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HORNET: High-speed Onion Routing at the Network Layer
- dang 11y agoUrl changed from https://www.dailydot.com/politics/hornet-tor-anonymity-network https://www.dailydot.com/politics/hornet-tor-anonymity-netwo..., which summarizes it and embeds it, yet doesn't link to it.
- Systemic33 11y agoIf those figures (93Gb/s) are right and represents a real-world scenario, and not a lab test, then it's really impressive. The following quote from the article highlights the difference between HORNET and Tor: "Unlike onion routing protocols that use global re-routing through overlay networks (e.g., Tor [23] and I2P [47]), HORNET uses short paths created by the underlying network architecture to reduce la- tency, and is therefore bound by the network’s physical intercon- nection and ISP relationships. This is an unavoidable constraint for onion routing protocols built into the network layer [29, 42]."
- travjones 11y agoSo does that mean that traffic on HORNET is viewable by one's ISP? (Sorry if this is a noob question)
- JulianMorrison 11y agoThey would see that you were communicating (because by necessity, all your stuff passes through them) but not who to, because they couldn't strip off the next layer of the onion. Much like Tor.
- travjones 11y agoThanks, Julian.
- andor 11y agoLatency vs. anonymity is usually a tradeoff: if you monitor the whole network, you can correlate flows between nodes, and this gets easier with lower latency. That's why Pond connections are randomly timed. They acknowledge this fact in section 5.2: Flow-dynamics-based end-to-end correlation. In general it is difficult even for high latency mix networks to resist such powerful adversaries. Low-latency anonymity systems are particularly prone to these types of attacks. HORNET cannot protect against them, but as mentioned above, the use of packet obfuscation makes these attacks more expensive and allows for potential additional measures to be taken (e.g., padding), either by upper layer protocols or by extensions of HORNET.
- nickpsecurity 11y agoInteresting research. We won't know how impressive it is until the kinds of people that break Tor give it a thorough analysis. Otherwise, it might be a scheme that simply de-anonymizes users faster than the competition. I'll add that combining anonymity and performance seems to be one of the hardest security problems to get right with so much left to learn. So, I don't trust anything that does that, including Tor. Asynchronous, non-real-time schemes that look like vanilla web traffic are the best. Especially using covert channels. However, my method is to do face-to-face with possible and otherwise use burner PC's, LiveCD's, and random Wifi hotspots. Tor or proxies optionally as extra layer of difficulty depending on what I'm doing.
- ShaneWilton 11y ago"Asynchronous, non-real-time schemes that look like vanilla web traffic are the best." It's a shame that high-latency mix networks died out with Mixminion [1] a few years ago. There's a lot of interesting research that never got implemented, that would, in my opinion, bring us a lot closer to truly anonymous email. If this is a topic you find interesting, take a look at the Pynchon Gate [2]. It's a private information retrieval system, proposed by Sassaman (Mixmaster), Cohen (Bittorrent), and Nick Mathewson (Tor), that had a lot of interesting ideas about how to facilitate the anonymous retrieval of email. It was never implemented, but it's a very approachable paper that serves as an excellent introduction to the incredible world of anonymity networks. [1] https://github.com/mixminion/mixminion/ https://github.com/mixminion/mixminion/ [2] http://freehaven.net/anonbib/cache/sassaman:wpes2005.pdf http://freehaven.net/anonbib/cache/sassaman:wpes2005.pdf (PDF Warning)
- nickpsecurity 11y agoOh yeah, good ole Mixminion. Yeah, the mix networks were the most promising. Thanks for the paper. That sure is a near-dream team of writers. I'll read it later.
- ShaneWilton 11y agoNo problem! I could talk for hours about mix networks. If you enjoy that paper, there's a few follow-up papers they wrote that examine some possible threat vectors and possible solutions. All in all, it's a very interesting system. If you're ever looking for more reading on the subject, I'd recommend all of the starred papers on Free Haven [1] [1] http://freehaven.net/anonbib/date.html http://freehaven.net/anonbib/date.html
- sudioStudio64 11y agoIts interesting that TOR takes a circuit based approach and these guys use a packet based approach... its the same thing that happened in telecom over a decade ago. (its analogous, anyway)
- cbsmith 11y agoI'm going to have to look at this closely. My first thought here is that it seems impossible to get high performance without leaking at least some form of sub-channel signaling about communications, but I don't yet understand the real "trick" behind HORNET.
- dredmorbius 11y agoOne thing I suspect widespread use of onion routing will need are compatible anonymous reputation systems. I'd really like to see work in this area. I'm aware of two proposed systems, both largely academic: FAUST and Fair Anonymity: https://gnunet.org/node/1704 https://gnunet.org/node/1704 http://arxiv.org/pdf/1412.4707v1.pdf http://arxiv.org/pdf/1412.4707v1.pdf One idea is that older (and still trustworthy) tokens become reliable and more valuable, encouraging parties to 1) keep their tokens for a long time and 2) behave themselves. As I recall, both operate with the concept of a token server. In the case of FAUST, tokens are requested unblinded (that is, from a non-Tor IP), but are anonymous and cannot be associated with the requestor after the fact. If there's other or more recent work, I'd really like to hear about them.
- DonGateley 11y agoWhat stands in the way of deployment of this for general usage? Invention, disclosure, coding or what?