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While we're on the topic, something that always puzzled me: doesn't Gödel's theorem apply only to 'non-trivial' axiomatic systems? Meaning you could come up wi
by statictype 17y ago
While we're on the topic, something that always puzzled me: doesn't Gödel's theorem apply only to 'non-trivial' axiomatic systems?
Meaning you could come up with a trivial system to which it doesn't apply. Which begs the question: How do you define triviality here?
- idlewords 17y agoTrivial in this context means a system that's not powerful enough to express basic arithmetic. This includes some surprisingly complicated systems, like real (as opposed to integer) arithmetic. Bonus pedantipoint: it's not begging the question - that actually means 'to assume X in your proof of X'. It's just raising the question.
- ivey 17y agoFollowing the derail a little further...while you got my vote for the pedantipoint, the misuse of "beg the question" is so pervasive that I've given up. It means what people use it to mean, now. We probably need a new name for the logical fallacy, unless lumping it into circular reasoning is sufficient.
- vidarh 17y agoEnglish is my second language, and until a few years ago I wasn't even aware of the original usage, while I'd seen the "misuse" on a regular basis. I don't think I've actually ever seen it used in the original usage "in the wild", as opposed to in the posts of pedants complaining about people using it wrongly.
- ars 17y agoI once told people the correct definition of "begs", and they refused to believe me, and thought I was wrong. To them begs means: raises a very obvious question. So it's over, "begs" has a new meaning, and complaining about it is pointless.
- philwelch 17y agoIt's because the original usage is rather technical--I've only seen philosophers use it, and only then as the adjective "question-begging".
- DoctorToWhom 17y agoThis includes some surprisingly complicated systems, like real (as opposed to integer) arithmetic. Real arithmetic is not enough to express integer arithmetic? I suppose it all boils down to how you define "arithmetic", but what is it that the integers have that the reals lack under the relevant definition? I would think that real arithmetic by any reasonable definition would give you enough tools to check whether a number was an integer, and in that case, doesn't it necessarily contain integer arithmetic as a subset?
- idlewords 17y agoCribbing from this book: http://books.google.com/books?id=71pK8Zz9Dd8C&printsec=frontcover&dq=godels+theorem&ei=nhglS777Non4zAS3n62uCw&client=safari&cd=2#v=onepage&q=godels%20theorem&f=false http://books.google.com/books?id=71pK8Zz9Dd8C&printsec=f... "Since the natural numbers form a subset of the real numbers, it may seem odd that the theory of real numbers can be complete when the theory of the natural numbers is incomplete. The incompleteness of the theory of the natural numbers does not carry over to the theory of the real numbers because even though every natural number is also a real number, we cannot define the natural numbers as a subset of the real numbers [...] How would we ordinarily define the natural numbers as a subset of the real numbers? The real numbers 0 and 1 can be identified with the corresponding natural numbers, and using addition of real numbers we get the natural numbers as the subset of the real numbers containing 0, 1, 1+1, 1+1+1, and so on. However, this "and so on" cannot be expressed in the language of the theory of real numbers [because it requires the notion of sets, a second-order concept outside of the theory]."
- 30ss 17y agoYour reasoning is correct, so it means that integers are not definable inside "real arithmetic". http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Real-closed_field http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Real-closed_field If you don't believe this, try writing down a formula in the language of this theory that says "x is an integer". Ultimately, the issue is that the first-order theory of real closed fields contains no axiom approaching the induction scheme of PA in power.
- jimfl 17y agoThe system need be no more complex than first-order Peano arithmetic, which is the Peano axioms (reflexivity, transitivity, succession, etc.) combined with the concept of induction.
- idlewords 17y agoWell, leave out succession and you get the reals, which are still complex enough (no pun intended) to offer hours of fun.
- gahahaha 17y agoTo construct the Gödel number (a part of the proof) requires use of an arithmetic that can express addition and multiplication. If any one of them is missing, the system can be shown to be complete.
- Lozzer 17y agoBeen a while since I studied it, but I thought induction was the key ingredient.