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> Given a real world waterfall that you have not constructed, but simply come across, can it be said to be computing the solution to a chess problem? Yes, that
by foldr 11y ago
> Given a real world waterfall that you have not constructed, but simply come across, can it be said to be computing the solution to a chess problem?
Yes, that's the question I was addressing. I'm really can't figure out why you thought otherwise. There's nothing in my original comment about constructing artificial water-based computers.
>This is where Scott's argument kicks in, where the mapping is doing all the work.
It is his conjecture that there is no computationally simple mapping, but I see no reason to believe that this conjecture is correct. He certainly doesn't give any reason to think so in the paper. And to echo jameshart's point, he gives no reason to think that the mapping from chess positions to brain states would be any simpler than the mapping from chess positions to waterfalls.
If you find his conjecture plausible for some reason, that's fine, but you're quite wrong if you think that the paper presents any rigorous mathematical argument. The discussion is much less rigorous and sophisticated than the existing philosophical literature on the topic. (After all, Putnam's original paper contained a proof.)
>Further evidence of this is that even if you want to sit here and argue that this boulder that is sitting in front of us (metaphorically) really and truly is calculating the state of your mind as well, well, with another equally sensible (and exponential and impossible) mapping, it's also calculating mine, it's also calculating Attila the Hun's, and it's also calculating the brain states of the final human being to ever live, and also deer's brains and the solutions to world hunger and pretty every other interesting thing ever, really.
Yes, that's the problem. That's why the computational theory of mind seems to be a bit of a non-starter. Since pretty much every physical system computes pretty much every function, it's difficult to see how thought can arise merely as a consequence of the brain computing a particular function.