4 ms·

Consider an alternative scenario: malware. In that situation, as a consumer, I'm actually pretty jazzed about living inside Apple's walled garden on my iPhone.

Consider an alternative scenario: malware. In that situation, as a consumer, I'm actually pretty jazzed about living inside Apple's walled garden on my iPhone. The phone refusing to run unsigned code gives me a little bit more security. It also largely defeats the scenario where I can hire someone to modify my phone's software. But I'm OK with that tradeoff, because I think it puts me on the side of greatest benefit to myself. I suspect most non-programmer users would fall in the same camp.

mikegerwitz 11y ago
Bugs are by definition unintentional. Surely Jeep did not intentionally introduce those flaws. Code signing does not help there.
llllllllllllll 11y ago
You should think what malware is. Maybe apple software is malware as well. Anyways if you could review the source code of the "malware" you (or people who can read it)could know what it does in advance and avoid it. And code could be signed and verified and still be free software. Linux distros verify software signatures and have almost no malware problems and at the same time use a lot of free software. So free software makes users more secure if anything.
vezzy-fnord 11y ago
If you think about it, package repositories are just like app stores. They're curated, centralized places to obtain software where you can have high confidence it's free of malware. ...And it's free software with no arbitrary usage restrictions. Meaning you can actually audit it if you so desire, and in fact you'll be doing a great service to users and developers in the process.
- llllllllllllll 11y ago
  Exactly linux distributions have had app stores for ages which have a lot of freedom. And then there are things like the arch user repository which is even less controlled and also great.
pessimizer 11y ago
It also allows Apple to attack its users at will.
weland 11y ago
What you're describing is security by obscurity, and it has been shown countless times that it never, ever works. It does not prevent flaws from being discovered. It slows down the discovery of some flaws, but this also means that the people who discover them can exploit them for years if they're malicious, because flaws are equally hard to discover as part of a well-intentioned an audit as they are as part of an evil plan. It also allows flaws that have been intentionally introduced to be hidden from sight for a long time -- and allows companies who do so to escape untarnished; since the commit logs are not available (and the source code is often only available in disassembled form), they can always claim it's a bug, not a feature. It does not provide additional safety, it provides only an illusion of safety -- while making actual safety a lot harder to implement, for everyone.
ewzimm 11y ago
Locking a computer into running signed code is just like programming Firefox to refuse to access https sites without properly signed certificates. There's nothing about it that's incompatible with a fully free, GPL software stack. In the case of Firefox, you're trusting the Certificate Authorities. In the case of the iPhone, you're trusting Apple. You could argue that Firefox leaves open vulnerabilities to things like Superfish (that Windows root CA didn't actually affect Firefox in most cases since Firefox keeps its own list), but you can take the signing concept as low-level as you like, including requiring a signed OS with a hard-coded, single software delivery mechanism which could still be fully GPL.
pjc50 11y ago
This is what Schneier calls "security feudalism": https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2012/12/feudal_sec.html https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2012/12/feudal_sec.ht... It's a rational choice given the complexity, but makes you totally vulnerable to your feu lord. And their feu lord. By the way, there is no necessary conflict between signing and software freedom if the system allows you to replace the master keys. Matthew Garrett is doing a collection of work to enable Linux users to use UEFI and TPM hardware to secure themselves against malware.
ArneBab 11y ago
You get a little bit of security by trusting Apple. But Apple does not give you the option to also trust someone else. You trade your freedom against short-term convenience. On the long-term it means that you have to accept all decisions Apple takes, even if you dislike them.

mikegerwitz 11y ago

Bugs are by definition unintentional. Surely Jeep did not intentionally introduce those flaws. Code signing does not help there.

llllllllllllll 11y ago

You should think what malware is. Maybe apple software is malware as well. Anyways if you could review the source code of the "malware" you (or people who can read it)could know what it does in advance and avoid it. And code could be signed and verified and still be free software. Linux distros verify software signatures and have almost no malware problems and at the same time use a lot of free software. So free software makes users more secure if anything.

vezzy-fnord 11y ago

If you think about it, package repositories are just like app stores. They're curated, centralized places to obtain software where you can have high confidence it's free of malware. ...And it's free software with no arbitrary usage restrictions. Meaning you can actually audit it if you so desire, and in fact you'll be doing a great service to users and developers in the process.

llllllllllllll 11y ago
Exactly linux distributions have had app stores for ages which have a lot of freedom. And then there are things like the arch user repository which is even less controlled and also great.

pessimizer 11y ago

It also allows Apple to attack its users at will.

weland 11y ago

What you're describing is security by obscurity, and it has been shown countless times that it never, ever works. It does not prevent flaws from being discovered. It slows down the discovery of some flaws, but this also means that the people who discover them can exploit them for years if they're malicious, because flaws are equally hard to discover as part of a well-intentioned an audit as they are as part of an evil plan. It also allows flaws that have been intentionally introduced to be hidden from sight for a long time -- and allows companies who do so to escape untarnished; since the commit logs are not available (and the source code is often only available in disassembled form), they can always claim it's a bug, not a feature. It does not provide additional safety, it provides only an illusion of safety -- while making actual safety a lot harder to implement, for everyone.

ewzimm 11y ago

Locking a computer into running signed code is just like programming Firefox to refuse to access https sites without properly signed certificates. There's nothing about it that's incompatible with a fully free, GPL software stack. In the case of Firefox, you're trusting the Certificate Authorities. In the case of the iPhone, you're trusting Apple. You could argue that Firefox leaves open vulnerabilities to things like Superfish (that Windows root CA didn't actually affect Firefox in most cases since Firefox keeps its own list), but you can take the signing concept as low-level as you like, including requiring a signed OS with a hard-coded, single software delivery mechanism which could still be fully GPL.

pjc50 11y ago

This is what Schneier calls "security feudalism": https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2012/12/feudal_sec.html https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2012/12/feudal_sec.ht... It's a rational choice given the complexity, but makes you totally vulnerable to your feu lord. And their feu lord. By the way, there is no necessary conflict between signing and software freedom if the system allows you to replace the master keys. Matthew Garrett is doing a collection of work to enable Linux users to use UEFI and TPM hardware to secure themselves against malware.

ArneBab 11y ago

You get a little bit of security by trusting Apple. But Apple does not give you the option to also trust someone else. You trade your freedom against short-term convenience. On the long-term it means that you have to accept all decisions Apple takes, even if you dislike them.