7 ms·
“Why are you releasing a full exploit just minutes after the patch is released?”
- nobody_nowhere 11y agoIncreases the need for Qualys security tools, no?
- tptacek 11y agoNo. Qualys sells primarily the tools you use to detect if you have bugs like these; by publishing exploits, they're actually giving away some of their own assets.
- Sanddancer 11y agoJust the opposite. Releasing a PoC means that /other/ security companies can add the exploit to their behavioral databases that much quicker.
- chucky_z 11y agoFor those curious... click through the entire thread with thread-next>. You'll be rewarded with some really great discussion!
- Titanous 11y agoWorking exploits are useful to test and iterate on to ensure that everything is patched correctly (both for admins and researchers). /r/netsec has some good discussion: https://www.reddit.com/r/netsec/comments/3ed4fu/cve20153245_and_cve20153245_local_exploit_that/ https://www.reddit.com/r/netsec/comments/3ed4fu/cve20153245_...
- dimman 11y agoThey sure are valuable, he never said otherwise. His point was that the PoC exploit was released before or right at the time that patches became available and delaying the exploit PoC would give people a bit time to patch their systems.
- emidln 11y agoDelaying PoC doesn't preclude others from analyzing the patch and writing exploits. The only thing delaying PoC does is provide a false sense of security.
- dimman 11y agoNo, analyzing a released patch and then write an exploit takes time. Compare that with taking a pre-written exploit and executing it, so it has nothing to do with "false sense of security". Fact is that it gives people more time to patch their systems.
- emidln 11y agoThere is no basis in the statement that witholding gives people more time to patch their systems. Even if these authors don't release their PoC, there isn't any way to prove it isn't already known to bad actors. Without the PoC, it is more difficult for legitimate users, particularly legit users with custom deployments, to know if they are vulnerable and to verify that patches actually fix the problem.
- nickpsecurity 11y agoThere's two options available: release patch and exploit simultaneously where bad guys all over the place can exploit users easily before their patch testing or deployment happens; release patch and delay exploit release so that only the subset R.E.ing the patch and converting it to a payload can hit whoever they chose to hit. One choice puts a lot of risk on the users of software. One choice puts way less. You're constantly encouraging putting more risk on users and exploits into arbitrary attackers' hands with the argument that one or more attackers might already be a risk. That makes no sense. The only people with a straight-up benefit from this are malware writers who don't want to work very hard converting the patch into an exploit. Researchers should delay the publishing of exploits at least a week so people can test and deploy the patch. I keep mentioning testing because patches sometimes break stuff themselves. Doing otherwise just saves attackers work.
- agounaris 11y agoself advertisement??
- Coding_Cat 11y agoI agree with Leif here. Sure releasing a PoC serves a purposes even in these cases, but this is just idiotic. One cannot expect outsiders to patch their systems this quickly. I would release without a PoC for a few weeks, maybe a month depending on how widespread the exploit is believed to be, to give everyone enough time to update. Humans need sleep , and some patches need downtime after all. Perhaps a tiered release would be best? Release a PoC to a few trusted partners to verify and pen-test the new patches before giving a full-disclosure. If there's something I'm missing here I'd love to hear it, cause frankly I feel like I'm just stating the obvious here...
- nkantar 11y ago> If there's something I'm missing here I'd love to hear it, cause frankly I feel like I'm just stating the obvious here... Likewise — I'm very much a n00b sysadmin, but I'm having a tough time understanding how giving people a buffer isn't desirable.
- Titanous 11y ago1) It helps admins verify that the patch was successfully applied. 2) It gives security researchers more surface area to evaluate when looking for similar bugs or bugs in the patch. 3) A PoC not existing provides a false sense of security. Just because one is not published does not prevent attackers from creating and using an exploit (in many cases before the vulnerability is disclosed).
- dimman 11y agoAgain, delaying the PoC exploit code release gives people some time to patch their systems. How much time depends on the skill of the attacker and complexity of the exploit, but some time is better than no time.
- Joky 11y agoAnd again the point of Titanous is that delaying the PoC provides a false sense of security. Saying "some time is better than no time" is the problem, you have a false impression that you have time while the fact that the PoC is not published does not mean it is not already used by some attackers. Delaying does not provide an incentive to people to update. I agree that there is a tradeoff, but it is not a simple a you present it (delaying means giving some time).
- fieryscribe 11y agoThat's what an embargo is and why it exists. And when it's up, it's up. This is essentially a rehashing of the Microsoft/Google squabble a few months ago.
- CydeWeys 11y agoMaybe there should be tiered embargoes then, so that the fix is released before the exploit?
- danielweber 11y agoNo, Google gave Microsoft X days to fix and release, and MS missed the deadline. (Assuming I'm thinking of the same issue as you.) Google didn't release PoC exploit code the same instant as Microsoft released the fix.
- davmre 11y agoThe point of an embargo is to allow vendors to coordinate patches. Since the exploit clock starts ticking when the first patch is released, releasing all patches at once means that everyone has some opportunity to patch before an exploit is in the wild. Releasing an exploit simultaneously with the patches gives people zero time to patch. In that sense it somewhat defeats the purpose of the embargo.
- seorphates 11y agoTo ensure that test kits, catches and patches prevail. But that's only a guess.
- wcummings 11y agoResponsible disclosure is a courtesy, not an obligation, to criticize reeks of entitlement.
- deleted 11y ago[deleted]
- mpdehaan2 11y agoI strongly disagree, and don't follow this logic. Responsible disclosure is intended to be ethical, the opposite is ... well, irresponsible. I've worked with irresponsible security disclosurists before, and even those that agree to a window only to dump another small variation after the window is up - rather than working to make sure the product is as good as it could be. Giving end users time to patch so they are not owned is quite a ethical thing to do. The end goal is less compromised systems. Doing this at the same time achieves the opposite effect and increases the amount of compromised systems. It's never been "we're giving you two weeks, get it done fast because the exploit is going out then", it should be "we'll give you enough time to fix this properly, and then give the customers time to update once announced". I personally would always release when something got done early, just because the person on the other end is usually unpredictable. However, the person on the other end shouldn't assume development of the fix didn't take the full interval. Let people pen-test after they had a chance to update to secure the systems. Having the ability to prove a fix is not worth systems being owned prior to being able to fix them. The damage is already done at that point. I've worked a lot of CVE reports, and about half the time, the person on the other end just wants credit, they aren't really going to hang around and try to help, and often they supply terse information (i.e. no exploit PoC to the vendor) as some form of game. I'd much rather this always be more user focused, the ultimate desire should always be to help the end user, and often users are less educated and don't have dedicated security teams.
- wcummings 11y agoAn exploit as the fruit of someone's labor is non-trivial, often holding significant monetary value. They (exploit authors) have no obligation to release it to the vendor at all, let alone for free and "responsibly". Is the unpaid labor scheme you're describing "ethical"? If vendors want "responsible disclosure", they can simply buy exploits at market value.
- tlo 11y agoI recently reported a security issue to a quite popular open source project (which has at least some company support). The fix is ready but because of coordinating other security fixes into one big release it is - after almost 2 month - still not released. I wonder if this is normal? What else can you do? Full disclosure?
- Titanous 11y agoIt is normal, but not desirable. You should feel free to exercise full disclosure if the vendor is not being responsible. > [W]ithout the threat of full disclosure, responsible disclosure would not work, and vendors would go back to ignoring security vulnerabilities. https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2012/06/on_securing_pot.html https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2012/06/on_securing_p...
- danielweber 11y agoWhat is your goal?
- davidgerard 11y agoThe actual answer is in the thread: http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2015/07/23/19 http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2015/07/23/19 "That's how coordinated release dates work. Instead of trying to shame Qualys for not following your arbitrary views on what is and isn't "Responsible Disclosure", perhaps you should make sure Red Hat releases patches hours before the CRD, like Ubuntu does?" The rest is the usual rehashed discussion on this topic.
- PhasmaFelis 11y agoImmediately followed by a Canonical employee saying that no, that's not true: "Ubuntu is actually very careful to not release anything ahead of CRD unless the CRD is broken elsewhere. Not saying we've never made a mistake, but as you can imagine it is quite annoying when a CRD is broken-- we certainly don't want to be the cause of that annoyance for others. :)"
- danielweber 11y ago> perhaps you should make sure Red Hat releases patches hours before the CRD, like Ubuntu does?" We could end up repasting the entire thread, but the very next comment is from Ubuntu denying that behavior. Releasing early is basically violating the embargo.
- cmurf 11y ago"There was absolutely nothing wrong with Qualys' timing. When the embargo ends, it ends." And then later some comments about people's panties being twisted, etc. which ends the thread. Reading the entire thing is worthwhile.
- tptacek 11y agoThis is a local privilege escalation bug. If you're a SAAS company protecting user data and you were relying in some way on RCE not being a gameover flaw because it wouldn't give attackers root, you were probably already boned. It's also a 90s style Unix file management bug. It's not like patches and vague advisories were going to keep the exploit under wraps. That doesn't make it unreasonable to complain about exploits being released in advisories (though: this is a complaint that is approximately as old as security advisories), but it should dampen the outrage a bit.
- eyeareque 11y agoThey do it for personal marketing reasons. Someone else could have posted a PoC soon after and stole some of their spotlight. I agree, it would be nice to wait a little while for people to get their patches installed. But also, people like to have a way to verify that the patch worked.
- bakhy 11y agothere's a lot of arguments here that delaying the patch release gives a false sense of security because we cannot prove that bad guys do not already have the exploit, or because they will develop one within hours. if to have real security we must prove that bad guys do not have an exploit, would that not lead to a conclusion that there is no real security at all? it is safe to assume that exploits for undisclosed vulnerabilities exist. and, regarding the "several hours" argument, didn't the release of the exploit reduce those several hours to zero? instead of not being sure if the bad guys have the exploit, or if they will develop it in 1 or 3 hours, we are now certain that they have it. instead of a sense of false security, we currently have no security. it seems obvious that little to nothing can be done about those who already have the exploit. and given the wide agreement that developing it will take a couple of hours, then wouldn't an optimal exploit release time be 1-2 hours? and as far as i could notice, only one very downvoted comment mentions that a motivating factor for a quick release could be to be the first to break the news. certainly sounds like good PR for a security company. why is this unspeakable? :)
- Nomentatus 11y agoPlease pardon what may be a naive suggestion. This isn't my area and illness had me "benched" for a long while. Is there an inverted solution? Maybe it's worth releasing not a simple PoC, but an unnecessarily large ball of executable or testing procedure that incorporates the PoC for testing purposes, but also does many harmless, exploit-like but nonsensical things, performing only one action that matters (the test.) A hairball of mostly trash code or procedure that is not trivial to untangle, in other words. The idea is to create enough of a mess to stop the script kiddies from quickly knowing what to modify for their own purposes, not forever; but for a time. Just maybe it would be possible to create a hairball that takes longer to untangle or trace than just having a pro tear apart the patch and roll their own attack, ignoring the hairball. If so, providing the test/PoC/hairball is not giving the pros in the black hats any extra time. (But in any case, at least you are not amusing all the script kiddies.) If you can make a worthy hairball, you might just want to release the hairball just a little ahead of the patch; enough to whet admins' appetites for the patch - inverting the current order of release. (Or not.) Again, this may not be practical in all cases or any; and my apologies if that's so. PS There may be an argument in here for providing an "unnecessarily" and complex patch, too, to make it harder to reverse engineer - perhaps worth considering.
- tzs 11y agoFor a particular system to actually be exploited, you need someone who (1) knows an exploit, (2) wants to use it on that particular system and (3) has access to that particular system. A lot of the analysis in the comments here does not seem to be taking all of these requirements into account. They are particularly relevant in this case because, I believe, the exploit is a local privilege escalation for people with shell access.
- Nomentatus 11y agoObfuscate the hell out of the PoC, then release it simultaneously.