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I guess that that's what happened, and what's happening everyday... Newton action at a distance wasn't convincing enough, so others sought other, "deeper" expla
by fbrusch 11y ago
I guess that that's what happened, and what's happening everyday... Newton action at a distance wasn't convincing enough, so others sought other, "deeper" explanations, among which most notable is of course general relativity. (And it's probably noteworthy that, from an "instrumental" point of view, its benefits were initially marginal...) The difference to me is between saying "the explanatory power of this current theory can (and will eventually) be outdone" and "being able to explain is a dimension of no importance in a scientific theory". Maybe that is Chomsky's concern, even though this instrumentalist attitude is far from new or unknown (think of Copenhagen (lack of) interpretation of quantum mechanics, and its (in)famous motto: "Shut up and calculate"!) If you are interested in this line of reasoning, I found David Deutsch ("The beginning of infinity") and Karl Popper ("Conjectures and Refutations") two passionate (and opinionated) voices!
- fenomas 11y agoThanks for the recommendations. Admittedly I'm just being perverse in applying this to fundamental physical laws but the distinction feels very important in areas like linguistics (where researchers' ideas of "truth" tend not to be expressible in calculus). That is, I picture an exchange where a deep-learning researcher says "our clustering algorithms found that languages A & B share characteristic C", and a linguistics professor replies "Aha, but the underlying truth is that A & B belong to the X class of languages, and X-like languages always have C". Intuitively the latter version somehow feels more robust, but in practice they're basically equivalent, and the first version arguably carries less baggage.