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I see a lot of people thoughtlessly applying computer-security mindset here to vehicle-safety. They're really not the same thing, because they are handling very
by jameshart 11y ago
I see a lot of people thoughtlessly applying computer-security mindset here to vehicle-safety. They're really not the same thing, because they are handling very different risk models. Vehicle safety is about "how will this system perform under typical conditions when something goes wrong?". Computer security is about "how will this system perform if a smart asshole tries to abuse it?". Vehicle safety generally doesn't concern itself with deliberate sabotage. You won't see a product recall for a car because "under some circumstances, a criminal might cut the brake cables". What Chrysler are doing here is, though, effectively that, and why they have to do that for a computer security issue is interesting.
We're all used to the idea that if you put a computer on the internet, it will come under attack. People will try to snoop on the data it handles, or subvert it to use it for their own purposes. So why do we then move on to assume that, if such a system is attached to something safety critical, that those same people who will attack the computer to get at its data or processing power will now move on to attacking the brakes, or the engine, and try to kill people?
Most vehicular crime isn't homicide, it's acquisitive - people will attack vehicle security systems to steal the car, or get access to valuable contents. Sabotaging the vehicle to kill the driver is way down the list.
As a society we tend to assume that physical security is not the only thing that stops random strangers from trying to kill us. We do not all drive around in armored cars in case someone decides to shoot at us from an overpass. We don't all sweep under our car with a mirror for bombs before we get in and start the engine.
And it's certainly not a failing of Chrysler's engineers to adequately consider customer safety that they sell Jeeps which are not bulletproof and which have exposed frameworks on the underside where bombs can be attached.
So why is it that we're so quick to assume that because a safety-critical computer system is exposed to the internet, that this is the worst thing ever?
Is it that as far as physical security of your Jeep goes you only have to trust the people in your neighborhood, but for internet security we have to trust the whole world?
- higherpurpose 11y agoSo you're okay with spy agencies (from all over the world) as well as drug cartels and other criminal organizations having the power to kill you in an almost untraceable way while you're on the highway? Also, the US gov has been using these entertainment systems to spy on people for more than a decade...it's already been happening. Unfortunately, I can't find the link now, but it was a post from 2001 or 2003 on NYT and I think they were using Ford Sync to do it.
- jameshart 11y agoDon't think I said that I was okay with that, no. But to be clear, drug cartels, spy agencies and criminal organizations have been able to do that for quite some time. They've just had to send a person to plant the bomb or the bug or the location tracker in person. And it's not generally regarded as the car manufacturer's problem to deal with that threat. So yes, there's a question of scale, which makes a difference here. Traceability can maybe be handled at the network level - who knows what information Sprint captures about traffic to these car systems? But the way most people are talking about this you'd think that as soon as the method for doing this hits the internet, script-kiddies are going to start randomly crashing Jeeps into bridge pylons.
- KeytarHero 11y ago> But the way most people are talking about this you'd think that as soon as the method for doing this hits the internet, script-kiddies are going to start randomly crashing Jeeps into bridge pylons. You mean the same script kiddies who think it's hilarious to sic a SWAT team on someone's house? It's not like script kiddies everywhere would start doing this - but all it takes is 1 before you've got a problem, and I'm sure that if it was easy enough for any script kiddie to do, at least one of them would. Say the car manufacturer made no attempt at security whatsoever - all you had to do to take control of the car's critical systems was know its IP address and guess its 8 character max admin password. Would that really not be on the manufacturer?
- jameshart 11y agoPeople today, in low-tech real-life, have been known to go and throw rocks off overpasses. People have died. People have also gone to prison. It's not the car manufacturer's responsibility to protect their customers from that. Make the same thing possible for someone to do from their basement, and sure: people will die; people will go to prison. Look, I'm not actually trying to absolve Chrysler of responsibility here, I'm trying to get to the bottom of why when virtual meets physical, we act like the nature of the internet fundamentally changes things. I'm interested in what it is about this threat to car owners which is in a difference from existing threats.
- krapp 11y ago>Is it that as far as physical security of your Jeep goes you only have to trust the people in your neighborhood, but for internet security we have to trust the whole world? Yes? If you connect a system to the internet, you have to consider attempts to attack that system (automated and not) to be part of typical operating conditions.
- jameshart 11y agoBut why does the internet need to be considered a completely hostile environment? Because the internet differs from the real world in that... Actions are untraceable? Crime has no consequences? It crosses borders? These are all true to a greater or lesser extent (often to a lesser extent than people think). But it makes for a pretty weird threat model, trying to protect your customers from high-tech murderers, anarchists, and three-letter-government agencies. This isn't like trying to stop someone steal a credit-card-number.
- Dwolb 11y agoI think one thing to consider is the attacker's leverage. In the physical world, an attacker might attack one victim at a time. However in the digital world, the attacker could attack multiple vehicles in a similar amount of time.
- jameshart 11y agoRight. To what end? Who's the threat here? Someone looking to cause a mass casualty event? So terrorists and psychopaths, then. So what liability does a car manufacturer have in such an event?
- luckystarr 11y agoAttacker: Nice car company you have here. Btw, I've got control over 300k of your vehicles. Want to pay up?
- dsfyu404ed 11y ago
- SilasX 11y agoThat doesn't sound like the same vulnerability at all. Cutting brake lines no longer results in someone's death [1], and they'd know at the time they first try to brake, when they'll probably be at low speed anyway. The Chrysler exploit, by contrast, allows you to silently take control of the vehicle in ways that don't reveal your position until much later (if at all), due to the sound system not being firewalled from the brakes. That seems fundamentally different from "hey, gangbangers might shoot at you while driving". [1] http://www.quora.com/Is-cutting-someones-brake-line-prior-to-a-drive-down-a-mountain-or-whatever-really-such-an-effective-way-to-murder-someone-as-the-movies-seem-to-indicate http://www.quora.com/Is-cutting-someones-brake-line-prior-to...
- jameshart 11y agoWhy is it fundamental different? What is the fundamental difference? I'm asking because I'm genuinely not sure. I agree it seems different. It does feel like chrysler should be responsible for securing the system from remote exploitation. But are they? And why?
- aianus 11y agoBecause a lot of immature assholes on the internet who would be too cowardly to confront you physically wouldn't bat an eyelash to disabling your car remotely as a prank. See: swatting.
- threatofrain 11y agoI think it's pretty clear that connecting a computer to the internet is a matter of trusting the whole world, which is a lot harder than trusting local circumstances. Your assessment of risk has to change when the cost of scanning and attacking your machine from afar in a hard-to-trace manner is dirt cheap.
- ScottBurson 11y agoInteresting questions. I think part of what's going on is that people don't like being exposed to new, unknown threats. Even if this turned out not to be a very big deal in practice -- and I am not sure it won't -- it's still a new risk that's being assumed. > Sabotaging the vehicle to kill the driver is way down the list. But if it can be done remotely and untraceably...?
- superuser2 11y ago>applying computer-security mindset here to vehicle-safety That might be a valid complaint if this attack required physical access, but it's a remote exploit. It is computer security, except the target is many times more interesting because it can kill people.
- munificent 11y ago> So why is it that we're so quick to assume that because a safety-critical computer system is exposed to the internet, that this is the worst thing ever? Because of the Greater Internet Fuckwad Theory (or, more nicely put, the "online disinhibition effect"[1]). We don't worry as much about random strangers harming us in person because most people are generally well-behaved when they are face to face with someone in real physical space. On the Internet, where all you see is a screen and all you do is click your mouse, "reality" gets a lot more tenuous. In that environment, people act worse. If you were walking over an overpass and saw someone left a cinder block up there with a note attached saying "Throw me!" how likely would you be to lumber it up off the ground, carry it to the edge, and heave it over onto to a car you can see passing below, whose occupants are visible to you? Now imagine you stumble onto a random web page with a button labeled "Click to drop cinder block off overpass". Tempting? The way our behavior differs in these two circumstances is a big part of why Internet security is so different from physical security. (The other big difference is how data can be replicated for free. It takes 50x as much effort to steal 50 cars. It often takes no more effort to apply the same have 50, or a million times.) [1]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Online_disinhibition_effect https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Online_disinhibition_effect
- imh 11y agoIn addition to this, there are differing scales at work. In real life, by your analogy, you might find a cinder block with a "throw me" note. With the internet, you might find a button that says "throw 1.4M cinder blocks." One maniac can cause much more trouble that way.
- amwang217 11y agoNot too long ago, many decent hackers were no longer interested in causing damage and instead focused on stealing people's identities or credit card information for financial gain. If Greedy Greg knew public CEO Huge McChecks was driving an exposed vehicle, Greedy Greg could short sale Huge McCheck's company and cause a multi-million dollar crash with Huge McChecks inside... all with a couple strokes on a keyboard from thousands of miles away.