19 ms·
Hacking Team: a zero-day market case study
- tptacek 11y agoThis is a really amazing post. Two things that startled me: First, there is apparently a market for vulnerabilities that bypass the Flash access controls for cameras and audio recording. There can be no benign purpose for those exploits. Nobody penetration tests a Fortune 500 company looking to see if they can light up the cameras on worker desktops. Second, there's an eighty thousand dollar price tag for a Netgear vulnerability. That shocked me: serverside, highly targeted. Only, it turns out, there probably isn't any such market. Apparently, some of these bugs are listed for sale at exorbitant price with no anticipation of ever selling them. They're not listed at close to a clearing price, but rather just aspirationally, with the idea being that anyone who will someday, maybe, engage a serious zero-day broker for a Netgear vuln is probably going to derive six figures of income from that bug. That's the theory, at least. For future HN bug bounty/black market threads: note the absence of Facebook XSS vulns on these price lists. Nobody is paying tens of thousands of dollars for web vulns. Except the vendors. :)
- ryanlol 11y agoThere definitely is a market for CSRF RCEs in common home routers. (The prices are absurd due to the fact that nobody has been selling these for very long)
- tptacek 11y agoI believe you. How are those bugs monetized by the buyers?
- ryanlol 11y agoThey generally enable AT LEAST full MITM access, so ad hijacking and espionage.
- elorant 11y agoIf you could hijack cookies you could run a ransom scheme. You take control of someone's email or some other equally important social service and then you demand a ransom to release the account. Just yesterday there was a topic like that in here: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=9949444 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=9949444
- tptacek 11y agoYour Netgear router can't break TLS. Google Mail and Facebook are designed to assume that your Netgear router is already evil.
- notduncansmith 11y agoBoth true - but once you own someone's router, one could (hypothetically) social engineer the target into downloading an alternative SSL cert (like you would do yourself when setting up a debugging proxy for HTTPS traffic). As soon as they do that, it's all cleartext. I've been able to convince various (non-technical) house guests and (technical) coworkers to do this in the past, so I imagine it'd be possible on a wider scale.
- tptacek 11y agoIsn't Facebook pinned? Google is. Obviously, if you can trick someone into running an EXE, it's game over, but that's true whether or not your router is owned up (95%+ of the Internet sites people visit can be used to stage this kind of phishing attack.) Someone who knows more about organized crime than I do can tell me whether or not people actually harvest logins from compromised routers. CSRF RCE definitely belongs to the class of attacks that can be deployed en masse with very little effort, so it's at least sort of plausible.
- ryanlol 11y agoHave you never executed a binary you downloaded over http? (Live) Patching backdoors into existing binaries is not exactly difficult. So far I've only seen one attack like this in the wild, but you need to understand that these exploit vendors primarily sell for targeted attacks (usually by various government actors)
- nickpsecurity 11y agoAttacks I heard of were MITM on vulnerable services, network monitoring to enumerate other attacks, malicious DNS activity, proxies, DDOS attacks, and shutdowns if it's eCommerce. Could be more. These are the one's I've seen happen or read in reporting on the subject.
- tptacek 11y agoYou are suggesting here that someone might pay $80,000 for a Netgear RCE to help them run DDOS attacks?
- nickpsecurity 11y agoNo, Im suggesting that's one use of router compromises. Already told you that $80k is asking price, not selling price, for its likely application: cyberespionage. It will play a support role for beginning or maintaining attackers' presence in network.
- deleted 11y ago[deleted]
- Ded7xSEoPKYNsDd 11y agoA bunch of software and devices assumes (or can be configured to assume) anything on the local LAN is safe and can be trusted. So routers seem like a good place to look for unsecured file shares, security cameras, printers and whatever else is on that LAN. I have strong doubts most network protocols are properly secured against eavesdropping or MITM in a LAN either.
- tptacek 11y agoThis is like the 'nickpsecurity comment downthread. The problem with it is, people don't buy vulnerabilities the way they buy power tools; they don't think of all the different things they might do with them. People who buy vulnerabilities (a) have a very specific thing they plan on doing with that bug and (b) plan on doing it in exactly the same way to a large number of targets. At the point where you're futzing around on someone's LAN looking for unsecured file shares --- something that perhaps 1 in 20 people actually have in 2015 (file shares at all, I mean) --- you're breaking both of those criteria.
- deleted 11y ago[deleted]
- archgoon 11y ago> For future HN bug bounty/black market threads: note the absence of Facebook XSS vulns on these price lists. Nobody is paying tens of thousands of dollars for web vulns. Except the vendors. :) Is this due to the fact that the value of a Facebook XSS vuln is very low, or that the high likelihood that Facebook will notice the vulnerability (possibly from another source) and patch the issue before a profit can be realized?
- groupmonoid 11y agoMy heart wants to agree with Thomas, but I think we should remember this is a single data point and not generalize too hastily.
- gfosco 11y agoIt's because Facebook, Google, and some others run generous bug bounties / white-hat programs. Without committing a crime, people can make a lot for disclosing it directly and confidentially. Vulnerabilities can pay 5-15k and there have been 30-40k payouts. Occasionally, you'll see a blog post explaining the process from detection to payment, like: http://homakov.blogspot.com/2013/02/hacking-facebook-with-oauth2-and-chrome.html http://homakov.blogspot.com/2013/02/hacking-facebook-with-oa... FB paid out 1.3m in 2014. http://www.zdnet.com/article/facebook-bug-bounty-program-paid-out-1-3-million-in-2014/ http://www.zdnet.com/article/facebook-bug-bounty-program-pai...
- tptacek 11y agoNo. Facebook is probably not outbidding the black market for their vulnerabilities. I think 'grugq is exactly right: the market for serverside vulnerabilities with hours-long half lives is very thin. Facebook could pay $500 for RCE, and so long as they do everything else they currently do for security, a thriving black market would not emerge for their vulnerabilities. It's interesting to me that there's a real market price for an Adobe Reader flaw, but that Facebook flaws have (generous) fiat prices set by Facebook.
- gfosco 11y ago
- tomjen3 11y agoAbout the first, pentesting that gives access to secret board meetings through company laptops must raise some eyebrows. I am not sure that is legitimate pentesting, though. About the lack of xss vulnerabilities that probably doesn't generalize to e.g. WordPress or bbforum software which are installed client side.
- tptacek 11y agoYou're right, about Wordpress and bulletin board software. There is a market for those flaws.
- noir_lord 11y agoAs someone currently sat next to a netgear router it did make me look at the thing and wonder. Now I'm considering a small fanless PC running something like pfsense for home... what a world eh.
- voltagex_ 11y agoA friend of mine launched http://orp1.com/ http://orp1.com/, but I haven't had any hands on experience with it. I've also been burnt by the Almond+ router (it's only as open as Cortina Systems will let it be) and my current ADSL router won't let me do full bridge mode to something running OpenWRT. Fun offtopic fact: My copper phone line is so bad I can only use specific Broadcom based modems if I want >5Mbit download speeds. These generally don't work well with OpenWRT, because Broadcom.
- noir_lord 11y agoI'm lucky I have 200mbps fiber which terminates on a box on the wall which I can plug a Cat-6 into and get a static address, currently that goes into my ISP supplied netgear box but absolutely nothing to stop me putting a pfsense box in front of the netgear box.
- nickpsecurity 11y agoI'd recommend an OpenBSD-based setup given 0-days, lack of security tech, and bad configuration are top methods of attackers. That team is way ahead of the rest in auditing for and preventing such problems in every area. Plus, unlike stronger architectures, it's available to you free and ready to go.
- omnibrain 11y agoHave a look at PC Engines ALIX.
- nickpsecurity 11y agoNah, something like Netgear vulnerability is for government or espionage-conducting clients. They're useful. Whether anyone is buying for $80,000 is another matter. I can't comment on it.
- tptacek 11y agoI'm not sure what this has to do with my comment. Can I ask --- because of your HN name --- have you done a lot of vulnerability research work? I'm curious to discover new perspectives on it.
- nickpsecurity 11y agoBout time we had a real intro rather than trolling each other. ;) My job in INFOSEC was high assurance security engineering and systems design. Premium stuff with provable properties to stop attacks by nation states or other High Strength Attackers. I learned from a tiny, elite community in academia and defense that published a lot on what worked vs what didn't. Not a great market in U.S. these days unless suppliers are willing to be very unethical. All I'll say on that. I left & am not doing INFOSEC commercially right now. So, past 7+ years I've been designing solutions to every problem I could spot, mostly giving them away for free on various forums to get our baseline up, and evangelizing strong security methods over the more mainstream ones that I call 0-day generators. Reference copies of most of my stuff posted on Schneier's blog since it reaches many people without any strings attached (i.e. ACM/IEEE's bullshit). Recently, I started doing stuff here too. Hindsight, probably should've done less work to focus on publishing in more mainstream outlets but I stayed too busy to be that wise. ;) My commercial framework [1] said the nation states would hit every layer of the system and any device in the network. All must be protected, monitored, obfuscated, whatever. It's was long known that routers, etc were being used as a beachhead. Anyone on the defense side against strong attackers would see unusual traffic. My perspective was always that, if it's useful & can run code, it will be hacked by pros eventually. That simple, no further imagination required. Mainstream ITSEC people I contacted always said I was too paranoid, no evidence of such attacks, stronger methods were overkill, etc. Post-Snowden, they're getting a bit of a wakeup call but still using same methods & tech that got them there. (sighs) That's background. Back to your comment. You said you were surprised there was a 0-day and huge price tag on Netgear routers. Think like an attacker. Such routers are used by many potential targets as the first line of defense, with visibility into the network, can run code, and have shit security. It was an obvious attack that can facilitate others. The attack requires an exploit, though. So, someone made one and tried to price it quite profitably. Router security sucks so bad that 0-days aren't worth that much based on effort to find but might sell well if limited supply. So, it follows from the existence of an opportunity and cases of attackers seizing it previously that there will be a market of supplying and buying 0-days for that type of target. We must also remember the specialization of malware market where people using hacking tools don't necessarily want to dig out 0-days themselves: they buy them & integrate them with custom or purchased toolkits. Especially for cyber-espionage and offensive warfare by governments. The rest, like prices and demand, I'd only be guessing at so no comment on that. Answering other question, I don't do vulnerability research. It's mostly mental masturbation that doesn't solve our problems. The few exceptions are those uncovering new classes of attack which I'm very grateful for. My segment of INFOSEC focuses on understanding the root problem of given issues, identifying ways to prevent/catch it, promoting them so they get more review, and I constantly try to enhance & integrate them in my own work since that community is more scattered than mainstream. That's what I call medium assurance with strongest designs, implementations, and security arguments being high assurance (or on that path). The only part of medium-to-high assurance that's mainstream right now is langsec.org, IIRC. They have methods and tools that eliminate a whole class of problems along with strong arguments that they work. That's how high assurance does it. Another micro-level example are stack overflows. Mainstream did canaries, checks, all kinds of BS. MULTICS (1970's) just made data flow away from stack pointer (reverse stack) and overflows drop into newly allocated memory. Root problem solved. Boom. Done. Most UNIX people, upon hearing of setuid risks, set on some auditing process to try to avoid abuses while using such apps. TIS's Trusted Xenix kernel cleared setuid bit upon a write to any such file w/ admin seeing that & having to manually reset it if it was OK. Setuid issue gone w/ legacy compatibility still there. I hope such simple examples illustrate the difference between my subset and mainstream INFOSEC's approaches to solving security problems. [1] http://pastebin.com/y3PufJ0V http://pastebin.com/y3PufJ0V
- vonklaus 11y agoA facebook xss vuln is probably not enough to do damage. However, a serious 0day or attack plan that could take down the network would be valuable now that it floats on a public exchange. During April 20 - June 20, 2011 sony shares fell from $30.14 to $24.28 during the PSN hack. A vuln that could take down facebook could allow shortsellers to profit if it was severe in magnitude even if not in duration especially if it created FUD about Facebook security.
- berdario 11y ago> There can be no benign purpose for those exploits. I agree, but as can be seen in the post by Netragard linked in the article: www.netragard.com/exploit-acquisition-program-shut-down Business can still rationalize and excuse their behavior by pretending that they're actually doing the morally right thing > The need for 0-days is very real and the uses are often both ethical and for the greater good. One of the most well known examples was when the FBI used a FireFox 0-day to target and eventually dismantle a child pornography ring. People who argue that all 0-day’s are bad are either uneducated about 0-days or have questionable ethics themselves. I loathe this viewpoint, for at least 3 reasons: - "Keys Under Doormats": you keep the 0day secret to target pedophiles, but other people will be affected by it as well - It's using the usual cheap rethoric of figthing pedophilia to defend some business interests - You're either with us (the spotless knights), or against us... "People who argue that all 0-day’s are bad [...] have questionable ethics themselves "
- tptacek 11y agoI think I agree with you. I see a market for camera bypass bugs as more evidence that the whole market is ethically bankrupt. I've always thought that --- high prices for exploits are premised on the idea that they aren't being fixed by vendors! --- but this is a lurid and disturbing detail. Of course, it's also possible that, like the Netgear CSRF RCE, this is a bug posted with a high price as a a trial balloon, and nobody actually buys them. (For what it's worth: I also think the idea that serious enterprises need zero-days to test their security controls is also pretty silly. I know it does happen, but I think the causality is mixed up; I think it happens because the markets exist, not the other way around.)
- palmer_eldritch 11y ago> One of the most well known examples was when the FBI used a FireFox 0-day to target and eventually dismantle a child pornography ring. Funny... that's when they took down Freedom Hosting right? If I recall correctly, they didn't use a 0-day, they targeted a vulnerability that had been patched in the regular tor browser so only people using an outdated version of the browser were hit by it. Plus, calling Freedom Hosting a "child pornography ring" isn't representing accurately what it was. Sure, their was child porn hosted there. Maybe even most of what was hosted there was child porn, I don't know... but that was a web host. There was no encouragements from Freedom Hosting to host cp there (apart from not doing anything to prevent it). Plus, apart from busting the guy responsible for FH, I'm not sure they got anyone of interest with this operation... at least, I haven't heard of it and I'm sure they wouldn't have been too shy to brag about it if they had made any high-profile cp bust from this.
- pasbesoin 11y ago> Nobody penetration tests a Fortune 500 company looking to see if they can light up the cameras on worker desktops. This surprises me, to some degree. Compromise a machine or laptop privvy to sensitive information -- meetings, phone calls, etc. -- and you might have access to valuable information. These days, I guess that could include the sound of passwords being typed in, for which keystroke analysis software was making the headlines a couple of years ago. Part of me is not surprised. Few people think of all the ways around security. But, big dollar pen testers should. I would presume that firewalls have some success in keeping such malicious data streams from exiting the internal network. Then again... How can one distinguish them from all the legitimate IP-based conferencing going on, these days? P.S. I suppose in part it is security through obscurity. Being able to identify a useful target and pick out the valuable bits of information. When you're simply spraying exploits, that's probably a needle in a haystack with regard to this kind of information. Or at least, needing of much more attention that waiting for your software to pass back a log of user name and password fields, cookies, etc.
- tptacek 11y agoThe zero-days used on high-dollar commercial pentests give attackers remote code execution.
- acdha 11y agoDoes it seem likely that this is the easiest way to get that information, however? If you get someone's email or files you get what is likely to be more detailed information in a conveniently easily searched and summarized form but if you get an audio recording you either have to listen to it yourself or spend time getting a high-quality speech recognition system up and running.
- pasbesoin 11y agoReplying to myself. I am certainly no expert, but both on my own and more so perhaps simply extrapolating from what I hear about, I imagine circumstances that, a few years later, I seem to end up reading about. But, that's not the point of my reply. That is, that I am not an expert, and I seem to be drifting further and further away from relevance in conversations, these days. So, I think it is time to unplug myself. Maybe still browse, but enough of my comments.
- jaytaylor 11y agoWhat is HACKING TEAMs motivation for publicly sharing all of this seemingly private underworld information?
- josu 11y agoThey didn't share it voluntarily, they got hacked and 400GB of data from their servers turned up in a data dump. http://leaksource.info/2015/07/07/hacking-team-hacked-400gb-data-dump-of-internal-documents-emails-source-code-from-notorious-spyware-dealer/ http://leaksource.info/2015/07/07/hacking-team-hacked-400gb-...
- jaytaylor 11y agoI see, thank you for the context! So then my next question would be what is this person hoping to do by publishing the info like this?
- MichaelCrawford 11y agoPerhaps he sold short on tech stocks.
- lawnchair_larry 11y agoActivism. Hacking Team were not liked.
- lcswi 11y agoExposing criminals.
- reilly3000 11y agoThe market for exploits is far cheaper than the cost of defense against them. It seems like firms would be better off hiring real black hats to make real exploits than mess with white hat firms.
- HNLogInsSuckAss 11y ago"Zero-day"? What's that supposed to mean?
- cletus 11y agoI don't want to be that guy but trying to read this on a tablet is a major pain. The scrolling keeps breaking. Why do people mess with something that isn't broken?
- lultimouomo 11y agoSome intersting stuff that shows up in the e-mails: Kaspersky discovered one of the exploits in use by Hacking Team, but kept shut for a while to trace its users and other linked code. HT's CTO Marco Vallery considers this behaviour "morally despicable". [https://wikileaks.org/hackingteam/emails/emailid/990150 https://wikileaks.org/hackingteam/emails/emailid/990150] The price for iOS exploits is apparently in the millions, because the price is "driven by federal programs" [https://wikileaks.org/hackingteam/emails/emailid/15494 https://wikileaks.org/hackingteam/emails/emailid/15494]
- tptacek 11y agoThe price for iOS exploits is also high because they are distinctively difficult to generate.
- MichaelGG 11y agoExcellent post; very interesting! How many of these "expensive" bugs are directly due to memory safety? From a quick glance it looks like this entire market is held up purely on that quirk of C/C++. Of course this is nothing compared to the money being poured into compiler and runtime tricks to try to undo those quirks. Which is probably little compared to the amount of money via time lost developing and debugging such an environment. Overall these prices seem low compared to the capability. Is that because it's easy enough for governments and big corps to just hire teams and dev in house? These prices are well within SMB price range if an unethical company wanted to attack a competitor (though there's probably cheaper ways in). That, plus given that the price to compromise even federal agents (going off known cases where FBI and CIA agents were turned)... my doubt increases that companies can actually keep secrets. I think of this when folks like Nikon refuse to document camera formats under the claim that it's a trade secret they are hiding from competitors. It is curious though how little these go for, overall. Perhaps because they aren't overly directly profitable (exploitable for cash)? I wonder if there's more money in exploiting server software that you can use almost directly for profit? Perhaps not; it could be easier for the criminals with the infrastructure in place to find and exploit directly as part of operations.
- chinathrow 11y agoGreat writeup. Lest not forget, that people got imprisoned for political reasons because of vendors such as HT, FinFisher by Gamma and others. http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/10/16/finfisher_criminal_complaint_gamma_international/ http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/10/16/finfisher_criminal_c... Vendors selling to HT and HT themselves should be sued and brought to justice for supporting oppressive regimes. The UN charta says it all.