an opportunity and cases of attackers seizing it previously that there will be a market of supplying and buying 0-days for that type of target. We must also remember the specialization of malware market where people using hacking tools don't necessarily want to dig out 0-days themselves: they buy them & integrate them with custom or purchased toolkits. Especially for cyber-espionage and offensive warfare by governments. The rest, like prices and demand, I'd only be guessing at so no comment on that. Answering other question, I don't do vulnerability research. It's mostly mental masturbation that doesn't solve our problems. The few exceptions are those uncovering new classes of attack which I'm very grateful for. My segment of INFOSEC focuses on understanding the root problem of given issues, identifying ways to prevent/catch it, promoting them so they get more review, and I constantly try to enhance & integrate them in my own work since that community is more scattered than mainstream. That's what I call medium assurance with strongest designs, implementations, and security arguments being high assurance (or on that path). The only part of medium-to-high assurance that's mainstream right now is langsec.org, IIRC. They have methods and tools that eliminate a whole class of problems along with strong arguments that they work. That's how high assurance does it. Another micro-level example are stack overflows. Mainstream did canaries, checks, all kinds of BS. MULTICS (1970's) just made data flow away from stack pointer (reverse stack) and overflows drop into newly allocated memory. Root problem solved. Boom. Done. Most UNIX people, upon hearing of setuid risks, set on some auditing process to try to avoid abuses while using such apps. TIS's Trusted Xenix kernel cleared setuid bit upon a write to any such file w/ admin seeing that & having to manually reset it if it was OK. Setuid issue gone w/ legacy compatibility still there. I hope such simple examples illustrate the difference between my subset and mainstream INFOSEC's approaches to solving security problems. [1] http://pastebin.com/y3PufJ0V http://pastebin.com/y3PufJ0V
- ectoplasm 11y agonickpsecurity's reply is dead because he used the m-word.
- nickpsecurity 11y agoHuh? If you mean mainstream, there's certainly a mainstreaming effect in INFOSEC. It sometimes promotes things that stop hackers. Mostly just tactical stuff that's bypassed later or thing inferior to more obscure stuff that worked with better design/architecture. Example (paraphrased): "Dude, what's with all this separation kernel, decomposition, and interface protection nonsense? Nobody does that shit. Real hackers use a monolithic kernel with several MB of privileged code, no POLA, implementation fully in C, and some security features/apps on top of that. Do that and you're good." Several hundred CVE's later related to the above... yeah, some things aren't popular for their actual security.
- tptacek 11y agoWhat's the "m-word"? (I certainly didn't flag that comment).
- wglb 11y agoFind It's mostly mental and possibly the m-word is what follows this. I didn't flag this. But I do object to the suggestion that Thomas learn to think like an attacker. I am pretty sure that he does this as well as anyone. But this approach seems dismissive of a lot of work that addresses the real world, whereas the approach advocated in this post and other posts reminds me strongly of back when I believed that it was worthwhile to prove programs correct. Very few outfits can do this, and perhaps most rails programmers and Java programmers don't expect to be able to prove their programs correct. It seems to boil down to "We need to build programs in a fundamentally different way". With that sentiment I agree, but I am not seeing much in the way of actionable advice in your many posts here.
- nickpsecurity 11y agoI didn't mean it as a cutdown on him: more a reminder to do what he does professionally. Security evaluators and hackers alike often get into networks with attacks on gateways and firewalls setup poorly. It's on everyone's checklist. A Netgear router works similarly, albeit less features, so I tried to get him to make the mental connection between a weakness he'd readily recognize in one area and one that applies in another area. I could see how it might come off differently though... Far as my post, it's part of my larger theme that people aren't apply what the field learns. You don't need to be Paul Karger or Dan Bernstein to do better than what we see. The safety critical industry responded to C's problems by subsets, reviews, static analysis tools, and dynamic testing systems. Quality went way up. We've seen the same in academia with free prototypes of many and further work to straight-up knock out the issues (Ur/Web & Softbound are recents). No uptake. There were system languages such as Ada that, by default, eliminated many of the common problems. Little to no uptake. There were concerns about a steady stream of compiler problems. They could improve/use the model with constant problems or the one (CompCert + ML implementation) with the solution. No uptake. Safety- and security-critical work showed microkernels greatly improved security by eliminating much kernel code, isolating others behind mediated interfaces, and allowing recovery in simple failure modes (eg drivers). Most ignored it and Linus deplored it but at least GenodeOS took it up with an active community. Rare exception. There's a recurring pattern in INFOSEC where proven solutions to problems are either forgotten or ignored. I fight that trend in my posts where I identify known issues or promote alternatives (design or implementation) that were previously field-proven. I also give credit to those that make solid attempts to do it better often with results: qmail, GenodeOS, Minix 3, INTEGRITY RTOS, Secure64's SourceT OS for DNS systems, Sentinel's HYDRA PCI firewall, CheriBSD, Cornell's SWIFT, Praxis's Correct by Construction w/ SPARK Ada, Python with Cleanroom methodology, and so on. There's lots of amateurs and pro's alike doing stronger methods in academia and commercial sector. It doesn't have to be a full EAL7 system or even that formal. Yet, if a tool exists that immunizes against big problems, why aren't we using or breaking/improving it? Why do I see another presentation at DEFCON breaking a vanilla bug or a new tech that delivers a tiny fraction of that protection? Why are security-critical apps not leveraging free tech to improve them and decomposition/least-privilege at the least? I'm not asking much. Just using what exists, what's shown to deliver most bang for buck, what's free, and what takes only a small portion of the labor. Do that from language to architecture to protocols. Baseline will be so much better. I noted in both comments I was grateful to the fragment of INFOSEC that does this. Yet, most of the field just reinforces the status quo while occasionally calling out or bandaiding the preventable problems it introduces. Many get a rush out of these attacks they create they don't get out of building tools that create immunity to attack classes. Hence, that other m-word as a metaphor for what they're doing. In the end, nothing changes with that approach but at least they're having fun. ;)
- jschwartzi 11y agoFor $80k I could probably hire someone for a few months to discover one for me. Why would I buy one on the open market if that's the case? As a bonus, hiring someone may produce more than one 0day.
- nickpsecurity 11y agoI agree. Yet, governments regularly buy zero-days for five to six digits instead of hiring someone to produce it for them. As I told Thomas, I doubt they'd get $80k for it but there should be someone with more money & need than tech talent that might buy it. That's the vulnerability broker business in a nutshell. The other end is integration with the attack tools that the company licenses. Combine them for the overall, value proposition.